Agreement between Johnston and Sherman

Gen. Joseph E. Wheeler

On Monday, April 17, 1865, Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and Union Gen. William T. Sherman met at the Bennett farmhouse, on the road from Hillsborough to Durham Station, to discuss a path toward peace.

A second meeting was held on today's date.* In the course of the discussion, Sherman sat down and wrote out a "Memorandum, or Basis of Agreement" based on his understanding of what he understood President Lincoln would have wanted. This agreement provided for an armistice that could be cancelled at 48-hours notice; disbanding Johnston's armies and surrendering weapons in state arsenals; U.S. recognition of state governments; reestablishment of federal courts; restoration of political and civil rights; and a general amnesty for Southern combatants. Both generals signed the agreement and Sherman sent it off to Washington for approval.

Confederate President Jefferson Davis also approved the terms, but U.S. President Andrew Johnston's cabinet, led by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, rejected them. Stanton had argued forcibly that Sherman did not have the proper authority to reach an agreement with Johnston. Further, he unfairly stated that Johnston was not being sincere in his negotiation with Sherman, but was, in fact, conducting a ruse to gain time for President Davis to escape with the imagined Confederate treasury.

Gen. William T. Sherman

On April 23rd, Grant personally visited Sherman in Raleigh, bringing with him Washington’s decision. He informed Sherman that his terms were disapproved, and ordered him to give Johnston the 48-hour notice required in the terms of the truce, and then proceed to attack the Confederate army. Sherman sent a message to Johnston with a demand for his surrender under the same terms offered to Robert E. Lee .

On the same day, Cheatham's Corps, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving, was ordered to move its camp 9 miles closer to Greensboro. The next day,  the Confederate army was put on alert to move when ordered. Cheatham's Corps was then ordered to hold itself ready to move promptly at 11:00 AM, when the truce expired. At that hour, Cheatham's Corps marched 10 miles on the Center and Thomasville road to the Salem and Fayetteville road.

Thankfully, in spite of the threat of renewed conflict and the bitter feelings in Washington, there was no new outbreak of fighting. Johnston replied to Sherman the same day, agreeing to meet again at the Bennett house. On the 26th, the generals met, and Sherman offered the more stringent terms of a military surrender. Johnston agreed. The negotiations finally resulted in a Confederate surrender.

That afternoon, the news came to Cheatham's Corps that a peace agreement had been reached.

Concerning Johnston's leadership in the closing 2 months of the war Mark L. Bradley writes, "No other Confederate general—not even Robert E. Lee—could have accomplished more with so few resources in such a brief span." Indeed, when Johnston took command on February 23rd, he believed that the best he could hope for by continuing the war was to obtain "fair terms of peace" for his men and for the Southern people. In spite of that, Johnston managed to consolidate his scattered forces and finally fight his opponent at Bentonville with uncharacteristic boldness. At Smithfield, he reorganized his army into a formidable 30,000-man force. Had he and Lee been successful in uniting their armies, the combined Confederate force would have presented Sherman with a daunting challenge. After Lee's surrender, Johnston also could have chosen to withdraw his army south to continue the war. Rather, he clearly understood the necessity for negotiating a peace with Sherman, ultimately even in defiance of President Davis. Bradley notes finally, "During the final weeks of the war in the Old North State, Johnston's qualities as commander shone forth in their most favorable aspect."

* Confederate Secretary of War, Maj. Gen. John C. Breckenridge, was also present at this meeting. One thing that made this remarkable was that Breckenridge had been Vice President of the United States under James Buchanan. Due to his former status, Sherman advised Breckenridge to flee the country rather than surrender.

Sources: This Astounding close, Mark L. Bradley; Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, Vol 2, Jacob Cox; Civil War Trust; Memoirs of W.T. Sherman, William Tecumseh Sherman; Official Records, Vol. 47, Pt. 1

Offer of peace

On today's date in 1865, Good Friday, Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston sent a letter under a flag of truce to Union Gen. William T. Sherman seeking an end to the war. In a return letter to Johnston on the same day, Sherman agreed to suspend hostilities and meet with his Confederate counterpart. The generals agreed to meet on April 17th at a point midway between the Federal line at Durham Station and Johnston's headquarters. While Sherman had been urged not to trust Johnston as this could be an attempt to escape, thankfully Sherman chose to believe in Johnston's sincerity and agreed to meet to negotiate a peace.

Incredibility, on this same day, actor and Confederate sympathizer John Wilkes Booth fatally shot President Abraham Lincoln at Ford’s Theatre in Washington, D.C. Lincoln died the next day. The attack came only 5 days after Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee surrendered his army at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. Neither Sherman or Johnston was aware of the tragedy while they were arranging their meeting.

On the 17th, just as Sherman was getting ready to leave for Durham Station for his first meeting with Johnston, he received a message informing him of Lincoln’s assassination. Sherman swore the telegraph operator to secrecy so as to not jeopardize the morale of the soldiers nor interfere with the peace talks.

The 2 generals then met alone in the farmhouse of James and Nancy Bennett's (originally "Bennitt") outside Durham Station. After showing Johnston the telegraph, their meeting proceeded under a cloud of uncertainty about the impact Lincoln's death might have on a peaceful surrender. It would take many more days of negotiations before a formal surrender was reached.

There must have been great uncertainty among the soldiers encamped around the Confederate headquarters at Greensboro. Even high ranking officers were in the dark about the war's possible outcome at this point. Maj. Henry Hampton of Gen. Cheatham's staff wrote concerning the days of April 17-19:

Monday, April 17—Ordered to remain where we are until further orders. As the enemy are all around us, both above, below, and behind, the inevitable inference is that the army is to be surrendered. The army remained in a state of suspense and uncertainty until Wednesday, April 19, when it was known that peace had been agreed upon between North and South, or rather, that terms of a peace had been agreed upon between Generals Sherman and Johnston and sent to their respective Governments for ratification.

Sources: This Astounding Close, Mark L. Bradley; Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, Vol 2, Jacob Cox; Memoirs of W.T. Sherman, William Tecumseh Sherman; Official Records, Vol. 47, Pt. 1

Sherman's March to the Sea

On today's date in 1864, Union Gen. William T. Sherman began his infamous march across Georgia to Savannah. He has finally been granted his wish to "make Georgia howl!" Sherman marched his 62,000 troops on the Decatur road, with 20-days' provisions. Behind him, Atlanta lay in ruins, while his gleeful troops sang the "Battle Hymn of the Republic."

Sherman faced little opposition in his campaign except for skirmishing with Joseph Wheeler's cavalry. He left a 60-mile wide path of destruction on his way to Savannah, which he reached by December 21st. At the conclusion of his march the conquering general wrote, "we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies."*

Sherman's "hard hand of war" terrorized the countryside, destroying all sources of food and leaving behind a hungry and demoralized people. It was psychological warfare in the most destructive campaign against a civilian population during the war, earning Sherman the epithet, "Nero of the Nineteenth Century." His March to the Sea was the first instance of a country bringing the might of its industrial and military prowess to destroy a population's ability to support war. And it was the harbinger of the policy of total war, which will be adopted in the 20th century.

Source: North Georgia Encyclopedia

As Sherman departed Atlanta on his campaign of havoc and destruction, Confederate Gen. John B. Hood was more than 200 miles northwest, crossing the Tennessee River to Florence. Hood's plan was to march on to Nashville, and after taking the Federal garrison there, to invade Kentucky. His long range goal was to unite with Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia. Or so he hoped.

* Much earlier in the war, Sherman had adopted a practice of bringing his "hard hand of war" to Georgia citizens. One infamous incident was his forced exile of the Rosewell Mill Women during his earlier Spring campaign.

Sources: Decision in the West, Albert Castel; North Georgia Encyclopedia; Life in Dixie During the War, 1861-1865, Mary A.H. Gay

The other Roswell incident | The tragedy of the Roswell Mill Women

Having suffered a defeat at the hands of the Army of Tennessee at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain on June 27, 1864, Union Gen. William T. Sherman renewed his pursuit of the Confederate army to the banks of the Chattahoochee River. Rather than attacking Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's strong position there, he sought another way to take Atlanta. By July 5th, Sherman took Roswell, an important crossing to the north of Johnston's position. He was surprised to find that he had also captured several textiles mills which were operating in support of the Confederate nation. These he ordered burned.

But he wasn't satisfied with destroying property only. On today's date in 1864, Sherman ordered everyone connected with the Roswell mills to be charged with treason against the United States. Among the civilian captives were over 400 women and their children. These were rounded up on the square where they were held for a day before being sent to the Georgia Military Institute in Marietta, recently captured by Sherman's invading army. 

There, the victims were housed with others rounded up from other mills in the area. What Sherman ordered next was one of his great war atrocities. However, it is one which is often overlooked in the history of that conflict. In Sherman's own words recorded in the Official Records:

I repeat my orders that you will arrest all people, male and female, connected with those factories, no matter what the clamor, and let them foot it, under guard, to Marietta, whence I will send them by cars, to the North... The poor women will make a howl. Let them take along their children and clothing, providing they have a means of hauling or you can spare them."

From Marietta, Sherman ordered the captives—mostly women with some children and a few men either too old or young to be soldiers—to be herded onto boxcars bound for Northern states. Given only a few days' rations, the heartbroken women were shipped through Chattanooga, and after a stopover in Nashville, they were transported to Louisville, the final destination for many of them. The rest were sent further to Indiana and put off the train just north of the Ohio River.

The victims in Louisville were first housed in a refugee camp. Later they took what menial jobs and living arrangements that could be found. Those who were abandoned in Indiana struggled to survive. Many settled near the river where eventually they found familiar work in the mills. Unless husbands had been transported with the women or had been imprisoned nearby, few had any hope of ever returning to Georgia. Eventually, many of the surviving deportees married local men and raised families, never reuniting with loved ones back home. Deprived of financial support, few ever made it back to Roswell. For most, their fate remains a mystery.

Sherman's detestable treatment of these women shocked decent people on both sides of the war. If it were not for a series of quick successes in the Atlanta Campaign, public opinion may well have gone entirely against him. As it happened, Atlanta fell by Summer's end, and the tragic exile of the Roswell Women was forgotten.

Source: Civil War Women

Until 1988. That year the Roswell Mills Camp No. 1547, Sons of the Confederate Veterans, began a project to identify the victims and locate their descendants. Intensive advertising and research led to the location of many of the progeny, and most of the mill workers were finally identified.

Today, a monument stands near the Roswell Town Square dedicated to the memory of the 400 exiled Roswell Mill Workers.

________________________________________________________

The Roswell Mill Workers Monument is a 10-foot Corinthian column, shattered at the top to symbolize the lives torn apart by Sherman's spiteful order of July 7, 1864. It was dedicated in 2000, by the Roswell Mills Camp 1547, Sons of Confederate Veterans.

Sources: New Georgia Encyclopedia; Civil War Women; Official Records, Vol. 38, Pt. 5

The destructive effects of Sherman's army

After Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston's withdrawal from Cassville on May 20, 1864, Federal Gen. William T. Sherman's overall plan for continuing his campaign through Georgia was to move his army in several columns to Dallas, and then along the ridge between the Etowah and Chattahooche Rivers to Marietta. Sherman planned to move his force away from its rail supply line, so he ordered his army to carry 20-days' supply of rations in their march. His decision effectively turned his men into looters and marauders in their destructive march through the north Georgia countryside. Union Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox writes apologetically of his army during this phase of the campaign:

The tendency of war to make men relapse into barbarism becomes most evident when an army is living in any degree upon the enemy's country. Desolation follows in its track, and the utmost that discipline can do is to mitigate the evil. The habit of disregarding rights of property grows apace. The legitimate exercise of the rules of war is not easily distinguished from their abuse. The crops are trampled down, the fences disappear, the timber is felled for breastworks and for camp-fires, the green forage is used for the army horses and mules, barns and houses may be dismantled to build or to floor a bridge,—all this is necessary and lawful. But the pigs and the poultry also disappear, though the subsistence officers are issuing full and abundant rations to the troops; the bacon is gone from the smoke-house, the flour from the bin, the delicacies from the pantry. These things, though forbidden, are half excused by sympathy with the soldier's craving for variety of food. Yet, as the habit of measuring right by might goes on, pillage becomes wanton and arson is committed to cover the pillage. The best efforts of a provost-marshal with his guard will be useless when superior officers, and especially colonels of regiments, encourage or wink at license. The character of different commands becomes as notoriously different as that of the different men of a town. Our armies were usually free from the vagabond class of professional camp-followers that scour a European battlefield and strip the dead and the wounded. We almost never heard of criminal personal assaults upon the unarmed and defenceless; but we cannot deny that a region which had been the theatre of active war became desolate sooner or later. A vacant house was pretty sure to be burned, either by malice or by accident, until, with fences gone, the roads an impassable mire, the fields bare and cut up with innumerable wagon-tracks, no living thing to be seen but carrion birds picking the bones of dead horses and mules, Dante's "Inferno" could not furnish a more horrible and depressing picture than a countryside when war has swept over it. 

The orders issued from our army headquarters in Georgia forbade soldiers from entering houses or stripping families of the necessaries of life. Most of the officers honestly tried to enforce this rule; but in an army of a hundred thousand men, a small fraction of the whole would be enough to spoil the best efforts of the rest. The people found, too, that it was not only the enemy they had to fear. The worse disciplined of their own troops and the horde of stragglers were often as severe a scourge as the enemy. Yet I believe that nowhere in the world is respect for person and property more sincere than among our own people. The evils described are those which may be said to be necessarily incident to the waging of war, and are not indications of ferocity of nature or uncommon lack of discipline.

Source: Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, Jacob Dolson Cox

Preparing for the Spring campaign, 1864

For just about the whole month of April in 1864, Union Gen. William T. Sherman readied his army for its move against Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston's Army of Tennessee, now entrenched in the hills around Dalton in north Georgia. All month, ammunition, provisions, and military stores of all kinds were rushed to Chattanooga. Everything was being readied for the inevitable forward advance against the Confederates, which will begin early next month.

By the time his Atlanta Campaign will open on May 5th, Sherman's army will number over 100,000 men. Johnston will begin with a little more than half that number, but his force will be increased in early May to over 65,000. From now on, Johnston will have the weaker army against his opponent's larger and more aggressive force. Consequently, he will be compelled from the start to act on the defensive, keeping his army intact and waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of any mistake that Sherman might make.

Gen. Joseph Eggleston Johnston, CSA

Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, USA

As the underdog, it also will be necessary for Johnston to rely heavily upon a series of fortifications, which he has carefully constructed. His hope is that Sherman will be lured into attacking his strong position on the precipitous cliffs at Rocky Face above Mill Creek, and suffer severe loss.

Johnston has carefully prepared for the contingency of being driven out of one defensive line by having another behind to which he may fall back if forced to withdraw. However, Sherman has prepared for this as well. His tactics will call for moving his army as near the Confederate works as possible to make demonstrations in front that will distract the Confederates, while he sends a flanking force around and behind. Indeed, he will conduct the coming campaign in this fashion all the way to Atlanta.

But before Sherman can deal a decisive blow, there will be many difficult marches, severe fighting, and massive destruction before the Confederates make a stand at Atlanta. Both armies will be forced to march over land that was, according to Sherman, "as difficult country as was ever fought over by civilized armies."

Sources: Civil War Times, Daniel Wait Howe; Memoirs of Gen. William T. Sherman

Sherman is promoted

On today's date in 1864, Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman was made the new commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi following Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's promotion to commander of all the Union armies. Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson ascended to Sherman's old position as head of the Army of the Tennessee.

Soon after his promotion, Grant met with Sherman to work out a master plan for winning the war. Their decision called for Grant to direct the Army of the Potomac and destroy Robert E. Lee's army while trying to take Richmond. For Sherman's part, he will try to do the same to Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee, now at Dalton, Georgia, and ultimately take Atlanta. This will be the first time that the Union's Eastern and Western armies will advance simultaneously in a coordinated effort to defeat the South.

In May, Sherman will begin his Atlanta Campaign at Dalton, and he will try to destroy Johnston's army along the way. Sherman will end the year with his infamous "March to the Sea." Also in May, Grant will confront Robert E. Lee in a series of bloody battles, beginning the Wilderness Campaign and ending with Lee trapped at Petersburg, Virginia. Grant finally will force Lee's surrender at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, and Sherman will receive Johnston's surrender at Durham, North Carolina, a few days later on April 26th.

William Tecumseh Sherman was one of several Union generals who hailed from Ohio. Appointed to U.S. Military Academy at West Point at 16 years of age, Sherman graduated sixth in his class in 1840. His early military career was unremarkable, and by 1853, he resigned his commission in the army. He tried his hand at banking and law before becoming the superintendent of the Louisiana Military Academy in 1859. When war broke out between the states, Sherman resigned from the academy and returned north to become a colonel of the 13th United States Infantry.

Sherman in Atlanta, 1864

Sherman saw his first war action at First Manassas as a brigade commander. Impressing his superiors by his leadership there, President Lincoln appointed him brig-adier general in August 1861. He was sent to the border state of Kentucky to keep it from seceding. However, the assignment brought him to  the verge of a breakdown, compelling him to request to be relieved of command. After a brief period of recuperation, he was transferred to serve under Maj Gen. Henry W. Halleck and supported his army in the successful battle for Fort Henry.

By now, Sherman was enjoying the support of personal friendship with Grant and had earned his commander's confidence.* From this point on, Grant will increasingly grow to depend on Sherman's military decisiveness.

In the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862, against Albert Sydney Johnston's army, Sherman commanded a division under Grant. Despite being overrun during the battle, Sherman was promoted to major general the next month.

Sherman next led troops in the Battles of Chickasaw Bluffs in late December 1862, and Arkansas Post in January 1863, and he commanded a corps during the Vicksburg Campaign. In the Battle of Chattanooga in November 1863, Sherman's attack against Patrick Cleburne's Division (which included my Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes) at Missionary Ridge was decidedly repelled, although the Union army under Grant did succeed in driving the Confederate army off the ridge and out of Tennessee.

Sherman's Atlanta Campaign and March to the Sea, 1864
Source: Georgia Stories

Now in March 1864, as commander of all troops in the Western Theatre, Sherman will soon prepare his 100,000-man army to wage warfare that will bring him both fame and notoriety. Believing that to defeat the South he must both destroy its military force and the source for its material support, Sherman will apply a strategy of total warfare. Adapting to Johnston's defensive approach, Sherman will use a series of flanking maneuvers to cut him off on the race to Atlanta, destroying most everything in his path. In July, he will have his prize in hand and then promptly destroy the city. He will do the same with the homes, farms, countryside—everything in his 60-mile wide path on his "March to the Sea" by year's end. Next, he will lead his army on a destructive route through the Carolina Campaign, hastening the war's end by April 1865.


* Sherman also was able to restore, and even increase, his reputation among those who would serve under him.  No less a leader than division commander Maj. Gen. Jacob B. Cox, who served under Sherman from the Atlanta Campaign through the Carolinas, wrote about his admiration for the general: "I soon acquired an undoubting conviction that of all the men I had met, [Sherman] was the one to whose leadership in war I would commit my own life and the lives of my men with most complete confidence. In him the combination of intellectual insight with fertility of invention and with force of will in execution was of the highest order. I felt that if the end we aimed at was a noble and worthy one, the price he asked us to pay was reasonable, and the object was worth the sacrifices he called for: we were therefore enthusiastic in our obedience."

Sources: Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864, Albert Castel; Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, Jacob Dolson Cox; Civil War Trust

Sherman repulsed by Cleburne's men on Missionary Ridge, 1863

By the night of the 24th, Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant erroneously believed that Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman had gained Tunnel Hill at the north end of Missionary Ridge in the battle earlier that day.¹ Based on this supposition, at midnight he issued an order for Sherman to attack the Confederates in his front on the morning of today's date in 1863. Sherman's objective was to turn Bragg's flank, which meant seizing the position from South Chickamauga Creek to Tunnel Hill. At the same time he issued orders to Maj. Gen. George Thomas to simultaneously attack the Confederates' center on Missionary Ridge. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker would join the attack from his newly won position at Lookout Mountain, move to the south end of the ridge near Rossville, and then advance northward on Missionary Ridge.

Source: Civil War Maps  by Hal Jesperson

The appearance of Hooker's column was the intended signal for the advance of Thomas's troops, who were then to attack the enemy's center on Missionary Ridge. But that morning it was discovered that the Confederates, though they had evacuated Lookout Mountain, had concentrated their entire army on Missionary Ridge. Instead of retreating, they were prepared to make a stubborn defense. They had successfully resisted all Sherman's assaults the day before, had fortified the north end of the ridge, and had reinforced the troops at the center.

Hooker started from Lookout Mountain about 10 AM, but was detained several hours at Chattanooga Creek thanks to the Confederates having burnt the bridge in their retreat from Lookout Mountain. He was held there until about 2 PM. Consequently, Hooker's force was seriously behind schedule and did not reach the point where he was expected.

By noon on the north end of Missionary Ridge, where Great Grandfather Nathan R. Oakes was fighting in Mark P. Lowrey's Brigade of Patrick Cleburne's Division, the Confederates had repulsed every assault by Sherman's troops. Sherman now had 6 divisions under his command—nearly a third of the army's strength at Chattanooga. Before noon, Sherman was sent another division, Baird's, for good measure. In total, Sherman had nearly 30,000 troops available to him. Confronting Sherman were just 6 brigades of about 4,000 Confederates: Smith's, Govan's, and Lowrey's of Cleburne's Division; Brown's and Cummings's of Stevenson's Division; and Maney's of Walker's Division.

By now, Bragg's entire Confederate Army of Tennessee was behind a defensive position along Missionary Ridge. Fifteen batteries, comprising about 50 guns were placed on its summit. There were also 2 siege-guns near Bragg's headquarters. The Confederate force on top of Missionary Ridge was about 1 mile from the Federal lines. The slope of the ridge, which was steep and rough, was about 600 yards in width, its average height about 400 feet. The Confederates had dug a line of rifle pits at the base of the ridge and a line of breastworks on the crest. The soldiers also had constructed breastworks at various intervals on the slope of the ridge.

During the morning, the Confederate movements seemed to indicate to the Federals that they were massing against Sherman on the north end of the ridge. Grant wrongly assumed that, in order to do this, they necessarily were weakening their center. Actually, the Confederate troops seen were those who had been withdrawn from Lookout Mountain and its adjoining valley following yesterday's loss. Grant believed that Sherman's situation on the north end of Missionary Ridge was turning critical so that an attack was required soon in order to relieve him.

Without having heard from Hooker's columns, and fearful for Sherman's situation, Grant made an spontaneous decision: He ordered Thomas to move his 4 divisions forward to take the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, a near suicidal mission. That being accomplished, his men were to reform their lines, then scale the cliffs and take the top of the ridge. By 4 PM, the Federal charge had begun. and 23,000 Yankees in a 2-mile battle line rushed forward and drove the Confederates from their works at the foot of the ridge.

While the order had been to wait to reform at the base of the ridge, the attackers came under fire from Confederate fire above. Their situation was untenable. They had to either advance or retreat, or else be killed by the fire from above. Without waiting for further orders the advancing troops made their decision and at once began climbing the cliffs.

Until that moment, most of the Confederates atop Missionary Ridge could not have imagined that enemy soldiers would attempt the climb, especially under incredible cannon and rifle fire. But amazingly, that's just what Thomas's men did. The Confederates were simply shocked and overwhelmed. Batteries couldn't depress their guns enough to fire in the invaders. Bragg had no reserves to send forward to fortify the positions being overrun. Hundreds of Confederates simply surrendered while thousands fled. In less than an hour and a half from the time the advance began, the Federals were in control of most of the ridge position that the Confederates had held for the past 2 months. Neither Grant nor Thomas could have imagined that Thomas's attack—what was designed to be secondary to Sherman's—would actually be the decisive one today. It was, in fact, the turning point of the battle.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

On the south end of the ridge Hooker had finally advanced his men from Lookout Mountain, and units began reaching Rossville Gap at the south end of Missionary Ridge. Around 4 PM, they began their attack. With little resistance from the corps of Maj. Gen. John C. Breckenridge² his troops moved northward along the top and both sides of the ridge until they met up with Thomas's men. By the evening of the 25th, the Hooker's and Thomas's forces held the middle and south ends of Missionary Ridge, and the Confederates were in retreat. Except for the north portion of the ridge, where Cleburne's and Cheatham's Divisions of Hardee's right wing still held on, Missionary Ridge was entirely under Federal control.

The only Confederate success of the day was with Patrick Cleburne's men fighting on the right end of the ridge at Tunnel Hill, and they were beating the strongest of the 3 armies—Sherman's—attacking Missionary Ridge. If it hadn't been for Cleburne's valiant men holding back Sherman's massive force on the north end of the ridge on today's date, it would have been an overwhelming disaster for Bragg and his army. As it was, it almost didn't happen.

Just 2 days before, Cleburne had been ordered to vacate his position on Missionary Ridge to join Gen. James Longstreet in his Knoxville Campaign. While supervising the transfer of troops at the Chickamauga Station on the 23rd, Cleburne was ordered to return to Missionary Ridge immediately: Thomas had begun his attack on Orchard Knob, and Sherman was not far behind. As the Federals were winning Lookout Mountain on the 24th, Cleburne was positioned at Tunnel Hill (a point on Missionary Ridge about 250 yards north of the actual railroad tunnel) with orders to stop Sherman and ensure a secure line of retreat if that became necessary. After briefly skirmishing with the enemy on a forward, detached ridge, Cleburne's men dug in around Tunnel Hill for the night.

The Battle of Missionary Ridge opened for Cleburne's men at Tunnel Hill at 10:30 AM with a Federal artillery barrage against Brig. James A. Smith's Texas Brigade as Sherman's renewed his attack on the north end of the ridge. Historian Wiley Sword writes:

... Cleburne's duel with Sherman loomed as a classic contest of generals, arguable the best against the best. The crucial question was that of applied combat leadership. The fight on the north end of Missionary Ridge thus was a momentous collision with immense stakes. For Cleburne, it was the test of a lifetime. For Sherman, it was the best chance of his career. No wonder that it would become one of the Civil's War's most remarkable encounters.

Cleburne's after battle report of the Battle of Tunnel Hill is captivating and compelling narrative, well worth repeating here:

Up to 10.30 a.m. the enemy contended himself with severe skirmishing, and a heavy artillery fire from batteries erected by him during the night on the detached hill. About this hour he drove in Smith's skirmishers, and possessed himself of the breastworks which Smith had abandoned that morning. A heavy attack on the tunnel and on Smith's line was now imminent. General Hardee sent me directions to take my position at the tunnel, and to take charge of everything in that quarter and to the right of it. The enemy was now in sight, advancing in two long lines of battle, his right stretching far beyond my left, his left stretching beyond Smith's right, where farther view of it was prevented by the woods that covered and bordered the detached hill....

At 11 a.m. the first serious fight of the day commenced. It was heavy along Smith's whole line, and extended some distance south of the tunnel. The right of the enemy's line, exposed to the fire of several pieces of artillery planted over the tunnel, and met by a brigade sent by General Hardee to the foot of the ridge, swayed backward and forward for some time, but did not dare to advance nearer than 400 yards, and finally lay down, contenting itself with sending forward a large body of skirmishers and sending to the rear a much larger number of stragglers. The enemy's left, however, under shelter of Smith's abandoned work of the night before, and protected by the woods on that flank, and by the precipitous, heavily wooded sides of Tunnel Hill, advanced rapidly on Smith's line, and finally made a heavy charge on Swett's battery on the apex of the hill. The artillerymen stood bravely to their guns under a terrible cross-fire, and replied with canister at short range, but still the enemy advanced. When he had reached within 50 steps of the battery, Brigadier-General Smith charged him with the right of Mill's regiment and the left of the Seventh Texas, Smith's north front pouring into him from the breastworks a close volley at the same time. The enemy was routed and driven back to his cover behind the hill-side and abandoned work.

Brig. Gen. Smith and Colonel Mills were both severely wounded as they led their men in this charge. Brigade command now fell to Col. Hiram .B. Granbury. A half-hour later, the Federals charged again. Grandbury's men held with help from the artillery and some long-range musket fire from Lowrey's men posted on an adjoining hill to the north behind hastily constructed breastworks. But Granbury's troops received heavy casualties. In fact, reported Cleburne, in just a few minutes so many artillery commanders were killed or wounded in succession that Granbury was forced to draft infantry to work the guns. In spite of the losses, the Federal attackers were again driven back. But Cleburne's men were not finished yet.

By noon, Sherman's first attack was over. Nearly 6 hours had passed since Sherman was to have launched an attack to take Tunnel Hill. However, all he had accomplished was to invite serious damage to 2 of his attacking brigades. In the brief lull before the next attack, Cleburne rushed to make several important changes, seemingly anticipating Sherman's next move. Cleburne's report continues:

About 1 p.m. it was evident that another grand attack was soon to be made on my division. In a few minutes after it commenced. The enemy again lined Smith's abandoned works, and from them kept up a close, incessant fire on Smith's north front, and particularly on the artillery on top of the hill. Simultaneously a charge was made on the west face of Tunnel Hill. Warfield's regiment was thrown forward outside of the work to the crest of the hill, looking into the Tennessee Valley, to meet this charge. Key['s battery] fired rapidly into the charging line as it crossed the open ground at the west foot of the of ridge, but it was soon under shelter. At the steep the enemy's line now seemed to form into a heavy column on the march, and rushed up the hill in the direction of the batteries. Warfield's fire stopped the head of the charging column just under the crest. Here the enemy lay down behind trees, logs, and projecting rocks, their first line not 25 yards from the guns, and opened fire. Tier after tier of the enemy, to the foot of the hill and in the valley beyond, supplied this fire and concentrated the whole on a space of not more than 40 yards, till it seemed like one continuous sheet of hissing, flying lead. This terrific fire prevented Warfield's men from moving sufficiently forward to fire with effect down the hill, but otherwise it only swept over our heads. The cross-fire from Smith's abandoned work was, however, more fatal. It took Warfield in flank and was constantly disabling men near the top of the hill.

It was about 1:30, and the fierce attack had now lasted more than a half-hour, with serious damage done to the advancing Federals. Key's Battery was forced to depress its guns to the extreme, firing shell and canister down the sharp incline as the enemy returned fire. Discovering the near impossibility of reaching the enemy by direct fire, and running low on ammunition, some of Cleburne's men found hurling large rocks and rolling great boulders down the steep slope to be more effective than rifle fire. Hardee sent some additional help in the form of artillery fire and a couple of supporting regiments. But these could offer little assistance.

Cleburne continues:

The fight had lasted unceasingly for an hour and a half, and the enemy seemed to be constantly re-enforcing. The First and Twenty-seventh Tennessee, of Maney's brigade, Colonel Field [sic] commanding, was moved in front of the work, and placed on Warfield's right, the latter officer and his gallant regiment, still nobly holding their exposed position, although the regiment was diminished in numbers and almost out of ammunition. It was at this critical period of the day that Lieutenant-Colonel Warfield suggested to me that our men were wasting ammunition and becoming disheartened at the persistency of the enemy, and proposed a charge down upon them with the bayonet. Brigadier-General Cumming gallantly proposed to lead the charge with two of his regiments. I immediately consented, and directed General Cumming to prepare for the charge and went to the left to see that a simultaneous charge was made on the enemy's right flank. I now ordered the left of Mills' (Texas) regiment, being the extreme left of my division, to make the charge on the enemy's flank the moment that Cumming charged them in front, and I remained at the breastwork myself to see the execution of the order.

In the meantime General Cumming, having placed the Fifty-sixth Georgia in line for the charge, and supported it by placing the Thirty-sixth Georgia 10 paces in rear, moved forward to the charge; twice he was checked and had to reform. Warfield's (Arkansas) regiment with empty guns, and the gallant First and Twenty-seventh Tennessee prepared to share his next effort. At the command the whole rushed forward with a cheer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sanders, simultaneously leading the left of Mills' (Texas) regiment on the enemy's flank. The enemy, completely surprised, fled down the foot, the Texas troops on the left pursuing him beyond the foot and nearly across the open ground in front. Our charging columns returned with many prisoners and stand of colors; a fresh force of the enemy, attempting to follow us as we returned from this charge, was quickly met and routed by the Fiftieth Tennessee and with troops of my division. Immediately on his last repulse the enemy opened a rapid and revengeful artillery fire on Tunnel Hill from his batteries on the detached hill, and under cover of this fire he went to work felling trees and fortifying his position.

That Rebel charge began at 4:00 PM, and, along with hand-to-hand fighting, it sent the Federals running. In less than an hour, another charge was organized to drive the remaining forces from the base of Tunnel Hill. Overall, it was magnificent fighting, that resulted in capturing several stand of colors and many prisoners. More importantly. it haling Sherman's attempts to capture Tunnel Hill, taking his force out of action for the rest of the battle.

For 7 hours, and against odds nearly 7 to 1, Cleburne's men had held Tunnel Hill against determined forces.³ But the Confederate success had come at great cost in terms of the brave lives lost. Cleburne's work was not in vain, although he was about to receive disheartening news from further down the line. Even as his men were cheering their triumph on the right, the left of the Confederate line had collapsed and was being carried away. By 6:00 PM, only Hardee's and Cleburne's troops stood in the path of a complete Federal sweep of Missionary Ridge.

The consequence for Cleburne's exhausted men will mean even more sacrifice if the army is to be saved. As Cleburne reported:

Soon after the final defeat of the enemy in front of Smith's position I received a dispatch from General Hardee to send to the center all the troops I could spare, as the enemy were pressing us in that quarter. I immediately ordered Generals Cumming and Maney, with their respective brigades, to report accordingly, and went myself to push them forward. Before I had gone far, however, a dispatch from General Hardee reached me, with the appalling news that the enemy had pierced our center, and were on Missionary Ridge, directing me to take command of my own, Walker's and Stevenson's divisions and form a line across the ridge, so as to meet an attack upon my flank, and take all other necessary measures for the safety of the right wing.

In the general retreat of Bragg's army that day, Cleburne’s Division, the only organized Confederate force left, served as rear guard. Cleburne will do everything in his power to save the army. He immediately ordered Brig. Gen. States Rights Gist, commanding Walker’s division, to form his troops across the ridge. Next, he ordered all vehicles that could be spared to cross the Chickamauga Creek. He sent Lucius Polk orders to send a force to the Shallow Ford Bridge and hold it at all cost. He also sent Govan’s brigade to meet the enemy’s advance on the Shallow Ford Road.

From Cleburne's report:

Soon after night was upon us, and General Hardee ordered an immediate retreat across the Chickamauga, and that Smith’s (Texas) brigade should remain in position and bring up the rear, General Lowrey attacked and drove back the enemy’s skirmishers in his front and then retreated. By 9 p.m. everything was across except the dead and a few stragglers lingering here and there under the shadow of the trees for the purpose of being captured, faint-hearted patriots succumbing to the hardships of the war and the imagined hopelessness of the hour. I now ordered Smith’s brigade to move in retreat. Sadly, but not fearfully, this band of heroes left the hill they had held so well and followed the army across the Chickamauga.

Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey, whose brigade was the least battered from the all-day fight, was ordered to launch a counterattack to drive back the Yankee skirmishers from in front of the ridge and mask the division's withdrawal from Missionary Ridge. Then, under cover of this attack, the rest of his command fell back to the bridge behind the division. The 32nd Regiment was one of the last to fall back, and Co. D, my Great Grandfather's, took up the rear to defend it while the regiment withdrew.⁴

By about 10:00 PM, nearly 12 hours after the first Federal assault that morning, Cleburne’s Division arrived on the northern bank of the East Chickamauga Creek. After burning the Shallow Ford Bridge to slow up Sherman's pursuit, the division joined the tattered army assembling at Chickamauga Rail Station.

The scene at the station was one of utter chaos. In his diary entry Capt. Daniel Coleman of Cleburne's Division describes what he witnessed:

We soon reach Chicamauga & there we find out what has taken place - Everything is confusion - stragglers innumerable hunting their commands - Cleburne’s Div’s alone seems to maintain any order - Ah the bitter humiliation of this disastrous day - That day should not have been lost - There was bad conduct somewhere & I don’t know where - Time will develop - We bivouac near Chicamauga Station sleeping about 3 or 4 hrs -

While the Battle of Missionary Ridge had been a disaster for the Confederate army, Gen. Cleburne’s actions and the courage of his men that night surely saved Bragg’s Army of Tennessee from destruction. Gathering his beaten army at the Chickamauga Station the night of the 25th, a despondent Bragg wired Richmond a terse report summarizing the disaster:

After several unsuccessful assaults on our lines to-day, the enemy carried the left center about 4 o'clock. The whole ground gave way in considerable disorder. The right [i.e., Cleburne's Division] maintained its ground, repelling every attack. I am withdrawing all to this point.

Bragg will withdraw his army through Ringgold to Dalton. The bravery and sacrifice demonstrated by Cleburne's men will again be called upon at Ringgold Gap on the 27th.

¹ Sherman had taken what he thought was the north end of Missionary Ridge, but actually he had taken a completely separate rise known as Billy Goat Hill. Across a deep ravine was Cleburne's Division, fortified at Tunnel Hill, the northernmost portion of the actual ridge. Sherman took no further offensive action that day, and, instead, ordered his men to dig in on Billy Goat Hill.

² Bragg blamed Maj. Gen.  John C. Breckinridge for the disaster that resulted from the collapse of his corps. At Dalton, Bragg immediately relieved Breckinridge of command and even accused him of being drunk at the time.

³ In his memoirs years later, Sherman still had not come to grips with his loss at Tunnel Hill. Instead of acknowledging his assigned role as the main attack on Missionary Ridge that day, he portrayed his part as diversionary to Thomas's assault on the center: "The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme flanks of Bragg's position was, to disturb him to such an extent, that he would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so that Thomas's army could break through his centre. The whole plan succeeded admirably; but it was not until after dark that I learned the complete success at the centre, and received General Grant's orders to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek…" Sherman's close friend and commander, U.S. Grant, also covered for his subordinate by recasting the attack as secondary to Thomas's main attack in the center of Missionary Ridge.

⁴ Capt. F.S. Norman of Co. D wrote in his report: "... built rudeworks of logs under fire of the enemy during the morning of the 25th, was by these works during the day was thrown out as skirmisher at night to hold the enemy in check, while the regiment marched off ..."

Sources: Civil War times, 1861-1865, Daniel Wait Howe; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Chattanooga—A Death Grip on the Confederacy, James Lee McDonough: The Shipwreck of Their Hopes; Peter Cozzens; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Mountains Touched With Fire, Wile Sword; Muster Roll of the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, Tommy Lockhart; Memoirs of Gen. William T. Sherman; Official Records, Vol. 31, Pt. 2; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Sherman attacks Cleburne's Division, 1863

Having been recalled yesterday from the Chickamauga rail station, Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne's men marched a return trip of 7 miles to Gen. Braxton Bragg's headquarters atop Missionary Ridge last night. Early the next morning, on today's date, a Tuesday in 1863, Bragg ordered Cleburne to send a brigade and a battery up the line to guard the railroad bridge over the Chickamauga Creek and to ensure a secure line of retreat for the army if it became necessary. Cleburne sent Brig. Gen. Lucius Polk's Brigade with Semple's Battery. The other 3 brigades of his division—Lowrey's, Smith's, and Liddell's—remained on the slope behind Bragg's headquarters. Cleburne put the men to work constructing a new defensive line along the top of the ridge from the Shallow Ford road to Bragg's headquarters. His men couldn't resist gazing on Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's immense army swarming below. They also can hear enemy cannonading and small arms fire in the direction of Lookout Mountain.

The northern end of the extended Confederate line on Missionary Ridge descended gradually along the course of the South Chickamauga Creek. South of the creek about a mile, the Chattanooga & Cleveland Railroad passed through a tunnel through the ridge before linking with the Western & Atlantic. The hill above, and about 250 yards north of the tunnel, was known as Tunnel Hill. The hill was critical to the security of the Confederate right, just as Lookout Mountain was for the Confederate left. 

At 2:00 PM on that rainy afternoon, Bragg sent Cleburne's Division and Wright's Brigade to the north end of Missionary Ridge. Cleburne was ordered to take Lowrey's, Smith's, and Liddell's (commanded by Col. Daniel Govan) Brigades with batteries to the north end of Missionary Ridge, near the railroad tunnel under the ridge. There was some urgency to the orders: Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's divisions, which had crossed the Tennessee River, were coming into position near that which Cleburne's men were to occupy. Cleburne also was instructed to hold "at all hazards" the railroad bridge in his rear that Polk's Brigade was presently guarding. His commander, Lt. Gen. William Hardee, had further instructions. He wanted a single brigade stationed on a detached rise, Billy Goat Hill, about a half-mile northwest of the main ridge. The rest Cleburne could deploy on Tunnel Hill itself, and on the ridge line extending southward, until they connected with Maj. Gen. William H.T. Walker's Division on his left.

After crossing the river overnight 23rd-24th, Sherman's objective was to take the Confederate position at Tunnel Hill with 6 divisions and 16,000 men under his command. At the same time, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's forces would take the other flank of the Confederate position on Lookout Mountain. The object of these 2 attacks was to force Bragg to send reinforcements away from his center on Missionary Ridge, where Grant planned that Maj. Gen. George Thomas should attack. Sherman was under the misimpression that Missionary Ridge was one prolonged even range. When he crossed the river, he passed over the foothills before moving his men up a hill—what he thought was the main portion of the north end of Missionary Ridge.

In the meantime, Cleburne quickly surveyed the ground at Tunnel Hill that Bragg had assigned him. Immediately he saw the impossibility of covering such an extended front with only 3 brigades. He sent word to Gen. Hardee about the situation, even as Sherman's Federals were advancing on his troops. Cleburne ordered Brig. Gen. James A. Smith to move his brigade to take possession of a detached hill known as Billy Goat Hill. But as Smith's men started up the hill, they came under attack by Sherman's infantry already on the summit, and were forced to pull back.

Having a full grasp on the potential of his position on the ridge, Cleburne promptly arranged the rest of his division. He placed Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey's Brigade, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving, in position south of the tunnel, and was positioning Govan's troops on his left in order to connect with Walker's Division, when fighting broke out on his right. Cleburne correctly assumed that Sherman was attempting to turn his right flank and gain the main ridge between his right and the Chickamauga Creek. If the attack were successful, Sherman would gain control of the railroads, and also cut off a line of retreat for the army. As a remedy to the rapidly changing situation, Cleburne placed Govan's men on Missionary Ridge itself, at a point that jutted out in the rear of the ridge just north of the tunnel, in order to cover the valley and road that led over the main ridge in the direction of the enemy's approach. As Cleburne's men were digging in on the surrounding hills, fighting began on Lookout Mountain far to his left.

Hardee soon arrived. Approving Cleburne's troop positions, he then ordered the destruction of another bridge over the Chickamauga in the division's rear right flank. He also ordered 2 of Lowrey's regiments, including Great Grandfather's 32nd Mississippi, and artillery into position in the rear of his right flank. These scant 2 regiments took up position to the left of Smith's Brigade and Walker's Division beyond, covering a distance of nearly a mile. The troops remained on the thin battle line all night.

The last of the fighting in Smith's front ended as darkness fell. Sherman's troops dug in under the misimpression that they had taken the north end of Missionary Ridge, Sherman's original objective. The reality was that Tunnel Hill lay beyond a deep depression between the 2 hills. Seeing that he was about out of daylight, Sherman ordered his men to entrench to hold the ground he had thus far gained.

By now, Cleburne was aware of the loss of the Lookout Mountain position in the south that had been taken late in the afternoon while his men engaged Sherman's troops. Overnight, Cleburne was ordered to hold his position and await the enemy's anticipated attack on Missionary Ridge. He spent the night repositioning his troops.² The main attack would come tomorrow.

¹ Sherman had made a huge mistake. Because he remained in the rear of his forces until after dark, his misimpression lasted until morning. Based on the supposition that Sherman had taken the actual ridge, at midnight Grant issued an order for him to attack the Confederates in his front the next morning. At the same time he plans for Maj. Gen. George Thomas to simultaneously storm the Confederates' center on Missionary Ridge. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker would join the attack after moving from his newly won position atop Lookout Mountain to assault the south end of the ridge near Rossville. These actions will bring on the Battle of Missionary Ridge tomorrow.

² Cleburne reported that there was an eclipse of the moon that night which hindered troop placement and fortification.

Sources: The Shipwreck of Their Hopes; Peter Cozzens; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Chattanooga—A Death Grip on the Confederacy, James Lee McDonough; Mountains Touched With Fire, Wiley Sword; The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill