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Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010 |
Following the unexpected victory at
Missionary Ridge on the evening of the 25th, Union Gen. U.S. Grant's attention turned towards how to send relief to Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, supposedly under siege at Knoxville. Consequently, he let slip the opportunity to do serious damage to Braxton Bragg's fleeing and disorganized army. Although some pursuit was attempted right after the Confederates fled, it was turned back largely by Patrick Cleburne's command. The hesitation afforded Bragg's army a slim margin of time to make its escape the next day southeast to the town of Ringgold, with Dalton, Georgia as its final destination.
Finally, on the 26th, Grant ordered part of his army to Knoxville and directed Sherman and Thomas to send a force to pursue Bragg. On the same day Bragg was pushing the remnants of his army through Ringgold Gap. Feeling vulnerable about a Federal attack, he ordered Cleburne's Division to again hold off the pursuers until the army had safely retreated to Dalton.
After serving as the rear guard for Bragg's army retreating from the disaster on Missionary Ridge late on the night of the 26th,
Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne ordered his men to bivouac on the South Chickamauga across from Ringgold, a small North Georgian town 20 miles southeast of Chattanooga on the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Serving in Cleburne's Division is
Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes, in
Company D1 of the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, commanded by Col. William H.H. Tison. Gen. Joseph Hooker's force encamped for the night about 2 miles northwest,.
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Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne |
At 3 AM on today's date, a Friday in 1863, Cleburne received Bragg's order to hold Ringgold Gap at all costs. There were only 4,157 men and 2 cannons in Cleburne's Division to hold back an overwhelming number of Federal troops. Initially, his Confederates will have to face 3 of Hooker's divisions, numbering nearly 9,000. More will arrive, swelling the Federal force to 16,000. Just like at Tunnel Hill on Missionary Ridge, the odds are again heavily stacked against Cleburne's men.
Shortly after receiving his instructions, Cleburne ordered his men to wade the stinging cold, waist-high South Chickamauga Creek. Volunteers had been sent ahead to light campfires on the opposite bank so the soldiers could warm and partially dry themselves before being deployed to defend the gap. Cleburne had already crossed the creek ahead of his men to make a quick examination of the ground he was ordered to defend.
Ringgold Gap was a steep, narrow, half-mile pass through Taylor's Ridge (known as Taylor Ridge today), about 400 feet high at its crest. The gap in the ridge was barely wide enough to accommodate the creek along with a wagon road and rail line close by. On the opposite, north side of the gap was White Oak Mountain, which rose 350 feet behind the town of Ringgold. The western slopes of both heights were steep and lightly forested. At the gap's western opening, which Cleburne's men would have to defend, the troops had an open field of fire. However, the ground behind them, on the eastern side of the gap was cut 3 times by the meandering stream. In a retreat, his men would have to cross several bridges or ford the creek to make their escape. It was a dangerous position to be caught in.
At around 7:00 AM, in a brilliant display of generalship, Cleburne quickly began positioning his troops on or behind every natural defense where they would be the most effective to hinder an attack. He posted most of his troops on and between the 2 ridges guarding the gap with the majority of them along the stretch of White Oak Mountain extending north. He placed 1 of
Brig. Gen. Mark Lowrey's regiments, the 16th Alabama, on Taylor's Ridge to guard the division's left flank. The other 3 regiments, he placed in reserve in Ringgold Gap itself. Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was posted here with his 32nd Mississippi Regiment (32nd/45th Consolidated). Because the pass was narrow, Cleburne was able to place his regiments in 4 short rows of defense. He had scant artillery, only 2 Napoleon cannons under the command of Lt. Richard W. Goldthwaite, which had to be used in the most effective spot. So, he camouflaged them and placed them in the center, within the mouth of the gap, where they could do the most damage. Cleburne remained here with the cannon to direct the coming fight.
Just a half-hour later, the leading edge of Gen. Hooker's column was spotted across the Chickamauga a short distance away. His skirmishers drove the Confederate cavalry2 at the crossing. Cleburne had planned a ruse to give the impression that only a small force guarded the gap. Fooled into thinking that the Confederate force at the gap was weak and demoralized, almost immediately Hooker ordered a direct attack, even before the rest of his force, including his artillery, had come into position to support it. So far, Cleburne's plan was working, but his men still had to receive the full weight of the approaching Federal attack.
The Confederate army's train of wagons was still in full view, struggling to pass over the winding creek through and beyond the gap toward Dalton, as Hooker's force approached the town. Cleburne's men were the only barrier between the tail of the Army of Tennessee and the pursuing Federal army.
Just after 8:00 AM, not knowing the Confederate force that faced him, Hooker moved his skirmishers forward across an open field to the trees at the foot of the White Oak Mountain. There they were surprised by Confederate skirmishers of Hiram Granbury's Brigade. Granbury's men held their fire until the attackers were within 50 yards, well within killing range. The troops concentrated their fire from concealed positions at the timberline of the mountain. As the Federals recovered they began to climb the steep ridge, only to be stopped by a Confederate unit under Maj. William A. Taylor who led a charge down the slope. The Federals were sent back in confusion towards the protection of Hooker's headquarters at the Stone Depot.
From the Stone Depot, the Federal command reacted by feeding more regiments into the fight. One regiment was sent out over the same ground to attack the Confederate right flank, while another attacked the south slope of White Oak Mountain at the gap. They didn't know it yet, but these troops were heading into Goldthwaite's concealed artillery. Once the Union line was within 150 yards—grape shot canister range—the Confederates opened fire. The right of the Federal line was shredded, and the survivors were sent running for shelter behind the railroad embankment where their fire was largely ineffective.
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Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010
Restored "Stone Depot" | Western & Atlantic RR Station at Ringgold. Hooker's
headquarters and the position from which he sent his troops forward to assault
the Confederate held ridge and gap beyond. View is from the Confederate side. |