The death of Capt. F. S. Norman, 1864

In the various battles for Atlanta in 1864, my Great Grandfather Nathan Richardson Oakes fought in Company D of the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, a renown regiment in the famous Patrick R. Cleburne's Division in William Hardee's Corps. Great Grandfather's uncle, Flemming S. Norman, was his captain.

Now in Atlanta, the Army of Tennessee's aggressive new commander, Lieut. Gen. John Bell Hood, had a daring plan for striking Union Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson's army. As the determined Hood envisioned it, Hardee's Corps would strike the south flank of the Federal line at dawn and, together with Benjamin Cheatham's Corps, drive enemy back to the Chattahoochee River. The bold plan would decide the outcome of Atlanta. However, it was doomed to failure.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Early in the morning of today's date, a Friday in 1864, Hardee sent his divisions to attack McPherson's line. Cleburne deployed Daniel Govan's Brigade on the left and James A. Smith's Brigade on the right. He placed Mark P. Lowrey's Brigade, in which was Capt. Norman's Co. D, 500 yards behind in a second line as a reserve.

At about 12:45 PM, Cleburne ordered his men forward. The division struck the left flank instead of the rear of McPherson's army as had been planned due to a curve eastward in the enemy's line at this point. Beyond that curved line a Federal division was posted on a round, bald hill.

Govan’s Brigade was first to meet the enemy, and after a 20-minute struggle, drove its skirmishers back to a line of breastworks. His brigade took severe casualties for the effort. Smith’s Brigade caught the enemy by surprise, and his men pursued the fleeing Federals. One of their successes was overtaking the commander of the army, Gen. McPherson, and killing him when he refused to surrender.

To this point, it seemed that the attack was going according to Hood's plan. But by 2 PM, the heat and exhaustion began to take a toll on the Confederates, thinning their ranks.

About 2 hours into the battle, Govan had encountered another line of formidable works, so Cleburne ordered Lowrey to move up his brigade, which to this point was behind Govan, to storm the enemy breastworks. At the same time a gap opened on the line, which, if left uncovered would threaten the 2 engaged Confederate divisions. So, Lowrey took it upon himself to order his brigade into the fight on Govan’s right.

Meanwhile, the fight on Cleburne's front continued. With the help of his artillery, Cleburne's men forced the Federals to fall back to fortifications on the round hill. From the base of that hill, known as Bald Hill (or Leggett's Hill today), Cleburne renewed the attack on a third line of Yankee breastworks. The determined Yankees, however, fought off this new assault.

Lowrey’s shattered brigade, along with another division, was added to the force of this attack. Despite their exhaustion, the Rebels made a furious and magnificent charge. But, just as determined, the enemy drove them back. For 45 minutes, the opposing sides fought across the entrenchments in a savage hand-to-hand struggle. However, in the end, Cleburne’s men were forced to fall back to the second line of Federal entrenchments and there dug in for the night.

There was little time to count the Confederate casualties, but they were severe.

Concerning this final charge, Gen. Lowrey later recalled that his brigade was, "cut to pieces, having lost half its number." Historian Dunbar Rowland,¹ says that Lowrey's 32nd Mississippi Infantry "had to cross a miry glade and advance through another brigade that had been repulsed." Lowrey wrote, "The Thirty-second Mississippi rushed forward almost to the works, when one-third of the command fell at one volley and two color bearers were killed in quick succession." He managed to rally his mangled brigade for another charge. Later he stated, "he never saw a greater display of gallantry than the charge of the brigade; they failed only because a thin line of exhausted men cannot take breastworks held by twice their numbers." The 32nd Regiment's casualties were 18 killed, 45 wounded, 23 missing.

It is likely that in this assault Acting Lieutenant Colonel of the 32nd Mississippi Regiment, Capt. Flemming S. Norman, was killed. Seven other men from Co. D, which by then was commanded by Lieut. B.F. Dilworth, also were killed and 38 were wounded. In fact, every company in the 32nd had captains and/or officers who were killed, wounded, captured, or missing. The 32nd's Col. William H.H. Tison also was wounded in the battle, and therefore, out of action. So, in the midst of so many other killed or wounded officers, it would have fallen to Acting Lieut. Col., Capt. F.S. Norman to lead the regiment in that doomed assault.

Flemming S. Norman was born in Virginia, to a Revolutionary War veteran, William Norman. Raised in Tennessee, he moved across the state line to Boneyard, Mississippi, which neighbored the small community of Kossuth where Great Grandfather Oakes lived and where Mark Lowrey pastored a church. He resided there with his wife, Susan, their 3 children, and his widowed mother. Norman was a saddler by profession, in a tiny township now extinct, that also boasted a tanyard, blacksmith, cabinet maker, and a Post Office.² 

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Confederate Obelisk at Oakland Cemetery in Atlanta
Approximately 6,900 Confederate dead are buried in the cemetery.

Great Grandfather Oakes and his Uncle Norman knew Mark Lowrey prior to the war. Indeed, both had seen prior service under him in the state militia. In the early months of 1861, the governor of Mississippi had called for 10,000 troops from his state to defend it against an anticipated Yankee invasion. This militia of 60-Day Troops served until it was incorporated into the newly formed Confederate Army of Mississippi. Norman enlisted as a lieutenant and helped Lowrey organize a company of men, Co. G, nicknamed "Lowrey Guards." When Capt. Lowrey was elected colonel of the regiment, Norman was promoted to captain.

With the outbreak of the War Between the States, Lowrey recruited a new regiment. It is a testament to the respect he held among his men and the community that many of the men from his old regiment enlisted in the new army and again elected him their colonel. Norman was also elected captain of the new Company D. Given his relationship with the colonel, it is no surprise that Norman borrowed the old moniker to name his new company "Lowrey Guards."

During his Civil War service, Capt. Norman frequently performed special temporary assignments for the regiment. At least twice he was detailed as recruiting officer. From time to time, he also served as major of the regiment. Following the victory at Chickamauga, and Lowrey's promotion to brigadier general of Wood's Brigade, Norman was put in command of the 32nd Regiment as its acting major, a position he held from October through December 1863. This stretch of command included the famous Battle of Missionary Ridge and the division's incredible defense of Ringgold Gap in November 1863.

After the wounding Col. W. H. H. Tison in Atlanta, command would have fallen to Acting Lt. Col., Capt. Norman. Once again he led the 32nd Regiment, on this date in its assault on Bald Hill in the Battle of Atlanta. Capt. Flemming S. Norman was 39 when he was killed on this famous battlefield. In addition to leaving a wife and children in Mississippi, he also had a brother, Lafayette Norman, who was at the moment of Norman's death fighting nearby in the 33rd Alabama, also in Lowrey's Brigade.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

The beautiful and moving "Lion of the Confederacy" in Atlanta's Oakland Cemetery,
commemorating the unknown Confederate fallen, some 3,000 of which lie nearby.

Sadly, this is about all the information I have uncovered about this brave soldier of the Southern Cause. I am indebted to Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes who in 1900, published a short letter to the editor of the Confederate Veteran. It was in that brief note that Great Grandfather mentioned that Capt. Norman was his uncle.³ Beginning with that single statement, then later Norman's service records and census information, I have been able to reconstruct this simple history of that valiant officer.

I have been unable to locate Norman's grave. Perhaps his body was one of those hundreds that were quickly buried on the field during the brief truce and never identified. Or possibly he lies among the 3,000 Confederate "Unknown" in Atlanta's Oakland Cemetery. I can only hope that some kindly person marked his grave and that it will one day be revealed. Until then, I can think of no more fitting tribute than these lines from Henry A. Wise,

The blessed and ever-glorious dead are not here to defend their memories from the taint of the reproach of rebellion and treason. Alas! I am alive and here, and am bound at every hazard to declare that these men were no rebels and no traitors; that they were patriots, loyal citizens, well-tried and true soldiers, brave, honest, devoted men, who proved their faith in their principles by the deaths which canonized them immortal heroes and martyrs.

¹ In his authoritative volume, Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898, Dunbar Rowland includes the organization in the Battle of Atlanta and lists the various officers killed and wounded in the 32nd Regiment. Co. D is incorrectly listed as Company "G." He records: "Captain F.S. Norman, Acting Lieutenant-Colonel (killed); Lieutenant B.F. Dilworth, commanding company; First Sergeant J.L. McLean (wounded).” Regrettably, Norman's sacrifice was not mentioned in any of the Official Records.
² Boneyard was founded in in Tishomingo County in the 1830s. It was destroyed by occupying Federal troops and never rebuilt. The 1860 census indicated that Flemming S. Norman and his family were all residing there.
³ Unfortunately, the editors published his name incorrectly as "S.F." instead of F.S. Norman. I have since learned that Norman was the half-brother of Great Grandfather's full uncle, James Oakes.

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue;  Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898, Dunbar Rowland; Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey's Autobiography; Confederate Veteran, Vol. 8 (1900); Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Vol. 5, Franklin Lafayette Riley; F.S. Norman Service Records; N.R. Oakes Service Records

The Battle of Atlanta, 1864

Having fought in 2 battles over the past couple of days in 1864, Lt. Gen. William Hardee's Corps, including Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne's Division in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving in the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, was called back from Bald Hill to the inner line of Atlanta's defenses. Leaving skirmishers behind to conceal the movement, Cleburne began pulling his men back after midnight on July 21st. The division was ordered to ready for yet another attack on the Federal line.

Now within the city's inner fortifications, Cleburne’s weary men had a short rest while he met with Hardee for new orders. Cleburne learned that the army's commander, Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, planned for Hardee to lead his corps on a lengthy and circuitous march east of the city to launch a surprise attack in the rear of Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson’s army approaching from Decatur. As Hood envisioned it, Hardee would strike at dawn and would "roll up" the south of the Federal line and drive it in confusion into the center. Then Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham’s (Hood's old corps) and Alexander P. Stewart's Corps would follow up with a final strike on the front and drive enemy back to the Chattahoochee River.

The fate of Atlanta rested on the outcome of this attack. But Hood's plan was doomed to failure.

Hood was relying on exhausted men who had not slept for 2 days and had seen near-constant marching and fighting. It was unrealistic for him to require these men to make a 15-mile night march through a panicked and crowded city, before launching a dawn attack. Hardee objected, so Hood agreed that instead of striking the Federal rear, he could turn north at a moment of his choosing and hit the enemy flank.

Source: Historical Markers Across Georgia

In the early morning hours on today's date in 1864, Hardee's Corps, accompanied by Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry, and stretching several miles long, marched under a bright full moon, south on the McDonough Road, then southeast, and finally northeast toward Decatur. About an hour before dawn, they halted near William Cobb’s Mill, 3 miles from McPherson's line, where the men got a couple of hours’ rest by the side of the road. Each man was issued an additional 20 rounds of ammunition in preparation to move northward toward the enemy's line.

After meeting with Gens. W.H.T. Walker and Joseph Wheeler to discuss the attack, Cleburne and Hardee decided they could delay no longer. About a mile beyond Cobb's Mill on the Fayetteville Road, Hardee split his corps. He sent the troops on another 2 miles toward the Federal line. Gens. William Bate's and Walker's Divisions would continue northwestward to Sugar Creek, then face left and move against the presumed Federal flank. Cleburne and Brig. Gen. George Maney (commanding Cheatham's Division¹) would move northward along the east side of Flat Shoals Road. Maney, traveling on the east side of the road would attack the center. Cleburne on the west side of the road would deploy on Walker’s left and flank the enemy, attacking in the rear

With the exception of that short rest by the side of the road, Cleburne’s men had now marched or fought continuously for 48 hours. They had almost marched in a complete circle and would be assaulting the south flank of the forces they had resisted throughout the previous day.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Cleburne's Division, with Mark Lowrey's Brigade (Great Grandfather Oakes's) trailing 500 years behind, encountered rough terrain on its march along Flat Shoals. The division was not in position until nearly midday, so Cleburne's attack came a little later than Walker's and Bate's, who were east of him about a mile away. Cleburne deployed his 3 brigades just to the west of Flat Shoals Road, with Brig. Gens. Daniel Govan's Brigade on the left of the division and James A. Smith's (Polk's) Brigade on the right. He placed Lowrey's Brigade 500 yards behind in a second line as a reserve.

At 12:45 PM, Cleburne gave the command, and the men moved forward. Very soon, the dense woods and thick underbrush broke up the attack formation. Lowrey's Brigade, and probably the others, too,  were forced into a column, 4-men wide, until about a mile forward Cleburne called a halt so his brigade commanders could correct their alignment. This consumed valuable time before the advance resumed.

Cleburne's men struck the left flank of McPherson's army where its line bent eastward in a fishhook of fortified works, beyond which a division was posted on a round hill, known locally as "Bald Hill," from which the Confederates had been forced the day before. Govan’s Brigade was first of the division to meet the enemy, and after a 20-minute struggle, drove its skirmishers back to a line of breastworks, which his men eventually captured along with an entire regiment. His brigade took severe casualties for the effort.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Gen. McPherson's monument marking the spot where he was killed.

Location is present day Monument & McPherson Avenues. His body

was removed and buried in the McPherson Cemetery in Clyde, Ohio.

On Govan’s right, Smith’s Brigade caught the enemy by surprise, and his men pursued the fleeing Federals. Rebel troops met face-to-face with a mounted Federal officer on the wrong side of his line, who was clearly startled to see them. Refusing to surrender as ordered, and touching his hat in salute, he attempted to gallop off. However the soldiers opened fire, mortally wounding the commander of the Army of the Tennessee, Gen. James Birdseye McPherson, the only Union army commander to be killed during the war.² Smith's and some of Govan's men then forced the enemy back to their defenses on the hill.

To this point, it seemed that the attack was going according to Hood's plan. But by 2 PM, the heat, lack of sleep, and exhaustion, began to take a toll on the Confederates, and their ranks were thinning.

About 2 hours into the battle, Smith encountered another line of formidable Federal works, so he sent a request for support. Lowrey then was ordered to move up his brigade, which had been held in reserve behind Govan's men, and to storm the enemy breastworks. Lowrey marched his troops eastward through deep woods, which he couldn't see through more than 100 yards, and came into the fight on Govan’s right wing. Here, Lowrey reported, his thin line "rushed forward with great impetuosity, as though they bade defiance to Yankee breast-works." Many of his officers were cut down or captured at this point of the attack.

Meanwhile, the fight on Govan’s front continued. Cleburne ordered his artillery to advance with the infantry, and ordered Capt. Thomas J. Key to bring his battery up to within 200 yards of the Federal line. The Federals wavered under Key's fire, and when Granbury’s Regiment came in on their left, the troops fled. Key reported to Cleburne and Govan who were watching the fight that the Federals were falling fall back to Bald Hill which, because of its height, dominated the battlefield and became vital to the outcome of the fight.

From the base of Bald Hill, Cleburne renewed the attack on a third line of Yankee breastworks positioned on the crown of the Federal line. But this time the Yankees didn’t run. Instead, they fought off Cleburne's renewed assault. About 4 PM, Lowrey’s shattered brigade added its force to this attack, while Maney/Cheatham's Division came into the fight on Cleburne’s left. Despite their exhaustion, the Rebels made a furious and magnificent charge across 40 yards of open ground. Many of Lowrey's men were cut down, while the rest plunged on into the enemy. A hand-to-hand struggle ensued.

The enemy was just as determined as Lowrey's men. After 45 minutes of savage fighting, the Federals drove back their attackers. Though some of the of the Confederates gained a temporary hold, night closed with the Federals still in possession of Bald Hill. Cleburne’s men fell back to the second line of Federal entrenchments, which they had captured earlier, and there dug in. What was left of Lowrey’s Brigade withdrew with the division into the dense woods and out of range of enemy fire.

Captured Confederate entrenchments, Atlanta 1864
From the Matthew Brady Collection

Concerning this charge on Bald Hill, Gen. Lowrey recalled that his brigade was "cut to pieces, loosing half its number." According to Mississippi historian, Dunbar Rowland, the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was fighting in Co. D, "had to cross a miry glade and advance through the remnants of [Smith's Brigade], that had been repulsed." Lowrey reported, "The Thirty-second Mississippi rushed forward almost to the works, when one-third of the command fell at one volley and two color bearers were killed in quick succession." He continues:

All the regiments acted well. Taking the brigade all together, I never saw a greater display of gallantry; but they failed to take the works simply because the thing attempted was impossible for a thin line of exhausted men to accomplish. It was a direct attack by exhausted men against double their number behind strong breast-works. The history of this war can show no instance of success under such circumstances.

Lowrey said that he lost about one-half the men in his brigade in that charge: Col. W. H. H. Tison was wounded and 578 men were either killed, wounded, or captured. "Many of the captured," he wrote, "were first wounded, but some charged over the breast-works and were captured, while others went to the works and could not get away."

Confederate entrenchments, possibly looking east toward Bald Hill, 1864
From the Matthew Brady Collection

In that assault, the 32nd Regiment lost 18 in killed, 45 wounded, and 23 missing. It is possible that in this fight Acting Lieutenant Colonel of the 32nd Mississippi Regiment, Capt. Flemming S. Norman, was killed. Norman was captain of Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes's Co. D³ since its formation in Corinth, Mississippi in 1861. Norman's death hit even closer to home for Great Grandfather Oakes, for Norman was also his uncle.⁴ Also, Lieut. B.F. Dilworth from his hometown of Kossuth, was killed while leading Co. D in this attack, as were many others. In fact, every company in the 32nd Mississippi had captains and/or officers who were killed, wounded, captured, or missing.

Around 5 PM, Cleburne personally led Govan's and Smith's Brigades, Maney's Division, and Mercer's Brigade, in an another attack, this time along Flat Shoals Road and Bald Hill. The Confederates captured a line of works and forced the Federal line on the crest of the hill to retire east of its original position. To the east of this fighting, other Confederate units attacked the Federal line, but without success.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Gen. Hardee later reported that the battle was "one of the most desperate and bloody of the war, and... won the only decided success achieved by the army at Atlanta." Indeed, his corps suffered severely receiving 3,300 casualties. The partial success of Cleburne’s Division on Bald Hill on this date was the high point of the Confederate assault. However it was largely in vain. On his right, Bate and Walker had been slowed by difficult terrain and suffered a repulse. Walker had been shot dead before the attack was barely under way.⁵ Cheat-ham’s Corps was not ordered into the fight until late afternoon, after Cleburne’s attack was losing its momentum. Hood had delayed ordering Cheatham forward in the hope that Hardee’s assault would drive the Federals north of Decatur Road, in which event Cheatham’s attack would have proved decisive. But Hood unleashed Cheatham's force too late in the day. While the men fought furiously, the attack was halted. A Federal counterattack restored the enemy's line.

Despite the heroic sacrifices of his soldiers, and even Hardee's success in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, Hood's goal of a coordinated attack to drive McPherson's army back to the Chattahoochee was not achieved.

That night, Cleburne’s Division improved their new defenses and prepared to defend the ground they had won. There was little firing overnight, so for the first time in 48 hours, Cleburne’s men were able to grab some sleep. When the sun came up on the 23rd, both armies remained in place, unwilling to renew the fight. At midnight, they agreed on an armistice to remove the dead and wounded from between the lines.

The Army of Tennessee, with Cleburne’s and Maney’s support, had managed to carry the left wing of the Federal army to its breastworks. As evidence of its progress in its sector, Cleburne’s men captured 1,600 prisoners, numerous wagons, ammunition, artillery, mules and horses, hundreds of small-arms, 8 pieces of artillery, and 4 stand of colors. In spite of this, the battle for the Confederates ended indecisively.⁶ It failed to halt Gen. William T. Sherman’s tightening siege on Atlanta. It also resulted in many more Confederate casualties than the army could afford. Confederate losses numbered upwards to 5,000. By contrast, the Federals lost about 3,600 men. Among the Confederate's loss were 1,388 from Cleburne's Division—more than half of those engaged in the battle.

Atlanta will soon fall to Sherman's victorious army. Sherman's successful conclusion to his Atlanta Campaign will boost President Abraham Lincoln's bid for re-election, assuring that he will retain the presidency until the eve of the Confederacy's defeat in 1865.

¹ Brig. Gen. George Maney commanded Cheatham's Division, while Cheatham led Hood's Corps at Peachtree Creek and the Battle of Atlanta.

² Gen. McPherson's death was mourned by officers on both sides. In fact, Confederate Gen. Hood, who had been McPherson's roommate at West Point, wrote,

I will record the death of my classmate and boyhood friend, General James B. McPherson, the announcement of which caused me sincere sorrow. Since we had graduated in 1853, and had each been ordered off on duty in different directions, it has not been our fortune to meet. Neither the years nor the difference of sentiment that had led us to range ourselves on opposite sides in the war had lessened my friendship; indeed the attachment formed in early youth was strengthened by my admiration and gratitude for his conduct toward our people in the vicinity of Vicksburg. His considerate and kind treatment of them stood in bright contrast to the course pursued by many Federal officers.

³ Dunbar Rowland incorrectly indicated that Norman was captain of Co. "G" rather than Co. D.
⁴ Capt. Norman had a brother, Pvt. Lafayette Norman, fighting in this same battle in the 33rd Alabama of Cleburne's Division.

⁵ Maj. Gen. Walker was killed by a Federal sniper while he as scouting the position assigned to him near Terry's Mill Pond. Following the battle, Walker's Division, which had suffered terrible losses, was reassigned to other Confederate commands. Division command on the field fell to Brig. Hugh Mercer. Walker's death was a personal loss to Gen. Hood, a close friend. 

⁶ Hood ultimately blamed Hardee for the outcome of the battle, although his assertion is much disputed. In his memoirs years later he wrote, 

A considerable time had elapsed when I discovered, with astonishment and bitter disappointment, a line of battle composed of one of Hardee’s divisions advancing directly against the entrenched flank of the enemy. I at once perceived that Hardee had not only failed to turn McPherson’s left, according to positive orders, but had thrown his men against the enemy’s breastworks. Thereby occasioning unnecessary loss to us, and rendering doubtful the great result desired. In lieu of completely turning the Federal left and taking the entrenched line of the enemy in reverse, he attacked the retired wing of their flank, having his own left almost within gunshot of our main line around the city 

Historians Albert Castel and Howell and Elizabeth Purdue are some who disagree with Hood's assessment. Hood’s greatest mistake was in failing to carry out his plan for Gens. Cheatham and Stewart who would take up action as soon as Hardee became engaged. By not ordering the 2 other corps forward, Hood failed to make a coordinated attack, which was essential to success. He delayed nearly 3 hours before ordering Cheatham to attack, and Stewart's force was never committed to action.


Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue;  Decision in the West, Albert Castel; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Atlanta, Jacob D. Cox; Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898, Dunbar Rowland; Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey's Autobiography; Advance and Retreat, J.B. Hood; Official Records, Vol. 38, Pts. 3 & 5

"The most glorious triumph" | Cleburne's Division in the Battle of Ringgold Gap, 1863

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Following the unexpected victory at Missionary Ridge on the evening of the 25th, Union Gen. U.S. Grant's attention turned towards how to send relief to Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, supposedly under siege at Knoxville. Consequently, he let slip the opportunity to do serious damage to Braxton Bragg's fleeing and disorganized army. Although some pursuit was attempted right after the Confederates fled, it was turned back largely by Patrick Cleburne's command. The hesitation afforded Bragg's army a slim margin of time to make its escape the next day southeast to the town of Ringgold, with Dalton, Georgia as its final destination.

Finally, on the 26th, Grant ordered part of his army to Knoxville and directed Sherman and Thomas to send a force to pursue Bragg. On the same day Bragg was pushing the remnants of his army through Ringgold Gap. Feeling vulnerable about a Federal attack, he ordered Cleburne's Division to again hold off the pursuers until the army had safely retreated to Dalton.

After serving as the rear guard for Bragg's army retreating from the disaster on Missionary Ridge late on the night of the 26th, Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne ordered his men to bivouac on the South Chickamauga across from Ringgold, a small North Georgian town 20 miles southeast of Chattanooga on the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Serving in Cleburne's Division is Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes, in Company D¹ of the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, commanded by Col. William H.H. Tison. Gen. Joseph Hooker's force encamped for the night about 2 miles northwest,.

Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne

At 3 AM on today's date, a Friday in 1863, Cleburne received Bragg's order to hold Ringgold Gap at all costs. There were only 4,157 men and 2 cannons in Cleburne's Division to hold back an overwhelming number of Federal troops. Initially, his Confederates will have to face 3 of Hooker's divisions, numbering nearly 9,000. More will arrive, swelling the Federal force to 16,000. Just like at Tunnel Hill on Missionary Ridge, the odds are again heavily stacked against Cleburne's men.

Shortly after receiving his instructions, Cleburne ordered his men to wade the stinging cold, waist-high South Chickamauga Creek. Volunteers had been sent ahead to light campfires on the opposite bank so the soldiers could warm and partially dry themselves before being deployed to defend the gap. Cleburne had already crossed the creek ahead of his men to make a quick examination of the ground he was ordered to defend.

Ringgold Gap was a steep, narrow, half-mile pass through Taylor's Ridge (known as Taylor Ridge today), about 400 feet high at its crest. The gap in the ridge was barely wide enough to accommodate the creek along with a wagon road and rail line close by. On the opposite, north side of the gap was White Oak Mountain, which rose 350 feet behind the town of Ringgold. The western slopes of both heights were steep and lightly forested. At the gap's western opening, which Cleburne's men would have to defend, the troops had an open field of fire. However, the ground behind them, on the eastern side of the gap was cut 3 times by the meandering stream. In a retreat, his men would have to cross several bridges or ford the creek to make their escape. It was a dangerous position to be caught in.

Source: The Wild Geese

At around 7:00 AM, in a brilliant display of generalship, Cleburne quickly began positioning his troops on or behind every natural defense where they would be the most effective to hinder an attack. He posted most of his troops on and between the 2 ridges guarding the gap with the majority of them along the stretch of White Oak Mountain extending north. He placed 1 of Brig. Gen. Mark Lowrey's regiments, the 16th Alabama, on Taylor's Ridge to guard the division's left flank. The other 3 regiments, he placed in reserve in Ringgold Gap itself. Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was posted here with his 32nd Mississippi Regiment (32nd/45th Consolidated). Because the pass was narrow, Cleburne was able to place his regiments in 4 short rows of defense. He had scant artillery, only 2 Napoleon cannons under the command of Lt. Richard W. Goldthwaite, which had to be used in the most effective spot. So, he camouflaged them and placed them in the center, within the mouth of the gap, where they could do the most damage. Cleburne remained here with the cannon to direct the coming fight.

Just a half-hour later, the leading edge of Gen. Hooker's column was spotted across the Chickamauga a short distance away. His skirmishers drove the Confederate cavalry² at the crossing. Cleburne had planned a ruse to give the impression that only a small force guarded the gap. Fooled into thinking that the Confederate force at the gap was weak and demoralized, almost immediately Hooker ordered a direct attack, even before the rest of his force, including his artillery, had come into position to support it. So far, Cleburne's plan was working, but his men still had to receive the full weight of the approaching Federal attack.

The Confederate army's train of wagons was still in full view, struggling to pass over the winding creek through and beyond the gap toward Dalton, as Hooker's force approached the town. Cleburne's men were the only barrier between the tail of the Army of Tennessee and the pursuing Federal army.

Just after 8:00 AM, not knowing the Confederate force that faced him, Hooker moved his skirmishers forward across an open field to the trees at the foot of the White Oak Mountain. There they were surprised by Confederate skirmishers of Hiram Granbury's Brigade. Granbury's men held their fire until the attackers were within 50 yards, well within killing range. The troops concentrated their fire from concealed positions at the timberline of the mountain. As the Federals recovered they began to climb the steep ridge, only to be stopped by a Confederate unit under Maj. William A. Taylor who led a charge down the slope. The Federals were sent back in confusion towards the protection of Hooker's headquarters at the Stone Depot.

From the Stone Depot, the Federal command reacted by feeding more regiments into the fight. One regiment was sent out over the same ground to attack the Confederate right flank, while another attacked the south slope of White Oak Mountain at the gap. They didn't know it yet, but these troops were heading into Goldthwaite's concealed artillery. Once the Union line was within 150 yards—grape shot canister range—the Confederates opened fire. The right of the Federal line was shredded, and the survivors were sent running for shelter behind the railroad embankment where their fire was largely ineffective.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Restored "Stone Depot" | Western & Atlantic RR Station at Ringgold. Hooker's
headquarters and the position from which he sent his troops forward to assault
the Confederate held ridge and gap beyond. View is from the Confederate side.

Farther to the Federal left, soldiers began moving north up the ridge of White Oak Mountain to seek a way around the Confederates' right. Earlier that morning, Cleburne had ordered Brig. Gen. Lucius Polk to form his brigade in the gap along the road running to the rear and to maintain contact with Granbury's force on the ridge. Polk's Brigade fought with the Federal skirmishers who had ascended nearly to the top of the ridge, and after a half-hour of skirmishing, the Federals were driven back. However, the attackers reformed, and being heavily reinforced, began to move back up the crest.

Seeing those Union forces moving to his right, Cleburne ordered Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey to move his command, including Great Grandfather's 32nd/45th Mississippi, from its position in the gap to the top of the ridge in order to hold the Confederate right. According to Cleburne:

I ordered General Lowrey to move his command up the hill and assist General Polk in defending that position. Moving rapidly ahead of his command General Lowrey found the First Arkansas again heavily engaged, but heroically holding its ground against great odds.  Assuring the regiment that support was at hand, he brought up the Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi in double time, and threw them into the fight at the critical moment. The enemy gave way and went down the ridge in great confusion. Lowrey now brought up the two remaining regiments of his brigade and Polk up the two other regiments of his command. The enemy, constantly re-enforcing, made another powerful effort to crown the ridge still farther to the right.

Lowrey had galloped off ahead of his troops and reassured Polk's men that help was coming up the ridge right behind him. Then he hurried back to speed his brigade along, feeding each of his companies into line as they arrived. In his report, Gen. Lowery wrote of the action:

I moved my brigade at once by the right flank, and after ascending the hill I heard firing several hundred yards to the right, and, leaving a staff officer to bring up the command, I went in haste to see what it meant. I found the First Arkansas Regiment engaging the enemy´s skirmishers, who had already gained the top of the hill. After assuring this regiment that support was at hand, and directing them to hold their position, I hastened to the head of my brigade, which was coming up the ridge at a double-quick with the right flank to the enemy, and the bullets from the enemy's guns already flying down the line, I knew that nothing but the most prompt and rapid movement could save the position, and that I could not take time to put the whole brigade in position before moving upon the enemy. Hence, on reaching the head of the column, composed of Hawkins' sharpshooters and the Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi Regiments, I commanded, by company into line, and deployed the column on the tenth company, continuing the movement to the front with all possible rapidity at the same time. I sent Lieutenant Hall, my aide-de-camp, to bring up the next regiment in the same manner, and I went with the first to their important work, and nobly did they perform it. Our spirited fire, the sight of re-enforcements, and a terrific rebel yell combined to strike terror to the foe, and he fled in confusion.

By now the opposing lines were only 100 feet apart. Col. Aaron. B. Hardcastle, leading Great Grandfather's 32nd/45th Mississippi, described his regiment's arrival:

On arriving on the top of the ridge, Brigadier-General Lowrey gave the command, "by company into line," and then, "on the tenth company deploy column, and move rapidly forward, obliquing [sic] to the right, and take position on the crest of the ridge to the front," which movements were executed rapidly, and under a hot fire of the enemy at short range, and, from the fatigue occasioned by the toilsome ascent of the steep ridge, some little confusion occurred, and the four right companies formed on the right and the remainder of the regiment on the left of the First Arkansas Regiment, which was in position on the ridge The enemy were near gaining the tip of the ridge when we arrived and drove them back in disorder and confusion, inflicting a heavy loss on the enemy.

Other Federal regiments were sent to support the troops struggling on the ridge, some coming within a few yards of reaching the summit. In order to counter this new threat, Polk and Lowrey shifted their forces to the right. Col. Hardcastle's report continues:

In about three-quarters of an hour the First Arkansas Regiment moved to the right, and I then formed my left on the right wing, and reformed my regiment in good order while subject to a heavy fire from the enemy.

Observing that the Federal forces continued to move to the Confederates' right flank, Polk moved his defending regiments to the threatened position and sent orders for the 5th Confederate Regiment to move to the top of the ridge. In his report, Gen. Polk stated:

After a considerable delay, about 12 m., the enemy commenced moving a column rapidly by the left flank on a road running some 200 yards from the foot of the ridge. I again moved by the right flank and watched their movements. Having moved by the left flank some half mile, the enemy by a rapid movement threw their line in a column of regiments and advanced up the hill. They were again met by the same stubborn resistance that before repulsed them. General Lowrey coming to my assistance with one of his regiments, I had it moved in rear of my line until the enemy had advanced within 40 yards of my line, when I ordered it up in line with First Arkansas Regiment, and at the same time throwing Second Tennessee down the hill upon the left flank of the enemy, they were again driven back to the foot of the hill in great confusion.

The Confederates on the ridge made excellent use of the terrain to deliver enfilading fire into the ranks of the advancing Yankee regiments. Gen. Lowrey reported:

The Thirty-third Alabama Regiment was soon brought up and formed on the left of the Thirty-second and Forty-fifth Mississippi, and the Forty-fifth Alabama on their left, while Brigadier-General Polk came up with two regiments and formed them on the right. The enemy, in the meantime, was pressing up the hill with great, determination, but the heavy fire from our advantageous position rendered their ascent impossible. But as they continued to move to the right, it was necessary for our line also to move to the right and to leave a bare line of skirmishers to hold the crest of the hill on the left. When Brigadier-General Polk was severely pressed, he sent to me in great haste for assistance, when I moved the Forty-fifth Alabama Regiment in double-quick to his support, and the general said as his ammunition was nearly exhausted they were just in time to save the position. When my ammunition was nearly exhausted and I had sent for more, my men and officers gave me assurance with great enthusiasm that they would hold the position at the point of the bayonet and with clubbed muskets if the enemy dared to charge them. The position was held until I was ordered to retire from it, which was done in good order.

It was a fight at close quarters. At one point, men fought with pistols and even resorted to hurling rocks. Gen. Cleburne credits the rocks thrown by the men as having actually knocked down attackers resulting in their capture. In his official report, Cleburne sums up Polk's and Lowrey's defense of the ridge in the Federals' second attempt to take it:

A peculiarity of Taylors Ridge is the wavy conformation of its north side. The enemy, moving up in a long line of battle, suddenly concentrated opposite one of the depressions in this wavy surface and rushed up it in heavy column. General Polk, with the assistance of General Lowrey, as quickly concentrated a double line opposite this point, at the same time placing the Second Tennessee in such a position as to command the flank of any force emerging from it. The attack was again defeated and the enemy hurled down the hill, with the loss of many killed on the spot, several prisoners, and the colors of the Seventy-sixth Ohio Regiment. The colors and most of the prisoners were captured by the First Arkansas.

Years after the war, Lowrey wrote about this critical phase of the struggle at Ringgold Gap:

Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey

The victory was ours and the enemy was gone down the hill in perfect confusion. A deafening shout of triumph went through our line, and General Polk, as if enwrapped in the glory of our success dashed up to me, and seizing me by the hand exclaimed, "Just in time to save us, General!" The men, observing the rapture of their brigade commanders, again pierced the heavens with their shouts of triumph, greatly to the annoyance, no doubt, of the discomfited columns of the enemy.

Lowrey went on call the defense at Ringgold Gap "the most glorious triumph I ever witnessed on a battle field." Due to his role on this date, perhaps he should be allowed a little poetic license. Certainly, the division deserved the same high praise for its triumph at Tunnel Hill only 2 days before, when the odds against it were nearly twice as high.

Author Peter Cozzens writes of Lowrey and Polk, "Seldom, in fact, was a unit commander in the Army of Tennessee better served by his subordinates than was Cleburne at Ringgold Gap." Cleburne reported, "To Brigadier-Generals Polk and Lowrey and Colonels Govan and Granbury, I must return my thanks. Four better officers are not in the service of the Confederacy." 

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker

During the 2 hours that Polk and Lowrey were defending the Confederate right on White Oak Mountain, Hooker sent in troops to renew the assault on the Rebel's weaker left on Taylor's Ridge. A little before 11:00, Federal regiments were sent through the fire of Goldthwaite's guns to the Chickamauga Creek towards Taylor's Ridge. They attacked Confederate skirmishers of Lowrey's lone 16th Alabama Regiment but were halted. Supporting Confederate snipers and return fire from the attackers kept both forces in a stalemate while other enemy forces began to advance. The Federals charged the Confederate line, but with supporting fire from the artillery, the defenders drove back their attackers. By noon, Hooker had finally begun to bring up his own artillery and started to shell the gap and the ridges on either side.

Thankfully for the Confederates, at noon Cleburne received word from Lt. Gen. Hardee that the Confederate supply wagons were now well beyond Ringgold, so he could withdraw his division from the gap. Cleburne made plans for a staged withdrawal. By 1:00 PM, the Rebels began withdrawing both cannon by hand under a rough screen constructed of brush. An hour later, Cleburne withdrew his skirmishers, burnt the bridges, and began forming a new line a mile in his rear. Col. Hardcastle reported that he left behind a small picket force of men from the 32nd/45th Regiment behind to watch the enemy. Other regiments did the same.

Gen. U.S. Grant arrived at Ringgold at 11:30 AM, in time to witness the Confederate triumph. He soon ordered Hooker to break off his attack and allow Cleburne's Division to withdraw. Professional army Gen. Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker, victorious in his assault of Lookout Mountain only 3 days before, was entirely outgeneraled by his volunteer army counterpart, Gen. Patrick "Stonewall of the West" Cleburne at Ringgold Gap. Although Hooker will be severely criticized for his leadership at the Battle of Ringgold Gap, he will retain his position through the Atlanta Campaign.

With the Federals showing no further signs of attacking, Cleburne ordered his men to bivouac behind Ringgold Gap and to build fires to fool the enemy. That night, he ordered his division to march southward where it will take up outpost duty at the town of Tunnel Hill, just north of Dalton, Georgia. The final stage of the fall campaign is now at an end.

In the Battle of Ringgold Gap, Cleburne's Division successfully held its position through 5 hours of heavy fighting before falling back towards the main Confederate army it had valiantly guarded. Against serious odds, Cleburne's defense of Ringgold Gap was a complete success. Outnumbered nearly 4 to 1, he lost only 20 killed and 201 wounded.³ His attackers suffered more than twice that with 509 killed and wounded.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne's Statue, Ringgold, Georgia
Unveiled October 9, 2009

On February 9, 1864, the Confederate Congress at Richmond passed a Joint Resolution of Thanks to Cleburne and his men for their "distinguished service" performed at the Battle of Ringgold Gap:

Resolved, That the thanks of Congress are due, and are hereby tendered, to Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne, and the officers and men under his command, for the victory obtained by them over superior forces of the enemy at Ringgold Gap, in the State of Georgia, on the 27th day of November, 1863, by which the advance of the enemy was impeded, our wagon train and most of our artillery saved, and a large number of the enemy killed and wounded.

¹ From Capt. F.S. Norman's report of Co. D: "... was engaged in the Battle of Ringgold Nov. 27th had 3 men wounded 1 mortaly [sic], 1 severly [sic], 1 slightly, have since gone into winter quarters." One of the wounded in the battle was Pvt. J.D. Boyd, who died of his wound on Dec. 4, 1863.
² Another ancestor of mine, Great-great Grandfather David Crockett Neal, fought in the 6th Tennessee Cavalry in Wharton's Division at Ringglod Gap.

³  Lowrey reported the brigade's losses: "My loss was slight, but 4 killed and 35 wounded."

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; The Shipwreck of Their Hopes, Peter Cozzens; Mountains Touched With Fire, Wiley Sword; Mark P. Lowrey Autobiography; Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898, Dunbar Rowland; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Cleburne's Division moves to Ringgold | 32nd Mississippi Infantry is rear guard

Serving as the rear guard for Bragg's fleeing army off Missionary Ridge on the night of the 25th, Patrick Cleburne's Division of Hardee's Corps, crossed the south branch of the Chickamauga Creek¹ at the Shallow Ford Bridge. Trailing the division was the 32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment of Lowrey's Brigade, skirmishing with the enemy at its heels, then serving as the division's rear defense. The men of Great Grandfather Oakes's Company D were sent as skirmishers protecting the rear of the regiment.² After burning the bridge, the division followed the beaten army along the Western & Atlantic Railroad line to the Chickamauga Station.

Around 11 AM on today's date, a Thursday in 1863, as the last of the Rebel column left the Chickamauga station, the Federals opened fire. The fighting was brief, and Confederate troops were soon on the road to Graysville, a village almost 4 miles ahead. Portions of Cleburne's and Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart's Divisions were attacked along the way. The last skirmish on this date was at Graysville, between Stewart’s Division and the vanguard of Hooker’s corps. Supporting the Confederate infantry were units from Wharton's Cavalry Division, including the 6th Tennessee in which another ancestor, my Great Great Grandfather David Crockett Neal served.

While the shattered main body of Bragg's army retreated on to Ringgold, its ultimate destination was Dalton, Georgia, 29 miles southeast of Chattanooga, on the rail line to Atlanta. Cleburne's men were assigned to slow the pursuing federal forces while Bragg's army continued its retreat. If necessary, Cleburne was to sacrifice his division to protect the lumbering wagons and artillery that were struggling to keep up with the army.

From Tunnel Hill on Missionary Ridge to Ringgold Gap
November 25-27, 1863

South of Graysville, Cleburne's men crossed the winding South Chickamauga at Gray's Mill, then marched another 5 miles before stopping at 10 PM opposite the town of Ringgold. The bridge over the meandering South Chickamauga at this point had already been burned, so rather than having his men cross the icy river to the southern bank as ordered, Cleburne directed them to go into bivouac where they were despite the real possibility that the Federal pursuers might catch them with their backs to the water. The division is now isolated from the rest of the army, which is retreating through Ringgold Gap.

Before dawn on the 27th, Cleburne's men crossed the waist-high Chickamauga to the small north Georgia town of Ringgold at the foot of Taylor’s Ridge. Here is where his division of merely 4,157 men was ordered to hold the Federals' advance until the army had safely evacuated behind them to Dalton.

Once again, Bragg will order Cleburne and his men to save the army.

¹ Chickamauga Creek is a tributary of the Tennessee River, which it joins near Chattanooga. There are 2 main branches of the creek, the North Branch and the South Branch. South Chickamauga Creek is a long and winding stream through the valley in the northwest corner of Georgia. It flows north from Ringgold, Georgia, over the border into Tennessee and from there into the city of Chattanooga.
² According to Co. D's Capt. F.S. Norman's sparse report of events of the 25th-26th: "... built rudeworks of logs under fire of the enemy during the morning of the  25th, was by these works during the day was thrown out as skirmisher at night to hold the enemy in check, while the regiment marched  off, marched that night with the regiment at Chickamauga 7 miles thence to Graysville, Ga. thence to Ringgold 12 miles…"

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue;  Mountains Touched With fire, Wile Sword; Shipwreck of Their Hopes, Peter Cozzens; Muster Roll of the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, Tommy Lockhart; Official Records, Vol. 31, Pt. 2; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Sherman repulsed by Cleburne's men on Missionary Ridge, 1863

By the night of the 24th, Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant erroneously believed that Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman had gained Tunnel Hill at the north end of Missionary Ridge in the battle earlier that day.¹ Based on this supposition, at midnight he issued an order for Sherman to attack the Confederates in his front on the morning of today's date in 1863. Sherman's objective was to turn Bragg's flank, which meant seizing the position from South Chickamauga Creek to Tunnel Hill. At the same time he issued orders to Maj. Gen. George Thomas to simultaneously attack the Confederates' center on Missionary Ridge. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker would join the attack from his newly won position at Lookout Mountain, move to the south end of the ridge near Rossville, and then advance northward on Missionary Ridge.

Source: Civil War Maps  by Hal Jesperson

The appearance of Hooker's column was the intended signal for the advance of Thomas's troops, who were then to attack the enemy's center on Missionary Ridge. But that morning it was discovered that the Confederates, though they had evacuated Lookout Mountain, had concentrated their entire army on Missionary Ridge. Instead of retreating, they were prepared to make a stubborn defense. They had successfully resisted all Sherman's assaults the day before, had fortified the north end of the ridge, and had reinforced the troops at the center.

Hooker started from Lookout Mountain about 10 AM, but was detained several hours at Chattanooga Creek thanks to the Confederates having burnt the bridge in their retreat from Lookout Mountain. He was held there until about 2 PM. Consequently, Hooker's force was seriously behind schedule and did not reach the point where he was expected.

By noon on the north end of Missionary Ridge, where Great Grandfather Nathan R. Oakes was fighting in Mark P. Lowrey's Brigade of Patrick Cleburne's Division, the Confederates had repulsed every assault by Sherman's troops. Sherman now had 6 divisions under his command—nearly a third of the army's strength at Chattanooga. Before noon, Sherman was sent another division, Baird's, for good measure. In total, Sherman had nearly 30,000 troops available to him. Confronting Sherman were just 6 brigades of about 4,000 Confederates: Smith's, Govan's, and Lowrey's of Cleburne's Division; Brown's and Cummings's of Stevenson's Division; and Maney's of Walker's Division.

By now, Bragg's entire Confederate Army of Tennessee was behind a defensive position along Missionary Ridge. Fifteen batteries, comprising about 50 guns were placed on its summit. There were also 2 siege-guns near Bragg's headquarters. The Confederate force on top of Missionary Ridge was about 1 mile from the Federal lines. The slope of the ridge, which was steep and rough, was about 600 yards in width, its average height about 400 feet. The Confederates had dug a line of rifle pits at the base of the ridge and a line of breastworks on the crest. The soldiers also had constructed breastworks at various intervals on the slope of the ridge.

During the morning, the Confederate movements seemed to indicate to the Federals that they were massing against Sherman on the north end of the ridge. Grant wrongly assumed that, in order to do this, they necessarily were weakening their center. Actually, the Confederate troops seen were those who had been withdrawn from Lookout Mountain and its adjoining valley following yesterday's loss. Grant believed that Sherman's situation on the north end of Missionary Ridge was turning critical so that an attack was required soon in order to relieve him.

Without having heard from Hooker's columns, and fearful for Sherman's situation, Grant made an spontaneous decision: He ordered Thomas to move his 4 divisions forward to take the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, a near suicidal mission. That being accomplished, his men were to reform their lines, then scale the cliffs and take the top of the ridge. By 4 PM, the Federal charge had begun. and 23,000 Yankees in a 2-mile battle line rushed forward and drove the Confederates from their works at the foot of the ridge.

While the order had been to wait to reform at the base of the ridge, the attackers came under fire from Confederate fire above. Their situation was untenable. They had to either advance or retreat, or else be killed by the fire from above. Without waiting for further orders the advancing troops made their decision and at once began climbing the cliffs.

Until that moment, most of the Confederates atop Missionary Ridge could not have imagined that enemy soldiers would attempt the climb, especially under incredible cannon and rifle fire. But amazingly, that's just what Thomas's men did. The Confederates were simply shocked and overwhelmed. Batteries couldn't depress their guns enough to fire in the invaders. Bragg had no reserves to send forward to fortify the positions being overrun. Hundreds of Confederates simply surrendered while thousands fled. In less than an hour and a half from the time the advance began, the Federals were in control of most of the ridge position that the Confederates had held for the past 2 months. Neither Grant nor Thomas could have imagined that Thomas's attack—what was designed to be secondary to Sherman's—would actually be the decisive one today. It was, in fact, the turning point of the battle.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

On the south end of the ridge Hooker had finally advanced his men from Lookout Mountain, and units began reaching Rossville Gap at the south end of Missionary Ridge. Around 4 PM, they began their attack. With little resistance from the corps of Maj. Gen. John C. Breckenridge² his troops moved northward along the top and both sides of the ridge until they met up with Thomas's men. By the evening of the 25th, the Hooker's and Thomas's forces held the middle and south ends of Missionary Ridge, and the Confederates were in retreat. Except for the north portion of the ridge, where Cleburne's and Cheatham's Divisions of Hardee's right wing still held on, Missionary Ridge was entirely under Federal control.

The only Confederate success of the day was with Patrick Cleburne's men fighting on the right end of the ridge at Tunnel Hill, and they were beating the strongest of the 3 armies—Sherman's—attacking Missionary Ridge. If it hadn't been for Cleburne's valiant men holding back Sherman's massive force on the north end of the ridge on today's date, it would have been an overwhelming disaster for Bragg and his army. As it was, it almost didn't happen.

Just 2 days before, Cleburne had been ordered to vacate his position on Missionary Ridge to join Gen. James Longstreet in his Knoxville Campaign. While supervising the transfer of troops at the Chickamauga Station on the 23rd, Cleburne was ordered to return to Missionary Ridge immediately: Thomas had begun his attack on Orchard Knob, and Sherman was not far behind. As the Federals were winning Lookout Mountain on the 24th, Cleburne was positioned at Tunnel Hill (a point on Missionary Ridge about 250 yards north of the actual railroad tunnel) with orders to stop Sherman and ensure a secure line of retreat if that became necessary. After briefly skirmishing with the enemy on a forward, detached ridge, Cleburne's men dug in around Tunnel Hill for the night.

The Battle of Missionary Ridge opened for Cleburne's men at Tunnel Hill at 10:30 AM with a Federal artillery barrage against Brig. James A. Smith's Texas Brigade as Sherman's renewed his attack on the north end of the ridge. Historian Wiley Sword writes:

... Cleburne's duel with Sherman loomed as a classic contest of generals, arguable the best against the best. The crucial question was that of applied combat leadership. The fight on the north end of Missionary Ridge thus was a momentous collision with immense stakes. For Cleburne, it was the test of a lifetime. For Sherman, it was the best chance of his career. No wonder that it would become one of the Civil's War's most remarkable encounters.

Cleburne's after battle report of the Battle of Tunnel Hill is captivating and compelling narrative, well worth repeating here:

Up to 10.30 a.m. the enemy contended himself with severe skirmishing, and a heavy artillery fire from batteries erected by him during the night on the detached hill. About this hour he drove in Smith's skirmishers, and possessed himself of the breastworks which Smith had abandoned that morning. A heavy attack on the tunnel and on Smith's line was now imminent. General Hardee sent me directions to take my position at the tunnel, and to take charge of everything in that quarter and to the right of it. The enemy was now in sight, advancing in two long lines of battle, his right stretching far beyond my left, his left stretching beyond Smith's right, where farther view of it was prevented by the woods that covered and bordered the detached hill....

At 11 a.m. the first serious fight of the day commenced. It was heavy along Smith's whole line, and extended some distance south of the tunnel. The right of the enemy's line, exposed to the fire of several pieces of artillery planted over the tunnel, and met by a brigade sent by General Hardee to the foot of the ridge, swayed backward and forward for some time, but did not dare to advance nearer than 400 yards, and finally lay down, contenting itself with sending forward a large body of skirmishers and sending to the rear a much larger number of stragglers. The enemy's left, however, under shelter of Smith's abandoned work of the night before, and protected by the woods on that flank, and by the precipitous, heavily wooded sides of Tunnel Hill, advanced rapidly on Smith's line, and finally made a heavy charge on Swett's battery on the apex of the hill. The artillerymen stood bravely to their guns under a terrible cross-fire, and replied with canister at short range, but still the enemy advanced. When he had reached within 50 steps of the battery, Brigadier-General Smith charged him with the right of Mill's regiment and the left of the Seventh Texas, Smith's north front pouring into him from the breastworks a close volley at the same time. The enemy was routed and driven back to his cover behind the hill-side and abandoned work.

Brig. Gen. Smith and Colonel Mills were both severely wounded as they led their men in this charge. Brigade command now fell to Col. Hiram .B. Granbury. A half-hour later, the Federals charged again. Grandbury's men held with help from the artillery and some long-range musket fire from Lowrey's men posted on an adjoining hill to the north behind hastily constructed breastworks. But Granbury's troops received heavy casualties. In fact, reported Cleburne, in just a few minutes so many artillery commanders were killed or wounded in succession that Granbury was forced to draft infantry to work the guns. In spite of the losses, the Federal attackers were again driven back. But Cleburne's men were not finished yet.

By noon, Sherman's first attack was over. Nearly 6 hours had passed since Sherman was to have launched an attack to take Tunnel Hill. However, all he had accomplished was to invite serious damage to 2 of his attacking brigades. In the brief lull before the next attack, Cleburne rushed to make several important changes, seemingly anticipating Sherman's next move. Cleburne's report continues:

About 1 p.m. it was evident that another grand attack was soon to be made on my division. In a few minutes after it commenced. The enemy again lined Smith's abandoned works, and from them kept up a close, incessant fire on Smith's north front, and particularly on the artillery on top of the hill. Simultaneously a charge was made on the west face of Tunnel Hill. Warfield's regiment was thrown forward outside of the work to the crest of the hill, looking into the Tennessee Valley, to meet this charge. Key['s battery] fired rapidly into the charging line as it crossed the open ground at the west foot of the of ridge, but it was soon under shelter. At the steep the enemy's line now seemed to form into a heavy column on the march, and rushed up the hill in the direction of the batteries. Warfield's fire stopped the head of the charging column just under the crest. Here the enemy lay down behind trees, logs, and projecting rocks, their first line not 25 yards from the guns, and opened fire. Tier after tier of the enemy, to the foot of the hill and in the valley beyond, supplied this fire and concentrated the whole on a space of not more than 40 yards, till it seemed like one continuous sheet of hissing, flying lead. This terrific fire prevented Warfield's men from moving sufficiently forward to fire with effect down the hill, but otherwise it only swept over our heads. The cross-fire from Smith's abandoned work was, however, more fatal. It took Warfield in flank and was constantly disabling men near the top of the hill.

It was about 1:30, and the fierce attack had now lasted more than a half-hour, with serious damage done to the advancing Federals. Key's Battery was forced to depress its guns to the extreme, firing shell and canister down the sharp incline as the enemy returned fire. Discovering the near impossibility of reaching the enemy by direct fire, and running low on ammunition, some of Cleburne's men found hurling large rocks and rolling great boulders down the steep slope to be more effective than rifle fire. Hardee sent some additional help in the form of artillery fire and a couple of supporting regiments. But these could offer little assistance.

Cleburne continues:

The fight had lasted unceasingly for an hour and a half, and the enemy seemed to be constantly re-enforcing. The First and Twenty-seventh Tennessee, of Maney's brigade, Colonel Field [sic] commanding, was moved in front of the work, and placed on Warfield's right, the latter officer and his gallant regiment, still nobly holding their exposed position, although the regiment was diminished in numbers and almost out of ammunition. It was at this critical period of the day that Lieutenant-Colonel Warfield suggested to me that our men were wasting ammunition and becoming disheartened at the persistency of the enemy, and proposed a charge down upon them with the bayonet. Brigadier-General Cumming gallantly proposed to lead the charge with two of his regiments. I immediately consented, and directed General Cumming to prepare for the charge and went to the left to see that a simultaneous charge was made on the enemy's right flank. I now ordered the left of Mills' (Texas) regiment, being the extreme left of my division, to make the charge on the enemy's flank the moment that Cumming charged them in front, and I remained at the breastwork myself to see the execution of the order.

In the meantime General Cumming, having placed the Fifty-sixth Georgia in line for the charge, and supported it by placing the Thirty-sixth Georgia 10 paces in rear, moved forward to the charge; twice he was checked and had to reform. Warfield's (Arkansas) regiment with empty guns, and the gallant First and Twenty-seventh Tennessee prepared to share his next effort. At the command the whole rushed forward with a cheer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sanders, simultaneously leading the left of Mills' (Texas) regiment on the enemy's flank. The enemy, completely surprised, fled down the foot, the Texas troops on the left pursuing him beyond the foot and nearly across the open ground in front. Our charging columns returned with many prisoners and stand of colors; a fresh force of the enemy, attempting to follow us as we returned from this charge, was quickly met and routed by the Fiftieth Tennessee and with troops of my division. Immediately on his last repulse the enemy opened a rapid and revengeful artillery fire on Tunnel Hill from his batteries on the detached hill, and under cover of this fire he went to work felling trees and fortifying his position.

That Rebel charge began at 4:00 PM, and, along with hand-to-hand fighting, it sent the Federals running. In less than an hour, another charge was organized to drive the remaining forces from the base of Tunnel Hill. Overall, it was magnificent fighting, that resulted in capturing several stand of colors and many prisoners. More importantly. it haling Sherman's attempts to capture Tunnel Hill, taking his force out of action for the rest of the battle.

For 7 hours, and against odds nearly 7 to 1, Cleburne's men had held Tunnel Hill against determined forces.³ But the Confederate success had come at great cost in terms of the brave lives lost. Cleburne's work was not in vain, although he was about to receive disheartening news from further down the line. Even as his men were cheering their triumph on the right, the left of the Confederate line had collapsed and was being carried away. By 6:00 PM, only Hardee's and Cleburne's troops stood in the path of a complete Federal sweep of Missionary Ridge.

The consequence for Cleburne's exhausted men will mean even more sacrifice if the army is to be saved. As Cleburne reported:

Soon after the final defeat of the enemy in front of Smith's position I received a dispatch from General Hardee to send to the center all the troops I could spare, as the enemy were pressing us in that quarter. I immediately ordered Generals Cumming and Maney, with their respective brigades, to report accordingly, and went myself to push them forward. Before I had gone far, however, a dispatch from General Hardee reached me, with the appalling news that the enemy had pierced our center, and were on Missionary Ridge, directing me to take command of my own, Walker's and Stevenson's divisions and form a line across the ridge, so as to meet an attack upon my flank, and take all other necessary measures for the safety of the right wing.

In the general retreat of Bragg's army that day, Cleburne’s Division, the only organized Confederate force left, served as rear guard. Cleburne will do everything in his power to save the army. He immediately ordered Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist, commanding Walker’s division, to form his troops across the ridge. Next, he ordered all vehicles that could be spared to cross the Chickamauga Creek. He sent Lucius Polk orders to send a force to the Shallow Ford Bridge and hold it at all cost. He also sent Govan’s brigade to meet the enemy’s advance on the Shallow Ford Road.

From Cleburne's report:

Soon after night was upon us, and General Hardee ordered an immediate retreat across the Chickamauga, and that Smith’s (Texas) brigade should remain in position and bring up the rear, General Lowrey attacked and drove back the enemy’s skirmishers in his front and then retreated. By 9 p.m. everything was across except the dead and a few stragglers lingering here and there under the shadow of the trees for the purpose of being captured, faint-hearted patriots succumbing to the hardships of the war and the imagined hopelessness of the hour. I now ordered Smith’s brigade to move in retreat. Sadly, but not fearfully, this band of heroes left the hill they had held so well and followed the army across the Chickamauga.

Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey, whose brigade was the least battered from the all-day fight, was ordered to launch a counterattack to drive back the Yankee skirmishers from in front of the ridge and mask the division's withdrawal from Missionary Ridge. Then, under cover of this attack, the rest of his command fell back to the bridge behind the division. The 32nd Regiment was one of the last to fall back, and Co. D, my Great Grandfather's, took up the rear to defend it while the regiment withdrew.⁴

By about 10:00 PM, nearly 12 hours after the first Federal assault that morning, Cleburne’s Division arrived on the northern bank of the East Chickamauga Creek. After burning the Shallow Ford Bridge to slow up Sherman's pursuit, the division joined the tattered army assembling at Chickamauga Rail Station.

The scene at the station was one of utter chaos. In his diary entry Capt. Daniel Coleman of Cleburne's Division describes what he witnessed:

We soon reach Chicamauga & there we find out what has taken place - Everything is confusion - stragglers innumerable hunting their commands - Cleburne’s Div’s alone seems to maintain any order - Ah the bitter humiliation of this disastrous day - That day should not have been lost - There was bad conduct somewhere & I don’t know where - Time will develop - We bivouac near Chicamauga Station sleeping about 3 or 4 hrs -

While the Battle of Missionary Ridge had been a disaster for the Confederate army, Gen. Cleburne’s actions and the courage of his men that night surely saved Bragg’s Army of Tennessee from destruction. Gathering his beaten army at the Chickamauga Station the night of the 25th, a despondent Bragg wired Richmond a terse report summarizing the disaster:

After several unsuccessful assaults on our lines to-day, the enemy carried the left center about 4 o'clock. The whole ground gave way in considerable disorder. The right [i.e., Cleburne's Division] maintained its ground, repelling every attack. I am withdrawing all to this point.

Bragg will withdraw his army through Ringgold to Dalton. The bravery and sacrifice demonstrated by Cleburne's men will again be called upon at Ringgold Gap on the 27th.

¹ Sherman had taken what he thought was the north end of Missionary Ridge, but actually he had taken a completely separate rise known as Billy Goat Hill. Across a deep ravine was Cleburne's Division, fortified at Tunnel Hill, the northernmost portion of the actual ridge. Sherman took no further offensive action that day, and, instead, ordered his men to dig in on Billy Goat Hill.

² Bragg blamed Maj. Gen.  John C. Breckinridge for the disaster that resulted from the collapse of his corps. At Dalton, Bragg immediately relieved Breckinridge of command and even accused him of being drunk at the time.

³ In his memoirs years later, Sherman still had not come to grips with his loss at Tunnel Hill. Instead of acknowledging his assigned role as the main attack on Missionary Ridge that day, he portrayed his part as diversionary to Thomas's assault on the center: "The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme flanks of Bragg's position was, to disturb him to such an extent, that he would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so that Thomas's army could break through his centre. The whole plan succeeded admirably; but it was not until after dark that I learned the complete success at the centre, and received General Grant's orders to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek…" Sherman's close friend and commander, U.S. Grant, also covered for his subordinate by recasting the attack as secondary to Thomas's main attack in the center of Missionary Ridge.

⁴ Capt. F.S. Norman of Co. D wrote in his report: "... built rudeworks of logs under fire of the enemy during the morning of the 25th, was by these works during the day was thrown out as skirmisher at night to hold the enemy in check, while the regiment marched off ..."

Sources: Civil War times, 1861-1865, Daniel Wait Howe; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Chattanooga—A Death Grip on the Confederacy, James Lee McDonough: The Shipwreck of Their Hopes; Peter Cozzens; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Mountains Touched With Fire, Wile Sword; Muster Roll of the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, Tommy Lockhart; Memoirs of Gen. William T. Sherman; Official Records, Vol. 31, Pt. 2; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill