Longstreet's Siege of Knoxville

James Longstreet

On this date in 1863, Confederate Gen. James Longstreet began a siege of the city of Knoxville, Tennessee.

The Knoxville Campaign began on November 4th, when Longstreet left Braxton Bragg's army at Chattanooga with 17,000 troops to take Eastern Tennessee for the Confederates. Just prior to the September Battle of Chickamauga, Longstreet had been loaned from Robert E. Lee's Army of Virginia to reinforce Bragg's army out West. He and 2 of his divisions arrived on the battlefield just in time to participate in the victory at Chickamauga on September 20. His breakthrough resulted in the Yankees fleeing in a panic to fortifications at Chattanooga.

In the weeks following the victory at Chickamauga, Longstreet, along with other general officers in Bragg's army, quarreled with their commander-in-chief. They were not happy with Bragg's ability to command the army and were disgusted with his failure to follow up the success at Chickamauga and destroy of Rosecrans's army. The result of the dispute was the reassignment of several of Bragg's generals. Somehow Longstreet avoided the firings and reassignments that ensued. Instead, he was allowed to stay in command through October at Lookout Mountain until he was given independent command of the Department of East Tennessee.

On November 5th, Longstreet and his troops departed the Army of Tennessee and moved toward Knoxville, a key military objective for the Confederate high command as well as President Lincoln. Longstreet's opponent was Gen. Ambrose Burnside and 5,000 Federal troops.

Ambrose Burnside

The previous December, Burnside had been soundly defeated at the Battle of Fredericksburg. In March 1863, he was sent to the Western Theater and given command of the Army of the Ohio. His orders were to move against Knoxville as quickly as possible to coordinate with Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland opposing Bragg's army in Middle Tennessee. Bragg was driven from Tullahoma in in early July, but stood his ground in the Chickamauga Campaign, resulting in a Confederate victory and Rosecrans's reassignment. Burnside wasn't about to repeat Rosecrans's mistake. By September 9th, he had taken control of Knoxville, due in large part to the departure of a significant Confederate force, Simon B. Buckner's, to reinforce Bragg at Chickamauga.

On November 16th, Burnside fought Longstreet in a delaying action at Campbell Station, before retreating behind the defensive perimeter of Knoxville. On today's date, Longstreet moved his men into position around the north side of the city, supported by Joseph Wheeler's cavalry, but could not cut off supplies to the Union troops. Longstreet laid siege to Knoxville while he waited for reinforcements to arrive, which they finally did on November 28.* He attacked, but was repulsed with heavy loses. Longstreet continued the siege in order to draw troops away from Chattanooga. The ruse worked, and 25,000 Union troops were dispatched from Chattanooga to chase Longstreet out of Eastern Tennessee.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Ultimately, Longstreet withdrew to Virginia. His Knoxville Campaign was a failure for him and disappointment for the Confederates who had hoped to take control of Eastern Tennessee and the railroad that linked the Confederacy from east to west. By Spring 1864, Longstreet will rejoin Lee's army in Virginia.

For the Federals, Longstreet's campaign deprived Bragg of troops he desperately needed to take the Federal army at Chattanooga.


* In fact, on November 23rd, Patrick Cleburne's Division, in which Great Grandfather Oakes was serving in the 32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment, was ordered off Missionary Ridge to to the Chickamauga station to depart by rail to reinforce Longstreet. Many of the troops had already embarked when Bragg, under attack on Missionary Ridge, ordered Cleburne to return at once with his men. The Battle of Missionary Ridge will take place on the 25th.

Sources: The Army of the Cumberland, Jacob D. Cox; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Official Records, Vol. 31, Pt. 2

Reorganization of Bragg's army

In the reorganization of Bragg’s Army on this date in 1863, the 32nd/45th Mississippi Consolidated, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving, was temporarily commanded by Lieut. Col. R. Charlton. The regiment was in Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey’s Brigade, in Cleburne’s Division, now in Cheatham’s Corps. Also in the Brigade were the 16th Alabama (Maj. Frederick A. Ashford), 33rd Alabama (Col. Samuel Adams), 45th Alabama (Lieut. Col. H. D. Lampley), and 15th Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters (Capt. Daniel Coleman).

When William J. Hardee was recalled to the Army of Tennessee from his 3-month posting in Alabama, he was given command of Cheatham’s Corps, and Cheatham returned to command a division. Cleburne’s Division was then transferred to Hardee’s Corps. Hardee now has under his command the divisions of Cleburne, Cheatham, Stevenson, and Walker.

With Hardee’s return Bragg now believed he had a rationale for getting rid of his antagonist, James Longstreet.* At President Davis’s suggestion, Bragg, in early November, will send Longstreet to East Tennessee to confront a Federal army under Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside near Knoxville. Bragg even promises to send additional forces to Longstreet later. When Longstreet leaves on November 4th, he will take nearly a third of Bragg's force, leaving the army at Missionary Ridge with only 2 corps under Hardee and Breckinridge, and no more than 37,000 men.

By this same date, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, overall commander of the Federal army in the West, arrived in Chattanooga. A few days earlier, Gen. George "Rock of Chickamauga" Thomas had succeeded Rosecrans as commander of the besieged Army of the Cumberland. Gen. Joseph Hooker's men are arriving to reinforce Thomas, as soon will be 4 divisions commanded by Gen. William T. Sherman from Mississippi.

The timing for sending Longstreet away couldn't have been worse for Bragg's Army of Tennessee.


* Not surprisingly, Longstreet had his own opinion about what to do with Bragg. Following a meeting with some of Bragg's other lieutenants (Polk and Hill, both of whom Bragg fired), Longstreet wrote to Secretary of War Seddon, summing up his (and probably the other generals') concerns about the leadership of the Army of Tennessee: "... I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander." Longstreet's remedy for the leadership crisis was to replace Bragg with Robert E. Lee. Of course, that idea went nowhere with the high command in Richmond.

Sources: Official Records, Vol. 31, Pt. 3; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; The Army of Tennessee, Stanly, F. Horn; General William H. Hardee: Old Reliable, Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr.

The Battles of Brown's Ferry and Wauhatchie Station, 1863

The Battles of Brown Ferry and Wauhatchie Station* were fought between October 27-29, 1863, between forces of Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg, whose army is on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and Union Gen. George Thomas in Chattanooga.

Source: Wikimedia Common

In an effort to relieve Union forces besieged in Chattanooga, Generals Thomas and Grant ordered the “Cracker Line Operation” on October 26, a plan first devised by Rosecrans to open a supply line to Chattanooga from Brown’s Ferry on the Tennessee River. Brown's Ferry was an ideal position from which to control a road through Lookout Valley after a pontoon bridge could be built to replace the ferry. The plan called for a simultaneous advance up Lookout Valley, securing the Kelley’s Ferry Road. 

At 3 AM on today's date in 1863, a Federal brigade under William B. Hazen floated in the fog on pontoons around Tennessee River's Moccasin Bend to Brown’s Ferry. Another brigade took a position on Moccasin Bend across from Brown’s Ferry. There the Federals secured the bridgehead, then assembled the pontoon bridge across the river, crossed, and took position on the other side. Within 20 minutes they succeeded in taking Brown's Ferry in spite of fire from Rebel troops, as well as cannon fire from the Confederates on Lookout Mountain.

Then on the 28th, another Federal force under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker marched through Lookout Valley and took up a position at Wauhatchie Station, a stop on the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad, to protect the line of communications to the south, as well as the road west to Kelley’s Ferry.

Observing the Federal movements on the 27th & 28th, Confederate Generals James Longstreet and Braxton Bragg decided on a rare nighttime attack on the Federals at Wauhatchie Station. Although the attack was scheduled for 10 PM on the night of October 28, confusion delayed it till midnight. While surprised by the attack, the Federals at Wauhatchie nevertheless held their position. Hearing the battle from Brown’s Ferry, Hooker sent 2 divisions to Wauhatchie Station as reinforcements. As Union troops arrived, the Confederates were forced to fall back to Lookout Mountain. The Union suffered 78 killed, 327 wounded, and 15 missing, while the Confederates lost 34 killed, 305 wounded, and 69 missing.

The results from these 2 actions meant that the Federals now had their connection outside Chattanooga. Next, they pushed rapidly forward with constructing the road from Brown's to Kelley's Ferry, which they finished by the 1st of November, thus controlling Lookout Valley. Supplies could now be hauled from Kelly's Ferry and Wauhatchie to Chattanooga. The siege being lifted, the Union army now could receive supplies, weapons, ammunition, and reinforcements via the Cracker Line.

While Bragg's hope of starving the Federals out of Chattanooga has ended, he yet had to contend with extreme shortages in his own starving army. Bragg still had not repaired his rail line to bring supplies from Atlanta. And now, he has lost control of a vital segment of the Tennessee River and valley. The initiative has definitely shifted in favor of Thomas's army.


* To see a 360-degree presentation of the Wauhatchie Station and the Chattanooga battlefield, visit the Civil War Trust Website, Chattanooga 360.

Sources: The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, Jacob Dolson Cox; The Shipwreck of Their Hopes, Peter Cozzens; Mountains Touched With Fire,Wiley Sword; CWSAC Batlte Summaries

"Our last reckless charge that broke the enemy’s lines" | Day 2 of the Battle of Chickamauga

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

With the arrival overnight of Gen. James Longstreet with 2 additional brigades, Confed-erate Gen. Braxton Bragg decided a hasty reorgani-zation of his army was in order. He placed the army's left, under Longstreet and the right under Leonidas Polk. Orders were made for a dawn attack, beginning with Polk's right wing in the north, with each division joining suc-cessively down the line from to the south. However, in the con-fusion and darkness, orders went astray and commanders could not be found. The Federals used the time to strengthen their mile-long defensive breastworks.

Toward morning on today's date, a Sunday in 1863, Gen. Patrick Cleburne received an order from Polk, explaining that he had sought in vain to locate Cleburne's corps commander, D.H. Hill, and so directed Cleburne to attack the enemy as soon as he could get into position. Polk sent an identical order to Gen. Breckinridge, now in position on Cleburne’s right.

About 7 AM, Hill received his copy of the orders, and immediately sent a message to Polk, explaining that it would be an hour before his divisions could move. Further, Hill informed Polk, “General Cleburne reports that the Yankees were felling trees all night, and consequently now occupy a position too strong to be taken by assault. What shall be done when this point is reached?” Bragg's reply came about 8 AM, with an order for Hill to attack as quickly as possible.

However, it will be 10:00 AM, 3 hours late, before Breckinridge opens the battle by striking toward Federal Gen. George Thomas's breastworks to the north of Cleburne's men. Two of his brigades drove all the way to the LaFayette road. But the left of Breckinridge's Division ran up against fierce fire from behind stronger fortifications, and the shot-up division was turned back. Confederate Brig. Gen. Ben Hardin Helm, President Lincoln's brother-in-law, was killed in the attack. By noon, Breckinridge's Division was ruined.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Now it was Cleburne's turn. From Cleburne's report of that morning:

I received orders from Lieut. Gen. Hill to advance and dress on the line of Gen. Breckin-ridge, who had been placed on my right. Accordingly, directing each Brigade to dress upon the right, and preserve its distance, I moved forward. Breckinridge was already in motion. The effort to overtake, and dress upon him, caused hurry and some confusion in my line, which was necessarily a long one.

Cleburne moved his division forward to began their own attack against Thomas's main line of defensive works. Almost immediately his men came under fire, and the advance became disorderly and needed to be rectified. However, before Cleburne could straighten out his lines, the men came under shattering firepower coming from the enemy's line.  According to Cleburne:

Polk's brigade and the right of Wood's encountered the heaviest Artillery-fire I have ever experienced. I was now within short canister range of a line of log breast-works, and a hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods, from the unseen enemy in my front.

This deadly fire was direct, and came from that part of the enemy's breast-works, opposite to my right and right centre; the rest of my line—stretching off to the left—received an oblique fire from the line of breastworks, which, at a point opposite my centre formed a retiring angle running off toward the Chattanooga-LaFayette road behind.

To the division's right and center the enemy's works ran about a half-mile north and south, and nearly parallel to the LaFayette road toward Chattanooga, which at this point was only 300 yards beyond. There Cleburne's men encountered the center of the Yankee fortifications, their works forming an angle, both sides running west toward the road. From Cleburne's center to his right were Lucius Polk's Brigade and Col. Mark P. Lowrey's Regiment of Wood's Brigade, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was fighting. Lowrey's men advanced in the lead in the most exposed part of the attacking line. It was nearly impossible for the men to line up an enemy target in their sights, so well fortified were the Federal log works.

Cleburne's report continues:

Passing toward the left at this time, I found that the line of advance of my Division, which was the left of the Right Wing of the Army, converged with the line of advance of the Left Wing of the Army; the flanks of the two wings had already come into collision—part of Wood's Brigade had passed over Bate's Brigade of Stewart's Division, which was the right of the Left Wing, and Deshler's Brigade, which formed my left, had been thrown out entirely, and was in rear of the Left Wing of the Army. I ordered Wood to move forward the remainder of his Brigade; opening at the same time in the direction of the enemy's fire with Semple's Battery.

That part of Wood's Brigade to the left of Lowrey's Regiment, and to the left of the Southern angle of the breast-works, in its advance at this time, entered an old field bordering the road (Chattanooga-LaFayette), and attempted to cross it in the face of a heavy fire from works in its front; it had almost reached the road, its left being at Poe's house (known as the Burning House), when it was driven back by a heavy oblique fire of small-arms and Artillery which was opened upon both its flanks. The fire from the right wing coming from the South face of the breast-works, which was hid from view by the thick growth of scrub-oak bordering the field. Five hundred men were killed and wounded by this fire in a few minutes.

At this point, the Confederates were well within the enemy's kill zone when their advance was checked. For Lowrey's troops it was the most severe ordeal they had yet experienced in the war. As Lowrey's men gained the summit of a ridge, they came under fire from a long line of infantry and a battery firing grapeshot from behind breastworks. "When they reached the top of a ridge 230 yards from the enemy's breastworks," reported Lowrey, "they took position behind trees and kept up a regular fire until the whole line had moved up to their position. The firing was heavy from the enemy's breastworks, and my whole line was soon engaged." Nearly a quarter of regiment's men were cut down here, including Maj. F.C. Karr and several of his men who tried to rescue him.¹ Sgt. Thomas J. Webster, Pvts. James P. Carter, Jerry M. Layton, and John W. Looney of Great Grandfather's Co. D were also killed. Many other friends from his hometown of Kossuth, Mississippi were killed or wounded near this spot.

There was so little protection that the Confederates lay down and did their best to fire back at the log defenses, while at the same time erecting what little defense they could of limbs, rocks, and brush that could be hastily collected. Lowrey's report continues:

A battery could be seen from my right wing, and the smoke from the enemy's guns was all else that could be seen at which to direct our fire, as the enemy's works were constructed over the crest of the next hill. Being disengaged a considerable distance from the left of Polk's brigade, so that a line of infantry much longer than my own poured a direct and cross-fire into my ranks, and a battery only 230 yards in my front all the time pouring grape-shot upon us, made the fire by far the most severe I have ever witnessed.

In a very short time, I lost over one-fourth of my command in killed and wounded. Nineteen of my men now sleep in one grave near where the colors stood, all of whom were killed near that spot. I would have caused my men to fall back over the crest of the hill and cease firing, but having had orders to go forward and engage the enemy and none to fall back, I supposed it was my duty to keep up the fire, and that a movement was going on the enemy's right flank that would soon remove them from their stronghold.

Lowrey's Regiment clung to the crest for over an hour, while the rest of the Wood's Brigade was driven back with heavy losses. Supposing some other advance would be made to relieve him, Lowrey held on. But when his ammunition was practically exhausted, each man having expended his 40-round issue, Lowrey was forced to pull back his regiment as well. Captain Coleman of the 15th Batallion Sharpshooters, who followed Lowrey's decision to withdraw, observed: "Owing to the gallantry and coolness of Colonel Lowrey, his regiment fell back in fine order, and this inspired my own company… The good order preserved under so hot a fire was remarkable."

When Wood's Brigade withdrew, Cleburne moved up Deshler's Brigade to fill the gap it left, intending to connect Dreshler with the left of Polk's Regiment. However, by this time Polk's left had been driven back and was in serious danger. Cleburne was compelled to order Polk to fall back and join Wood's men in a strong defensive position more than 300 yards in rear of the point from which they had been repulsed.

Deshler moved his brigade forward toward the right of the enemy's defenses, but he could not go beyond the crest of the low ridge from which Lowrey had been forced back. Cleburne ordered Deshler to take cover there and hold his position as long as possible, while the rest of the division rested several hundred yards behind. Sadly, while in command of the advanced position, Gen. Deshler was killed when a shell hit him in the chest.

Other brigades were thrown forward in series rather than together. Some further to Lowrey's left made it as far as the LaFayette road before being turned back. Consequently, while each unit fought vigorously, they were not victorious. Gen. Leonidas Polk's decision not to assault Thomas with his whole wing had been a mistake. Bragg's plan that morning for a series of sequential attacks all along the line did not achieve the expected breakthrough.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

For Cleburne’s and Breckinridge’s Divisions that morning, their attacks were repulsed at great cost. To their credit, wrote Hill, the men fought in a single line without reserves or supporting forces, and they had assailed formidable breastworks. Their heroism and sacrifice had not been in vain, however, and their attack did have a significant influence on the outcome of the battle. Their piecemeal assaults, although repulsed, were so forceful that Gen. Thomas repeatedly called for reinforcements. Rosecrans, convinced that the Confederate army planned to turn his army's left, hurried heavy reinforcements (Gen. T.J. Wood's Division) to Thomas from the Federal right. The gap that opened shortly before noon offered Confederate General James Longstreet the opportunity to pierce the Federal right and achieve a decisive outcome.²

At 1 PM, Gens. Longstreet's and John Bell Hood's men surged through the opening at the Brotherton field, striking the exposed Federal right flank. Within 10 minutes the Rebels were across the LaFayette road, driving a deep wedge into the Federal rear. The Union center and right were routed and fled. Most of the demoralized Federals fled to Chattanooga, as did Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden, and McCook. Also fleeing was the Assistant Secretary of War, Charles A. Dana, who was present at the battle as an observer for Secretary Stanton. Part of a single division, Gen. Philip H. Sheridan's, stopped upon reaching a gap in Missionary Ridge, but it did not return to the battlefield. By sunset, which came around 6 PM, essentially the whole Federal army was full retreat through McFarland's Gap, not stopping until they got to Rossville on the outskirts of Chattannooga.

Yet, one obstinate Yankee corps general, George Thomas, did not flee. He was commanding the forces in Cleburne’s front when Longstreet attacked, and he remained in place. Only his unbroken line along the LaFayette Road, plus a few thousand more Federals on Horseshoe Ridge, still held the field.

Thomas soon formed a new line to his rear on Horseshoe Ridge from where he made a stubborn stand that halted Longstreet’s pursuit. With reinforcements, yet outnumbered 2 to 1, Thomas resisted Longstreet’s vigorous assaults throughout the afternoon, earning him the well-deserved nickname, "The Rock of Chickamauga," as well as the Thanks of the U.S. Congress. At 4 PM, Thomas received orders to withdraw from Rosecrans. The message was brought by future President, Chief of Staff James A. Garfield, who famously rode under enemy fire through the battlefield to Thomas on Snodgrass Hill. With the Federal army safely behind him at Chattanooga, Thomas quietly withdrew to Rossville under cover of darkness, there to await a renewed attack that never came. Then on the 21st, he retreated on to Chattanooga with the rest of the Federal army.

 

During Longstreet's attack on Thomas's position, Cleburne and Breckinridge regrouped their men for another assault. At about 3:30 PM, Polk ordered Cleburne to attack. Just before 5 PM, Cleburne had formed his battered men in a line and advanced. This time the Rebel attack was too heavy to be resisted. Cleburne's men drove the enemy's skirmishers, as my Great Grandfather recalled, "in our last reckless charge that broke the enemy’s lines."³ With help from the artillery the men took the works from which they had been repulsed that morning.

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

As the Federals were fleeing, Polk's Brigade, with Lowrey's Regiment following in support, took up the pursuit some distance up the LaFayette road. Capturing the enemy's artillery and hundreds of prisoners, Cleburne halted his division in the enemy's camp to await further orders. His victorious men had finally gained the LaFayette road for which they had fought for 2 days. There they will camp for the night, while less than a half-mile to the west, Gen. Thomas is gathering a Federal force to make a stand on Horseshoe Ridge.
 

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

The direction from which Cleburne's men attacked the Federal breastworks
in the Kelly field along the LaFayette Road

Initially, Bragg was unable to believe that the Confederates had won without following his battle plan. He, therefore, delayed in following up on his victory, which could have meant the complete destruction of Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland. The opportunity for overwhelming victory was allowed to pass.

________________________ The 32nd Regiment Roll of Honor ________________________

"Many of my best men fell," wrote Col. Mark P. Lowrey. Indeed the 32nd Regiment lost 25 killed and 141 wounded.  Major F.C. Karr was shot and died soon after the battle. The various companies selected the following men for the Roll of Honor: Smith Scroggins, (killed), Co. A; J.B. Milton (killed), Co. B; Samuel H. Stevenson, Co. C; J.W. Looney (killed), Co. D; Monroe M. Miller (killed), Co. E; J.M. Cooper, Co. F; C.H. Reed, Co. G; Sgt. John Calvin Dean, Co. H; C.C. Campbell (killed), Co. I; Sgt. T. W. Crabb, Co. K.

____________________________________________________________________________

For his actions in this battle, Col. Mark P. Lowrey was promoted to brigadier general on October 4, 1863. He will be given command of Wood's Brigade, which will henceforth be called "Lowrey's Brigade." In his report of the battle, Lieut. Gen. D. H. Hill wrote: "Col. M. P. Lowrey has been deservedly promoted, and a worthier object of advancement could not have been selected." Gen. Cleburne said after the battle that Lowrey was “the bravest man in the Confederate Army."

¹ In 1899, an old veteran from among this rescue party wrote to the Confederate Veteran magazine (Vol 7): "At about the time Maj. F.C. Karr fell Cleburne’s column fell back two hundred yards to get ammunition. Gen. Mark Lowrey came down the line and cried out: ‘Boys, you have left your major on the field, and he is still exposed to danger!’ Five men immediately volunteered to bring the wounded major from the field. They were D.W. Rogers, Jessee Cheeves, Serg. Hanks, Serg. Crabb, and W.P. Hammons. The Federals were still pouring a deadly fire into the field, and shot and shell were plowing the ground in every direction around the wounded officer. The five men walked across the field without faltering for an instant, and had secured the Major and were bringing him back to their line stretched on a blanket, when a bomb exploded among them. The brave fellows fell in a heap, with shattered limbs and bodies. They were rescued by other comrades, but all were maimed for life." 

² Gen. John Bell Hood was severely wounded at the height of this assault, requiring the amputation of his right leg. He had earlier received a serious wound at the Battle of Gettysburg, rendering his left arm useless for the rest of his life. Nevertheless, this dedicated soldier will continue to lead men in battle. He will return to field service during the Atlanta Campaign of 1864, and replace Bragg as the commanding general of the Army of Tennessee.

³ From a letter Nathan R. Oakes wrote to the editor of the Confederate Veteran magazine (Vol. 7, 1889). One of Great Grandfather's comrades in Co. D, Thomas "Ben" Settle, wrote home a few days after the battle: We have had a hard fight near this place. It commenced on the nineteenth of this month and ended on the twentieth. We had a very hard fight lost a great many men but succeded in driving the enemy from the field... They fought very stubbornly all the while, but our men went to the field determined to drive the enemy back, and they fought with that determination."

Sources: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; This Terrible Sound, Peter Cozzens; The Army of Tennessee, Stanley F. Horn; Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West, Glenn Tucker; The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Confederate Veteran, Vol. 7,  January 1899-December 1899; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill; National Archives Civil War Service Records; Official Records, Vol. 30, Pts. 1 & 2

Cleburne's sunset attack | Day 1 of the Battle of Chickamauga

The first day of the Battle of Chickamauga opened on this date, a Saturday in 1863. Just after daylight, a Union force from George Thomas's division was ordered to Jay’s sawmill to confront what was thought to be a lone Confederate brigade. Instead, the Federals ran into Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry.¹ The 2 forces clashed the dense woodlands. The fierce fighting compelled Bragg to shift some of his forces to the right of the battle line. By 1 PM, the battle there reached a lull, and the fighting began to shift toward the middle of the Confederate line.

All morning the fighting rumbled southward, roughly following the LaFayette road, passing from the Confederate divisions of Cheatham, Walker, and then Stewart. Both sides took heavy casualties but neither gained an edge. Then around 4 PM, Confederate Maj. Gen. A.P. Stewart launched a charge that pushed back the Federal center across the LaFayette road, and it nearly carried the fight. But this attack stalled. To the south, Gen. John B. Hood had some success with driving his opponent on Stewart's left, but he gained no significant advantage for the fighting. Bragg needed to crush the Federals.

Hope lay with Gen. Patrick Cleburne, whose division will soon have an opportunity to change the dynamic of the battle. His men, having listened to cannonading all morning, are about to enter the fight. Early in the afternoon, Cleburne was ordered to move his division northward to Thedford's Ford, there to cross the Chickamauga Creek and to report to Gen. Leonidas Polk who would direct him into line. Cleburne set his men out on the 6-mile march along a road which was clogged by marching troops,  wagons, and artillery.

A little further up the road, and observing Cleburne's men marching under their distinctive blue and white banners, Gen. Forrest remarked to a subordinate, “Do you see that large body of infantry marching this way in columns of fours? That is General Pat Cleburne’s division; hell will break loose in Georgia in about fifteen minutes.”

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

Arriving ahead of his men at Thedford’s Ford, Cleburne received orders to continue northward to reinforce the right wing of the army under Gen. Polk. Bragg's plan was to attack the Federal army on its left flank, cut it off from Chattanooga, drive it southward to McLemore’s Cove, and there destroy it. Gen. D.H. Hill’s Corps, including Cleburne’s Division, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving, was to spearhead the attack.

Artillery was firing in the east as Cleburne's men reached Thedford’s Ford in the late afternoon. Moving his men along immediately, the troops took off their shoes and pants, and holding their clothing and rifles high, they crossed the creek and resumed their march for 2 more miles over ground on which the battle had been raging all day. They arrived near the extreme right of the Confederate position just as the sun was setting.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Battlefield marker, September 19th, 6 PM

At about 5 PM, Cleburne formed his tired men in a line 300 yards behind Liddell’s and Cheatham's divisions, which were lying prone in a long skirmish line. When Gen. Hill rode up, he ordered Cleburne to ready for an attack even though it meant an evening fight in heavy woods on unfamiliar ground against an unknown foe. The Federals were posted behind defensive breastworks, albeit hastily con-structed, and they offered heavy artillery and small-arms fire.

Cleburne personally deployed his brigades in a line. He placed Gen. S.A.M. Wood’s Brigade, which included Great Grandfather Oakes's 32nd/45th Consolidated Mississippi Regiment, in the center with Lucius Polk's Regiment on the right and Dreshler's on the left. At 6 PM, Cleburne issued the order to advance. His troops passed through the ranks of Liddell’s prone men who gave them a cheer as they moved forward in a single rank into the twilight through the smoke-filled woods.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Battlefield marker, September 19th, 6:30 PM

“In my front," wrote Cleburne after the battle, "were open woods—with the exception of a clearing (fenced in) in front of my centre, the ground sloping upwards as we advanced. Ordering the Brigades to direct themselves by Wood’s (Center) Brigade, and preserve Brigade-distance, I moved forward—passing over the first line—and was in a few moments heavily engaged along my right and centre. The enemy, posted behind hastily-constructed breastworks opened a heavy fire of both small arms and artillery.”

In this attack, Col. Lowrey's 32nd/45th Regiment of Wood's Brigade was among the first to strike the enemy. Polk and Dreshler advanced through the thick and dark woods, but in the center lay the cleared Winfrey field directly in front of Wood’s men. As they stepped into the open ground and crossed the field, the Federals let loose a devastating fire. Years later, Lowrey recalled "my regiment charged gallantly through an open field on the most exposed part of the line." His regiment aimed its attack at the enemy's barricaded fence at the far edge of the Winfrey field. In his official report of the 32nd/45th Regiment's attack, Lowrey wrote:

The advance was accordingly made, and I soon passed a line of our troops lying down. As I approached an open field in my front my skirmishers soon engaged the skirmishers of the enemy. I pushed my line of skirmishers forward as rapidly as possible, but their advance was slow, as the ground was hotly contested. My main line gained rapidly on the skirmishers, so that by the time the main line reached the first fence they received a volley from the enemy’s main line, which was behind the next fence, about 200 yards distant. My main line then commenced firing as the skirmishers in their front retired to their rear, and the whole line was soon engaged. I pushed my regiment forward as rapidly as possible, but their advance was slow, as they were compelled to pass through an open field against a line of battle of the enemy strongly posted behind a fence. The advance, however, was steady, and the enemy's line began to give way as we advanced within 40 or 50 yards of the fence. Up to this time the enemy had fired rapidly, but as it was already getting dark they overshot us, only killing 5 of my men and wounding about 20, which was a small number considering their great advantage.  

During the advance some brigades got out of alignment, and some units fell back. In the confusion and terror of the nighttime battle, combatants on both sides fired into friendly ranks. Cleburne reported, "For half an hour the firing was the heaviest I had ever heard; it was dark, however, and accurate shooting was impossible. Each party was aiming at the flashes of the other’s guns, and few of the shot from either side took effect. In the darkness and smoke, the fire was mostly inaccurate, and men desperately tried to distinguish friend from foe."

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Tree line from where Wood's attack began

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

The direction of Wood's attack through the Winfrey field (foreground),
and into the enemy-held woods beyond

Having crossed the field and clambered over the first line of entrenchments, Lowrey's men then came under fire from the enemy's main works about 200 behind. The division's lines by now had become confused and overlapping. Because of fear of shooting into friendly troops, Lowrey ordered a cease fire. By then, Cleburne had ordered Maj. Hotchkiss, whose batteries were behind Wood's Brigade, to bring up his artillery in front of the brigade. Hotchkiss, who was wounded in the attack, later reported he "let fly the dogs of war into the Yankee ranks" with double canister within 60 yards of the enemy's breastworks. The artillery fire, combined with pressure from Polk’s Brigade on the right, forced the enemy to fall back into the heavy woods.

Col. Lowrey ordered his men to hold the position while he reorganized his 32nd/45th Regiment for a further advance. In the meantime, Gen. Hill rode to Lowrey and ordered him to hold the position until further orders from Cleburne. By now, Wood's Brigade had taken the enemy's position, capturing 3 artillery pieces, 2 regimental colors, and 100 prisoners. In the struggle, it had also killed Col. Philemon Baldwin of the 6th Indiana, who was commanding the 3rd Brigade.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Monument of Col. Philemon P. Baldwin, 3rd Brigade. In the
center rear of the picture is the cannonball shell monument
marking the position where he was killed.

Further pursuit became impossible in the darkness, so around 9 PM, Cleburne halted his brigades. For all the fighting and terror, the attack had succeeded in pushing the Federals back only 300 yards. Rebel skirmishers were placed a quarter-mile in advance of the soldiers who slept without campfires in the miserable, near-freezing temperature. Some of them dozed with dead Federals for pillows, and everyone was painfully aware of the groans of the injured and dying scattered about. They also could hear the sound of axe blows and falling trees, which indicated that their renewed attack in the morning would mean assailing enemy defenses. Of the results of this fight, Author Steven E. Woodworth comments, "30 percent of the best division in the Army of Tennessee had become casualties while inflicting about equal losses on the enemy, and that was no bargain for the Confederacy."

As Cleburne's attack closes the first day of fighting, losses were great on both sides. One historian estimates casualties for the Confederates as high as 9,000. The Federal loss could have been as many as 7,000. There was one encouragement for the Confederates, however: The long-awaited Gen. James Longstreet had arrived. Overnight, Bragg placed Longstreet in command of the Left Wing of his army, and that will make all the difference in the fighting tomorrow.²

___________________________

From Lieut. Gen. D.H. Hill’s Report of today's action, 1863:

In the afternoon I received an order to report in person to the commanding general at Thedford’s Ford, and to hurry forward Cleburne’s division to the same point. Soon after Breckinridge was ordered to relieve Hindman at Lee and Gordon’s Mills. I found, upon reporting to the commanding general, that while our troops had been moving up the Chickamauga, the Yankees had been moving down, and thus outflanked us and had driven back our right wing. Cleburne was ordered to take position on the extreme right and begin an attack. We did not get into position until after sundown, but then advanced in magnificent style, driving the Yankees back some three-fourths of a mile... We captured 3 pieces of artillery, a number of caissons, 2 stand of colors, and upward of 300 prisoners. His [our] own loss was small, and fell chiefly upon Wood’s brigade, which had to cross an open field and encounter breastworks upon the opposite side of it.

Gen Hill paid a rare complement when he reported of Cleburne’s men: “I have never seen troops behave more gallantly than did this noble division, and certainly I never saw so little straggling from the field.”

¹ Great-great Grandfather, David Crockett Neal, was presently serving in Forrest's cavalry in Frank C. Armstrong's Division, in Armstrong's Brigade, which was commanded by Col. James T. Wheeler.

² Overnight (19th-20th), James Longstreet arrived with 2 brigades. Three of his brigades arrived earlier, in time to participate in the first day's fight. Tonight, Bragg takes the risky step of reorganizing his army into 2 wings, placing the left under Longstreet and the right under Leonidas Polk. Because of the difficult reorganization in darkness and general confusion, the daylight attack on the 20th will not take place as ordered by Bragg. Orders went astray in the dense woods.

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; This Terrible Sound, Peter Cozzens; Mark P. Lowrey Autobiography; Six Armies in Tennessee, Steven E. Woodworth;  Official Records, Vol. 30, Pts. 1 & 2; Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 9; Confederate Military History, Vol 10; Huntsville Historical Review, Vol 26, No. 2. 1999: Transcription of Capt. Daniel Coleman Diary, Univ. North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Longstreet is ordered to reinforce Bragg

While Confederate General Braxton Bragg is moving his army south of Chattanooga to find the enemy, he is unaware that Richmond has finally decided to send reinforcements from Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia. On today's date in 1863, Lee and President Davis agree to send 2 divisions under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet to Tennessee/North Georgia where Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes is serving in the 32nd Mississippi Infantry.

The direct rail line through Knoxville had just been broken with the fall of that city to Union Gen. Ambrose Burnside on September 3. Longstreet's rail movement would now have to take a much longer and indirect route through the Carolinas and Georgia, then north to Bragg's army. Longstreet's force of John Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws's divisions, along with Col. Edward Porter Alexander's 26-gun artillery battery, will begin their trip on September 9. Lead elements will begin arriving on September 17th, just in time for the Battle of Chickamauga.

Born in South Carolina in 1821, James Longstreet became one of the most successful generals in the Confederate army. After  "Stonewall" Jackson, he is considered the most effective corps commander in Lee's army. Longstreet was certainly one of Lee's most trusted subordinates, and Lee affectionately referred to him as his "Old War Horse."

Longstreet grew up in Georgia and graduated from West Point in 1842. He was a close friend of Ulysses S. Grant, and in 1848, he attended Grant's wedding. Longstreet served in the U.S. army in the Mexican-American War (1846-48) and was wounded at the Battle of Chapultepec. At the outbreak of the War Between the States, he resigned his commission as major and soon was named brigadier general in the Confederate army.

Longstreet fought at the First Battle of Bull Run, Virginia, in July 1861, and within a year was commanding his own corps in Robert E. Lee's army. In 1862, he led his corps in the Peninsula Campaign in June-July, Second Bull Run in August, and at Fredericksburg in December. In July 1863, he led  his corps at the Battle of Gettysburg. In September, he fought at Chickamauga, and then was moved to the Knoxville Campaign later that year. Back with Lee in May 1864, he helped save the army in Battle of the Wilderness. However, he was severely wounded and missed much of the rest of the year while he recuperated. Rejoining the army in October at Petersburg, Longstreet fought with Lee until the surrender at Appomattox Court House, in April 1865.

After the war, Longstreet worked in a number of businesses, and he held several governmental posts, including U.S. Marshall and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. However, he also became the center of some Southern controversy. Several Southern leaders thought Longstreet had stained his reputation by joining the despised Republican Party and endorsing Grant for president in 1868. It didn't help matters that Longstreet had also openly questioned Lee's strategy at the Battle of Gettysburg. His fellow officers, particularly Jubal Early, John Gordon, and William Nelson Pendleton, considered Longstreet's assertions indefensible and even traitorous. Turning the tables, they alleged that it was actually Longstreet who was responsible for the errors that lost Gettysburg. In spite of his tarnished reputation, Longstreet did maintain warm relationships with many veterans' groups, including many who had fought with him and against him.

Longstreet outlived most of his comrades and critics before dying on January 2, 1904, at age 82. He is buried in the Alta Vista Cemetery in Gainesville, Georgia.

Sources: This Terrible Sound, Peter Cozzens; Civil War Trust