Cleburne's sunset attack | Day 1 of the Battle of Chickamauga

The first day of the Battle of Chickamauga opened on this date, a Saturday in 1863. Just after daylight, a Union force from George Thomas's division was ordered to Jay’s sawmill to confront what was thought to be a lone Confederate brigade. Instead, the Federals ran into Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry.¹ The 2 forces clashed the dense woodlands. The fierce fighting compelled Bragg to shift some of his forces to the right of the battle line. By 1 PM, the battle there reached a lull, and the fighting began to shift toward the middle of the Confederate line.

All morning the fighting rumbled southward, roughly following the LaFayette road, passing from the Confederate divisions of Cheatham, Walker, and then Stewart. Both sides took heavy casualties but neither gained an edge. Then around 4 PM, Confederate Maj. Gen. A.P. Stewart launched a charge that pushed back the Federal center across the LaFayette road, and it nearly carried the fight. But this attack stalled. To the south, Gen. John B. Hood had some success with driving his opponent on Stewart's left, but he gained no significant advantage for the fighting. Bragg needed to crush the Federals.

Hope lay with Gen. Patrick Cleburne, whose division will soon have an opportunity to change the dynamic of the battle. His men, having listened to cannonading all morning, are about to enter the fight. Early in the afternoon, Cleburne was ordered to move his division northward to Thedford's Ford, there to cross the Chickamauga Creek and to report to Gen. Leonidas Polk who would direct him into line. Cleburne set his men out on the 6-mile march along a road which was clogged by marching troops,  wagons, and artillery.

A little further up the road, and observing Cleburne's men marching under their distinctive blue and white banners, Gen. Forrest remarked to a subordinate, “Do you see that large body of infantry marching this way in columns of fours? That is General Pat Cleburne’s division; hell will break loose in Georgia in about fifteen minutes.”

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

Arriving ahead of his men at Thedford’s Ford, Cleburne received orders to continue northward to reinforce the right wing of the army under Gen. Polk. Bragg's plan was to attack the Federal army on its left flank, cut it off from Chattanooga, drive it southward to McLemore’s Cove, and there destroy it. Gen. D.H. Hill’s Corps, including Cleburne’s Division, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving, was to spearhead the attack.

Artillery was firing in the east as Cleburne's men reached Thedford’s Ford in the late afternoon. Moving his men along immediately, the troops took off their shoes and pants, and holding their clothing and rifles high, they crossed the creek and resumed their march for 2 more miles over ground on which the battle had been raging all day. They arrived near the extreme right of the Confederate position just as the sun was setting.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Battlefield marker, September 19th, 6 PM

At about 5 PM, Cleburne formed his tired men in a line 300 yards behind Liddell’s and Cheatham's divisions, which were lying prone in a long skirmish line. When Gen. Hill rode up, he ordered Cleburne to ready for an attack even though it meant an evening fight in heavy woods on unfamiliar ground against an unknown foe. The Federals were posted behind defensive breastworks, albeit hastily con-structed, and they offered heavy artillery and small-arms fire.

Cleburne personally deployed his brigades in a line. He placed Gen. S.A.M. Wood’s Brigade, which included Great Grandfather Oakes's 32nd/45th Consolidated Mississippi Regiment, in the center with Lucius Polk's Regiment on the right and Dreshler's on the left. At 6 PM, Cleburne issued the order to advance. His troops passed through the ranks of Liddell’s prone men who gave them a cheer as they moved forward in a single rank into the twilight through the smoke-filled woods.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Battlefield marker, September 19th, 6:30 PM

“In my front," wrote Cleburne after the battle, "were open woods—with the exception of a clearing (fenced in) in front of my centre, the ground sloping upwards as we advanced. Ordering the Brigades to direct themselves by Wood’s (Center) Brigade, and preserve Brigade-distance, I moved forward—passing over the first line—and was in a few moments heavily engaged along my right and centre. The enemy, posted behind hastily-constructed breastworks opened a heavy fire of both small arms and artillery.”

In this attack, Col. Lowrey's 32nd/45th Regiment of Wood's Brigade was among the first to strike the enemy. Polk and Dreshler advanced through the thick and dark woods, but in the center lay the cleared Winfrey field directly in front of Wood’s men. As they stepped into the open ground and crossed the field, the Federals let loose a devastating fire. Years later, Lowrey recalled "my regiment charged gallantly through an open field on the most exposed part of the line." His regiment aimed its attack at the enemy's barricaded fence at the far edge of the Winfrey field. In his official report of the 32nd/45th Regiment's attack, Lowrey wrote:

The advance was accordingly made, and I soon passed a line of our troops lying down. As I approached an open field in my front my skirmishers soon engaged the skirmishers of the enemy. I pushed my line of skirmishers forward as rapidly as possible, but their advance was slow, as the ground was hotly contested. My main line gained rapidly on the skirmishers, so that by the time the main line reached the first fence they received a volley from the enemy’s main line, which was behind the next fence, about 200 yards distant. My main line then commenced firing as the skirmishers in their front retired to their rear, and the whole line was soon engaged. I pushed my regiment forward as rapidly as possible, but their advance was slow, as they were compelled to pass through an open field against a line of battle of the enemy strongly posted behind a fence. The advance, however, was steady, and the enemy's line began to give way as we advanced within 40 or 50 yards of the fence. Up to this time the enemy had fired rapidly, but as it was already getting dark they overshot us, only killing 5 of my men and wounding about 20, which was a small number considering their great advantage.  

During the advance some brigades got out of alignment, and some units fell back. In the confusion and terror of the nighttime battle, combatants on both sides fired into friendly ranks. Cleburne reported, "For half an hour the firing was the heaviest I had ever heard; it was dark, however, and accurate shooting was impossible. Each party was aiming at the flashes of the other’s guns, and few of the shot from either side took effect. In the darkness and smoke, the fire was mostly inaccurate, and men desperately tried to distinguish friend from foe."

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Tree line from where Wood's attack began

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

The direction of Wood's attack through the Winfrey field (foreground),
and into the enemy-held woods beyond

Having crossed the field and clambered over the first line of entrenchments, Lowrey's men then came under fire from the enemy's main works about 200 behind. The division's lines by now had become confused and overlapping. Because of fear of shooting into friendly troops, Lowrey ordered a cease fire. By then, Cleburne had ordered Maj. Hotchkiss, whose batteries were behind Wood's Brigade, to bring up his artillery in front of the brigade. Hotchkiss, who was wounded in the attack, later reported he "let fly the dogs of war into the Yankee ranks" with double canister within 60 yards of the enemy's breastworks. The artillery fire, combined with pressure from Polk’s Brigade on the right, forced the enemy to fall back into the heavy woods.

Col. Lowrey ordered his men to hold the position while he reorganized his 32nd/45th Regiment for a further advance. In the meantime, Gen. Hill rode to Lowrey and ordered him to hold the position until further orders from Cleburne. By now, Wood's Brigade had taken the enemy's position, capturing 3 artillery pieces, 2 regimental colors, and 100 prisoners. In the struggle, it had also killed Col. Philemon Baldwin of the 6th Indiana, who was commanding the 3rd Brigade.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Monument of Col. Philemon P. Baldwin, 3rd Brigade. In the
center rear of the picture is the cannonball shell monument
marking the position where he was killed.

Further pursuit became impossible in the darkness, so around 9 PM, Cleburne halted his brigades. For all the fighting and terror, the attack had succeeded in pushing the Federals back only 300 yards. Rebel skirmishers were placed a quarter-mile in advance of the soldiers who slept without campfires in the miserable, near-freezing temperature. Some of them dozed with dead Federals for pillows, and everyone was painfully aware of the groans of the injured and dying scattered about. They also could hear the sound of axe blows and falling trees, which indicated that their renewed attack in the morning would mean assailing enemy defenses. Of the results of this fight, Author Steven E. Woodworth comments, "30 percent of the best division in the Army of Tennessee had become casualties while inflicting about equal losses on the enemy, and that was no bargain for the Confederacy."

As Cleburne's attack closes the first day of fighting, losses were great on both sides. One historian estimates casualties for the Confederates as high as 9,000. The Federal loss could have been as many as 7,000. There was one encouragement for the Confederates, however: The long-awaited Gen. James Longstreet had arrived. Overnight, Bragg placed Longstreet in command of the Left Wing of his army, and that will make all the difference in the fighting tomorrow.²

___________________________

From Lieut. Gen. D.H. Hill’s Report of today's action, 1863:

In the afternoon I received an order to report in person to the commanding general at Thedford’s Ford, and to hurry forward Cleburne’s division to the same point. Soon after Breckinridge was ordered to relieve Hindman at Lee and Gordon’s Mills. I found, upon reporting to the commanding general, that while our troops had been moving up the Chickamauga, the Yankees had been moving down, and thus outflanked us and had driven back our right wing. Cleburne was ordered to take position on the extreme right and begin an attack. We did not get into position until after sundown, but then advanced in magnificent style, driving the Yankees back some three-fourths of a mile... We captured 3 pieces of artillery, a number of caissons, 2 stand of colors, and upward of 300 prisoners. His [our] own loss was small, and fell chiefly upon Wood’s brigade, which had to cross an open field and encounter breastworks upon the opposite side of it.

Gen Hill paid a rare complement when he reported of Cleburne’s men: “I have never seen troops behave more gallantly than did this noble division, and certainly I never saw so little straggling from the field.”

¹ Great-great Grandfather, David Crockett Neal, was presently serving in Forrest's cavalry in Frank C. Armstrong's Division, in Armstrong's Brigade, which was commanded by Col. James T. Wheeler.

² Overnight (19th-20th), James Longstreet arrived with 2 brigades. Three of his brigades arrived earlier, in time to participate in the first day's fight. Tonight, Bragg takes the risky step of reorganizing his army into 2 wings, placing the left under Longstreet and the right under Leonidas Polk. Because of the difficult reorganization in darkness and general confusion, the daylight attack on the 20th will not take place as ordered by Bragg. Orders went astray in the dense woods.

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; This Terrible Sound, Peter Cozzens; Mark P. Lowrey Autobiography; Six Armies in Tennessee, Steven E. Woodworth;  Official Records, Vol. 30, Pts. 1 & 2; Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 9; Confederate Military History, Vol 10; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The bloodiest 2-day battle of the Rebellion

Tomorrow is the 150th anniversary of the 2-day 1863 Battle of Chickamauga,¹ named for the creek that ran through the battlefield, which will become by far the bloodiest 2-day battle of the war.² By its conclusion on the 20th, Gen. Braxton Bragg's Confederate Army of Tennessee, together with James Longstreet’s Corps from the Army of Northern Virginia, will defeat their Union opponent, General William S. Rosecrans and his Army of the Cumberland.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Today, the park-like battlefield is very beautiful and serene. 150 years ago,
however, the scenes of carnage and devastation would have been unbearable.

Battle Overview: The maneuvers and combat of this 2-day battle are somewhat confusing and difficult to follow. Before I try to track my Great Grandfather Oakes's 32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment through the battlefield, a short summary and overview of the general situation is in order.

Following the Tullahoma Campaign in late June through early July, Rosecrans renewed his offensive to force the Confederates out of Chattanooga. Rosecrans split his army into 3 corps, setting each out for Chattanooga by separate routes.

In early September, Rosecrans compelled Bragg to pull his army out of the town and head south. The Union troops followed the Confederate army and skirmished with it at Davis's Crossroads. But Rosecrans didn't immediately recognize his peril and waited until mid-month to consolidate his forces scattered in the mountainous region of Tennessee and Georgia.

Bragg was determined to reoccupy Chattanooga and decided to launch an offensive against Rosecrans’s army, cut it off, then move back into the city.

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

On the 17th, Bragg headed back toward Chattanooga, intending to draw Rosecrans into a decisive battle. As he moved north on the 18th, Bragg's cavalry and infantry skirmished with Union cavalry and mounted infantry, which were armed with Spencer repeating rifles.

The real battle began in earnest on the morning of the 19th, on the west side of Chickamauga Creek. While Bragg’s men hammered the Union line, they did not break it.

On the 20th, Bragg continued his assault on the left of the Union line. In late morning, Rosecrans was informed that he had a gap in his line. In moving units to shore up the supposed gap, Rosecrans inadvertently created one, and Gen. Longstreet’s men promptly exploited it, driving one-third of the Union army, including Rosecrans himself, from the field. Union Gen. George H. Thomas took over command and began consolidating some of the retreating army on Horseshoe Ridge. Although the Rebels launched determined assaults on Thomas's forces, the "Rock of Chickamauga" held his ground until after dark, thus saving Rosecrans's army. Thomas then withdrew from the field, leaving it to the Confederates.

The Union army retreated to Chattanooga, while the Rebels occupied the surrounding heights on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, laying siege to the city. This will bring on the beginning of the siege of Chattanooga.

¹ The name Chickamauga was Cherokee for "River of Death."

² Army of the Cumberland historian, Henry Martyn Cist, noted: "All things considered, the battle of Chickamauga for the forces engaged was the hardest fought and the bloodiest battle of the Rebellion."

Sources: CSWSAC Battle Summaries; This Terrible Sound, Peter Cozzens; The Army of Tennessee, Stanley F. Horn; The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist

Preliminary movements of the Battle of Chickamauga

Having missed earlier opportunities to crush portions of Rosecrans's army, Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg now has a chance to turn Rosecrans's left flank, get possession of the important LaFayette Road, and doing so, cut off a Federal retreat to Chattanooga. With this as his object, Bragg's offensive begins with bridge crossings over the West Chickamauga Creek on today's date, a Friday in 1863. This will be his opening move that will result in the Battle of Chickamauga, September 19-20, one of the bloodiest in the War Between the States.

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

Every day the situation for Bragg's enemy—Rosecrans and his scattered Army of the Cumberland—became more critical. Masses of reinforcements were being hurried to Bragg. In addition to Buckner's arrival, plus troops from Johnston in Mississippi, Longstreet's appearance from Virginia is imminent. And if that weren't enough, noted one Union soldier, "every militiaman of northern Georgia that could carry a gun was pressed into service." With that knowledge and the fact that his own army was scattered from Lee & Gordon's Mills north to Chattanooga, Rosecrans knew, as he said in his report, that it was "a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of [his] army."

By the 17th, Federal Generals Crittenden, McCook, and Thomas had begun uniting their 3 corps in supporting distance of each other. However, they were not yet in position to avert the impending danger that was the source of Rosecrans's anxiety. Bragg had his army in readiness for a general advance immediately. It undoubtedly would be successful if the Federal army were not in position to prevent the Confederates from taking the LaFayette Road and a direct path to Chattanooga.

Bragg's strategy required moving most of his army northward beyond the Federal left flank at Lee & Gordon's Mills, then crossing the Chickamauga Creek and driving southward, pushing Rosecrans's army back into McLemore's Cove. His plan anticipated 4 separate crossings over the creek from north to south: Gen. Bushrod Johnson's Division was to cross at Reed's Bridge, turn to the left, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee & Gordon's. Gen. William Walker's Reserve Corps would cross at Alexandria Bridge and attack the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction. Gen. Simon Buckner's Corps would cross at Thedford's Ford, then push the Federals back up the creek from Gen. Leonidas Polk's Corps. Polk would cross at Dalton's Ford and unite in the attack wherever he could find the enemy. Gen. D.H. Hill's Corps, in which Great Grandfather Oakes was serving, was to cover the left flank of Bragg's army, while the cavalry under Generals Forrest¹ and Wheeler would cover the army's northern and southern flanks respectively.

The Confederate army's opening movements on today's date were not executed as rapidly as Bragg planned. Early in the morning, Johnson approached Reed’s Bridge over the Chickamauga with his 5 infantry brigades, supported by Forrest’s cavalry. Union Col. Robert Minty, who was guarding Reed’s Bridge, was positioned about a mile east with 3 infantry regiments, supported by only a small cavalry force. At around 7:30 AM, Forrest's cavalry began skirmishing with Minty's force as Johnson's Division began arriving. Minty's troops were able to hold the bridge until mid afternoon before Johnson could force a crossing. Johnson was now hours behind schedule.²

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Overlook today from Reed's Bridge into the West Chickamauga Creek. The
difficulty of the terrain makes the importance of a bridge crossing obvious.

Several miles south, Walker's Corps attempted to force a crossing at Alexander's Bridge, which was defended by Wilder's "Lightning Brigade." Unsuccessful in his attack, Walker was forced to move north to cross at Byram's Ford late in the afternoon. Wilder's action at Alexander's Bridge likely prevented the Confederates from flanking the Union army and gained another day of preparation for the Federals. 

By evening, Bragg's offensive was seriously behind schedule. Johnson's Division, now under Hood's command, had marched southward on the Alexander Bridge Road, but was halted in front of Wilder's blockade. Walker had finally gotten his men west of the creek, but his troops were scattered for a mile along the road behind Johnson. Buckner had managed to push only 1 brigade across the creek at Thedford's Ford. Polk was still facing Crittenden at Lee & Gordon's, while Hill's Corps guarded crossing sites even further south. Nevertheless, Bragg believed he had successfully turned the Federal flank, and the next day he expected to descend upon Crittenden in a massive coordinated attack. 

Unbeknownst to Bragg, Rosecrans was bringing up his forces to confront the Confederates. However, Rosecrans was not yet in the position to defeat Bragg's plan. To accomplish that, it was necessary to make further repositioning of troops, which would be done under the safety of darkness. All night on the 18th, Generals Thomas and McCook will be moving their corps behind Crittenden's, north from McLemore's Cove to the field on Kelly's farm. The then will connect with Crittenden's corps on his right at Lee & Gordon's Mills. Thomas's troops will still be moving into the positions designated for them when the battle opens tomorrow.

By the evening of today's date, Rosecrans assumed that the extreme right of the Confederate army was on the east side of Chickamauga Creek and opposite Lee & Gordon's Mills. In fact, Bragg had a large force on the west side of the Chickamauga with the intention of turning Crittenden's left flank near the mill. In the morning, Bragg will attack what he assumed to be the Federal left. However, when the battle opens tomorrow, the enemy's left flank will be further north of where Bragg expected to find it.

Despite careful planning on both sides, the Battle of Chickamauga will open in an area not anticipated by either, because each is ignorant of the exact position of the other.

¹ Great-great Grandfather, David Crockett Neal, was presently serving in Forrest's cavalry in Frank C. Armstrong's Division, in Armstrong's Brigade, which was commanded by Col. James T. Wheeler.

² Angered by Bushrod Johnson's failure to cross the Chickamauga today, Bragg sent Gen. John Bell Hood to take command from him. Hood had only arrived by rail that afternoon as part of Longstreet's detachment from Robert E. Lee in Virginia. Receiving written orders at the station, Hood immediately mounted his horse and galloped out to Reed's Bridge. He arrived there in time to see the Confederates charge across. By evening, Hood marched his men southward on the Alexander Bridge Road, in the direction of Lee & Gordon's Mills, until he was forced to halt in front of Wilder's blockade, where he spent the night.

Sources: This Terrible Sound, Peter Cozzens; The Army of Tennessee, Stanley F. Horn;The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Civil War Times, David Wait Howe; Official Records, Vol. 30, Pt. 2; National Park Service

Cleburne's Division moves into position at Chickamauga

Having failed in earlier attempts to destroy Rosecrans's army piece by piece, Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg abandons that strategy for another one to force his opponent into a fight. He will take the offensive and try to draw Rosecrans into battle by moving back toward Chattanooga. Bragg will throw out his divisions along the east side of the Chickamauga, with his right at Reed's Bridge, 4 1/4 miles northeast of his left at Lee & Gordon's Mills.

Rosecrans, meanwhile, has come to the realization that rather than retreating, Bragg has turned on him while his Federal forces are still divided. Bragg's movements, including his attempt to trap the Federal force at Davis's Crossroads on September 10-11, has convinced the Union general that he had better unite his forces or risk defeat. He, therefore, hastened to concentrate his 3 corps. By the 16th, leading elements of McCook's corps joined Thomas's in McLemore's Cove.

On today's date in 1863, the corps of Union Generals Thomas and McCook west of Pigeon Mountain are both marching northward toward Lee & Gordon’s Mills. Confederate Gen. Cleburne's Division of Hill's Corps, east of the same mountain, is also ordered to march northward toward Lee & Gordon’s. Many historians believe that if Bragg had been ready for a general attack today, it would undoubtedly been successful as the Federal army was not then in a position to prevent the Confederate army from taking possession of the Lafayette road, the route to Chattanooga. So Bragg will order an attack for tomorrow. However, delays will prevent him from carrying it out as scheduled.

At daylight tomorrow, Cleburne’s Division, including Great Grandfather's brigade, will march to Dr. Anderson house, 4 miles southeast of Lee & Gordon’s Mills and form its line of battle as the left flank of the Confederate army. At this point they are now opposite the left wing of Rosecrans's army.* Bragg plans to make a strong demonstration at Lee & Gordon's to draw Rosecrans's attention away from the Confederate force crossing at bridges to the north in order to cut off the Federals from Chattanooga. Contrary to both commanding generals' information, the 2 forces are not opposite each other. Rather, most of Rosecrans's line is far north of Bragg's.


* Cleburne's Division will remain there until it is shifted north to meet the enemy on the late afternoon of the 19th.

Sources: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; This Terrible Sound, Peter Cozzens; Civil War Times, 1861-1865, Daniel Wait Howe; Official Records, Vol. 30, Part 2;  Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Another missed opportunity

On September 11, Union Gen. Thomas Wood with his 2 brigades was on a reconnaissance at Lee & Gordon's Mills, while Gen. Thomas Crittenden was ordered to occupy Ringgold to report on Confederate activity there. The results of these movements confirmed to Gen. Rosecrans's satisfaction that Bragg's main Confederate force was in the vicinity of LaFayette. He immediately ordered Crittenden and Wood to move as quickly as possible to the Rossville and LaFayette road, near Lee and Gordon's Mills. On the 12th, Crittenden was gathering his command at the mill as ordered.

In the meantime, having failed to crush Thomas's corps at Davis Cross Roads/Dug Gap 2 days earlier, Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg determined to hurl his columns upon Crittenden's divided corps, now approaching him from Chattanooga to the north. Bragg withdrew his troops facing Thomas's Corps toward LaFayette and directed Polk's and Walker's corps to move immediately in the direction of Lee & Gordon's Mills.

On the evening of the 12th, Bragg wrote to Gen. Leonidas Polk, notifying him of Crittenden's position of the previous day, and revealing some of his strategy:

This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn on the force in the cove. Wheeler's cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.

Later in the evening, 2 additional orders were issued to Polk, urging him to attack promptly at dawn on the 13th. At 11:00 that night, Polk, sensing that there were more Yankees present than Bragg knew, sent a dispatch stating that he had taken a strong defensive position and asked that he be reinforced. Bragg sent him an immediate order, making it clear that Polk was not to delay his attack, believing that Polk's force was numerically superior to Crittenden's.

Early on today's date, a Sunday in 1863, Bragg, at the head of Buckner's command, went to the front, and was shocked to learn that Polk had not advanced as ordered and that Crittenden had united his forces and recrossed the Chickamauga.

Again the Confederates lost a golden opportunity.

Bragg now gave orders to his commanders to concentrate along the east bank of the Chickamauga in position for battle to await Longstreet's reinforcements from Virginia for an attack with Bragg's entire command. In the meantime, Gen. Joseph Wheeler, with 2 cavalry divisions on the army's extreme left, was to engage Thomas's attention in McLemore's Cove, covering the Confederates' main movement. Forrest and and Pegram's cavalry divisions were to cover the right and front.

For the next several days, Cleburne's men, including my Great Grandfather Oakes's 32nd Mississippi, remained in Dug Gap watching the enemy in McLemore's Cove.

Sources: The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Civil War Times, David Wait Howe; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue;  Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

32nd Mississippi Infantry and the Battle of Davis Cross Roads/Dug Gap, 1863

On September 10 and 11, the Battle of Davis Cross Roads, or Dug Gap, was fought between elements of the armies of Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg and Union Gen. William Rosecrans.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

By September 8th, Bragg became aware that Rosecrans's dispersed army was in a hurry to pursue, under the impression that the Confederates were in full retreat. When he learned that a Federal column was entering McLemore's Cove, a V-shaped valley formed by Lookout Mountain and a spur named Pigeon Mountain, he turned to attack. The northern end of the valley was open, and several gaps provided access to it from the east. With his army screened behind Pigeon Mountain, Bragg saw an opportunity to destroy the Federals in the cove before they could receive assistance.

That evening Bragg ordered Gen. Thomas C. Hindman to prepare his division to move against the Federals. He also ordered Gen. D.H. Hill, whose corps was currently guarding gaps in the Pigeon Mountain, to send Cleburne's Division, which included Great Grandfather Oakes's 32nd Regiment of Wood's Brigade, into the cove toward Davis Crossroads. Hindman was to enter the cove from the north and drive the enemy toward Davis Crossroads. The planned attack was aimed at Gen. James S. Negley's division of Thomas's corps, which had been ordered to move from Steven's Gap into McLemore's Cove through Dug Gap, and then on to LaFayette.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Upon receiving his orders, Gen. Hill uncharacteristically failed to obey, complaining that his part of the movement was impracticable, as Cleburne was sick, and that both gaps—Dug and Catlett's—had been closed by downed trees, which the Confederates had felled to slow the enemy. In his judgment, it would require 24 hours to remove the obstacles. The basis for Hill's excuses proved to be flimsy and inaccurate.

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

Hindman was of less use to Bragg than was Hill. Hindman marched 10 miles during the night of the 9th, and took position, 3 miles from Negley in McLemore's Cove. But without Hill's support, he refused to go farther. Bragg, not wishing to lose so favorable an opportunity, sent Gen. Simon Buckner's Corps to join Hindman in the cove, arriving in the late afternoon of the 10th. After these commands had united, the generals held a conference and determined that Bragg's plan was not practicable, and then deliberately waited for further orders even though they outnumbered Negley 3 to 1.

Bragg refused to make any change and sent an oral order to Hindman to proceed at once to carry out his previous instruction. At the same time, Bragg sent written orders by courier to Hindman, updating him of the enemy's movements and informing him of Polk's assignment to cover his rear. Bragg then ordered Hindman to attack and fight his way through Negley's force to LaFayette at the earliest hour in the morning, adding, "Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard."

On the morning of the 10th, about 500 men from Col. Mark P. Lowrey's 32nd Regiment—including Great Grandfather's Co. D—were deployed as skirmishers in front of the Confederate force at Dug Gap and were, therefore, first to engage the Federal force.* The enemy advanced to within three-quarters of a mile from the gap before withdrawing. Overnight, Wood's Brigade cleared all obstructions from the gap in preparation for Cleburne's advance. 

By daylight on the 11th, Cleburne was reinforced with the rest of his division and Gen. W.H.T. Walker's Corps. Amassed in the area were a total of 30,000 Confederate troops positioned to crush Negley along with Gen. Absalom Baird's support division. Bragg's trap was set.

At daylight on the 11th, Cleburne, with 2 of his brigades at the edge of the cove, was waiting for the sound Hindman's guns to open—the signal for his attack—on the flank and rear of Negley and Baird's divisions. Well past noon, and with no word or sound of Hindman's guns, Bragg ordered Cleburne and Walker to attack. Cleburne's attack, with Wood's Brigade in advance, drove back the Union pickets and skirmishers. In fact, his whole battle line advanced across the Chickamauga Creek and to the base of Lookout Mountain, when a courier arrived from Bragg telling him to halt.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Negley, having been warned by local citizens of the size of the Confederate force facing him, fell back to Steven's Gap. As he was retiring his division, Hindman finally attacked, joined by a few Confederate cavalry and a battery. At dusk, Cleburne united with Hindman at Davis Crossroads, but by now the enemy was behind Steven's Gap. Bragg then ordered most of his command to LaFayette, while leaving Cleburne's Division to guard the gaps through Pigeon Mountain. His men now guarded against Federal Maj. Gen. Thomas's entire corps on the other side of the mountain.

Sadly for the Confederates, another opportunity was lost.

* Several official reports and records confirm these facts:

1. According to Col. John. T. Morgan's report on September 10, Col. Mark Lowrey (32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment) had an infantry force of about 500 men at Dug Gap (Official Records, Vol. 30, Pt. 1, p. 633).
2. In his company report for September 10-11, Capt. Norman writes that Company D "was engaged in skirmish with the enemy 10th and 11th in McElmore [sic] Cove" (Company D Record of Events, July-August 1863).
3. Brig. Gen. S.A.M. Wood reported to division headquarters that at 12:20 PM, "The enemy are in three-quarters of a mile of me, advancing. All the cavalry has gone to the right. I should like to have two pieces light artillery. I am now deploying to fight them. They have infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Charged once on our cavalry and broke it. Infantry deployed in front... I think it an advance in force, and we should be supported" (Official Records, Vol. 30, Part 2, pp. 299-300). 
4. Union Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas reported on September 10: I have just returned from General Negley's division in front of Dug Gap, or 1 mile west of Dug Gap, which place has been heavily obstructed by the enemy, and which is also occupied by a strong picket line; could not discover what force they have supporting their pickets. An officer of the Thirty-second Mississippi who was on picket guard lost his way, came into our pickets, and was captured. He was not very communicative, but was generous enough to advise General Negley not to advance or he would get severely whipped…” (Official Records, Vol. 30, Part 3, p. 510).

Sources: The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Six Armies in Tennessee, Steven E. Woodworth; Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West, Glenn Tucker;  National Park Service; Official Records, Vol. 30, Pts. 1-4; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Watching the enemy | Pat Cleburne's Division

Confederate General D.H. Hill’s Corps, which includes Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes's division (Patrick Cleburne's), is now concentrated at LaFayette, Georgia, while the rest of the Bragg's army is in position near Lee & Gordon’s Mills 14 miles to the north.

The next assignment for Cleburne's Division's is to guard several key passes or "gaps" through the mountainous area behind Bragg's army. On assignment in several of these same gaps is another ancestor, Great-Great Grandfather David Crockett Neal, whose 6th Tennessee Cavalry Regiment in Wharton's Division has been busy obstructing the gaps to slow the enemy's advance.¹ 

Thirty-two miles south of Chattanooga, a spur from Lookout Mountain projects to the northeast and then veers north. Known as Pigeon Mountain, the spur continues for nearly 20 miles, paralleling Lookout Mountain. McLemore’s Cove, the origin of Chickamauga Creek, is the valley between Lookout and Pigeon Mountains. The cove forms a V-shaped cul-de-sac about 5 miles wide. The only outlets are a few gaps in Pigeon and Lookout Mountains. Chickamauga Creek, starting at the south end of McLemore’s Cove, flows north through the valley. Dug Gap crosses Pigeon Mountain 4 miles northwest of LaFayette. Two miles northwest of Dug Gap lies Davis’s Crossroads. Steven’s Gap and Cooper’s Gap, 2 miles apart, ascend Lookout Mountain.

Into these passes that dissect Pigeon Mountain Cleburne sent elements of Wood’s Brigade, Great Grandfather Oakes's unit.² In some of these gaps, the soldiers felled trees and set up other obstacles to slow any Union advance through them. From each of these gaps Wood's Regiment will keep a watchful eye on enemy activity in McLemore’s Cove, while the rest of the division remains at LaFayette.

Source: The War of the Rebellion Atlas

About midnight on today's date, Bragg received confirmation from Wharton's scouts that 1 Federal corps (McCook's) was in Will's Valley. Other reports showed that Thomas's Corps was en route to McLemore's Cove via Steven's and Cooper's Gaps. Other Federal units were moving toward Dug Gap toward LaFayette. Effectively, Bragg believed he had constructed a trap for his enemy. His army now outnumbers the pursuing Rosecrans, whose army is still divided into 3 separate corps. Bragg is preparing to defeat the widely separated Union forces one group at a time, and he will start tomorrow with Thomas at Davis Crossroads.

Meanwhile in Virginia, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s divisions are today departing from Lee’s army by railroad to reinforce Bragg. However, they are forced to take an indirect route and won't begin reaching Bragg until the 17th.

¹ Wharton's Division was assigned to watch the lower passes in Lookout Mountain on a long front from Gadsden, Alabama, to Rome, Georgia.
²The passes in Pigeon mountain assigned to Wood were Dug Gap, Catlett's Gap (2 miles north of Dug Gap), and Bluebird Gap (1 1/2 miles south of Dug Gap).

Sources: Pat Cleburne:  Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; The 6th Tennessee Cavalry (unpublished manuscript), John F. Walter; Official Records, Vol. 30, Pt. 4

Cleburne's Division moves to Lee & Gordon’s Mills

In the late afternoon of today's date in 1863, Gen. Patrick Cleburne's Division of Hill's Corps, led the army in its march southward down the LaFayette Road into Georgia. The Army of Tennessee is abandoning its hold at Chattanooga and the state. Marching from Chattanooga, the soldiers passed through the village of Rossville at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and then on through Rossville Gap toward the Lee & Gordon's Mills. Cleburne's Division bivouacked on the west side of the Chickamauga Creek near Lee & Gordon’s Mills. Tomorrow morning, Hill's Corps will continue on south to to concentrate at LaFayette about 14 miles away.

The army had just marched over ground that, in less than 2 weeks, will become the Chickamauga battlefield during the bloodiest fighting of the war.

Lee & Gordon's Mills, 1863
Source: National Archives

Lee & Gordon's Mills is located about 14 miles south of Chattanooga, on the west bank of the Chickamauga Creek. The mill was built by James Gordon in 1836. It served as the first general store in the area. A blacksmith shop was located nearby, and the stagecoach and mail passed twice each week. During the Battle of Chickamauga, the mill first served as Bragg's headquarters. Then on September 10, Bragg moved his headquarters south to Lafayette, Georgia, and Union troops occupied the mill and surrounding area the next day. Skirmishes between the opposing armies occurred September 13-18, with the major Battle of Chickamauga drawing the Federal troops to the north on September 19-20. The mill next served as a headquarters for Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, but was recaptured in the winter of 1863 by Union troops.

The wartime mill burned in 1867. Shortly thereafter, James Lee, a partner in the mill, rebuilt it on the same site, which still stands today. The mill was operated by different owners until 1967, and stood empty and neglected until 1993, when Frank Pierce purchased the mill and restored it to operating condition and rebuilt the dam. Today the picturesque mill is a local attraction and houses a museum.

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Official Records, Vol. 30, Pt. 4; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Cleburne's Division is called to Chattanooga

From Harrison and other points along the Tennessee River, Confederate Gen. Patrick Cleburne moved his troops, including the 32nd Mississippi Regiment, to Chattanooga. The men will march via Tyner’s Station south 13 miles to Chattanooga, arriving there about 11:00 PM on today's date, a Sunday, in 1863. Elements of Forrest's cavalry are left to guard the length of river vacated by Bragg's infantry, from Chattanooga to Blythe's Ferry.

Gen. Braxton Bragg has decided to abandon Chattanooga, moving his army south toward Rome, Georgia, where he has concluded that Gen. William S. Rosecrans's army is heading to cut his railroad communication with Atlanta. He plans to unite with Buckner's army before confronting Rosecrans. The problem for Bragg is that he doesn't actually have an idea of where his enemy is.

At present, Rosecrans's army was concealing its movements in Wills Valley, screened behind Lookout Mountain. Bragg concluded that the Federals were likely going to Rome, to sever his railroad communications with Atlanta and the South. He decides to evacuate Chattanooga and march toward Rome so as to insert his army between the Federals and the railroad. The dirt road to Rome, known as the “LaFayette road,” led through LaFayette, Georgia, a town of about 200 inhabitants, 26 miles south and slightly east of Chattanooga. The road will will factor in significantly in the coming conflict that will be the Battle of Chickamauga.

Leading the army out of Chattanooga, Cleburne's Division will be on the southward march again in the morning.

Sources: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; The Third Battalion Mississippi Infantry and the 45th Mississippi Regiment, David Williamson; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Official Records, Vol. 30, Pt. 4; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Longstreet is ordered to reinforce Bragg

While Confederate General Braxton Bragg is moving his army south of Chattanooga to find the enemy, he is unaware that Richmond has finally decided to send reinforcements from Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia. On today's date in 1863, Lee and President Davis agree to send 2 divisions under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet to Tennessee/North Georgia where Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes is serving in the 32nd Mississippi Infantry.

The direct rail line through Knoxville had just been broken with the fall of that city to Union Gen. Ambrose Burnside on September 3. Longstreet's rail movement would now have to take a much longer and indirect route through the Carolinas and Georgia, then north to Bragg's army. Longstreet's force of John Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws's divisions, along with Col. Edward Porter Alexander's 26-gun artillery battery, will begin their trip on September 9. Lead elements will begin arriving on September 17th, just in time for the Battle of Chickamauga.

Born in South Carolina in 1821, James Longstreet became one of the most successful generals in the Confederate army. After  "Stonewall" Jackson, he is considered the most effective corps commander in Lee's army. Longstreet was certainly one of Lee's most trusted subordinates, and Lee affectionately referred to him as his "Old War Horse."

Longstreet grew up in Georgia and graduated from West Point in 1842. He was a close friend of Ulysses S. Grant, and in 1848, he attended Grant's wedding. Longstreet served in the U.S. army in the Mexican-American War (1846-48) and was wounded at the Battle of Chapultepec. At the outbreak of the War Between the States, he resigned his commission as major and soon was named brigadier general in the Confederate army.

Longstreet fought at the First Battle of Bull Run, Virginia, in July 1861, and within a year was commanding his own corps in Robert E. Lee's army. In 1862, he led his corps in the Peninsula Campaign in June-July, Second Bull Run in August, and at Fredericksburg in December. In July 1863, he led  his corps at the Battle of Gettysburg. In September, he fought at Chickamauga, and then was moved to the Knoxville Campaign later that year. Back with Lee in May 1864, he helped save the army in Battle of the Wilderness. However, he was severely wounded and missed much of the rest of the year while he recuperated. Rejoining the army in October at Petersburg, Longstreet fought with Lee until the surrender at Appomattox Court House, in April 1865.

After the war, Longstreet worked in a number of businesses, and he held several governmental posts, including U.S. Marshall and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. However, he also became the center of some Southern controversy. Several Southern leaders thought Longstreet had stained his reputation by joining the despised Republican Party and endorsing Grant for president in 1868. It didn't help matters that Longstreet had also openly questioned Lee's strategy at the Battle of Gettysburg. His fellow officers, particularly Jubal Early, John Gordon, and William Nelson Pendleton, considered Longstreet's assertions indefensible and even traitorous. Turning the tables, they alleged that it was actually Longstreet who was responsible for the errors that lost Gettysburg. In spite of his tarnished reputation, Longstreet did maintain warm relationships with many veterans' groups, including many who had fought with him and against him.

Longstreet outlived most of his comrades and critics before dying on January 2, 1904, at age 82. He is buried in the Alta Vista Cemetery in Gainesville, Georgia.

Sources: This Terrible Sound, Peter Cozzens; Civil War Trust

Rosecrans on the move

Before Confederate General Braxton Bragg was fully aware of it, Rosecrans's army had crossed the Cumberland Plateau on August 16th, and moved to the Tennessee River. On the 29th, 3 Federal corps—Thomas's, McCook's, and Stanley's—crossed the river near Stevenson and many miles south of Chattanooga.

The evening of August 31st, Bragg received a report that the main force of Rosecrans’s army was crossing the Tennessee River at points 22 and 32 miles southwest of Chattanooga. Unopposed on today's date in 1863, large Federal forces were now in the Wills Valley, west of Lookout Mountain. Part of the Union army was reported to be moving south in the valley, and perhaps would cross the mountain at Winston’s Gap, 42 miles from Chattanooga, in an attempt to cut off the Confederate supply line from Atlanta. Learning of this threat to the rear of his army, Bragg will abandon Chattanooga on September 8, and the next day the Federals will occupy the city.

Great Grandfather's division's commanding general, Patrick Cleburne, advised the army's commander-in-chief, Gen. Braxton Bragg, that he should attack and crush the enemy corps facing him. However, Bragg did not agree and passed up an important opportunity.

Sources: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Muster Roll of the 32nd Mississippi Infantry; Official Records, Vol. 30, Pt. 4

Co. D of Lowrey's Regiment marches to Harrison

My Great Grandfather, Pvt. Nathan Oakes, served in Company D of the 32nd Mississippi Regiment. Following is Capt. F.S. Norman's meager report for today's date, 1863, concerning his company's march in response to the Yankees' movement across the river:

Left Blythes Ferry, Sept. 2, 1863 and marched to Harrison, a distance of 20 miles, then to Chattanooga...

The regiment arrived at Harrison the next day and remained in camp for several days more near a brick female college.

On this same date, another ancestor, Great-great Grandfather David Crockett Neal, with the 6th Tennessee Cavalry Regiment in Wharton's Division, is guarding passes through Lookout Mountain, watching for the enemy's approach.

Sources: Muster Roll of the 32ndMississippi Infantry, complied by Tommy Lockhart; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; The 6th Tennessee Cavalry (unpublished manuscript), John F. Walter; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill