The Lost Opportunity at Spring Hill, 1864

At dawn on today's date in 1864, Gen. Patrick Cleburne moved his elite division to the Duck River crossing at Davis's Ford. His leading brigade, Mark P. Lowrey’s—in which was serving Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes in the 32nd Mississippi Regiment—was first to cross the river on a pontoon bridge at the ford 4.5 miles southeast of Columbia, and almost due south of Spring Hill.

Confederate Gen. John B. Hood

Lowrey's Brigade was accompanied by the army's commander, Lt. Gen. John B. Hood.¹ The rest of the division was in the lead of Cheatham's Corps, which followed it across by 7:30 AM. By 9:30, the remainder of the striking column was north of Duck River.

The corps marched ahead 18 miles to the small farm town of Spring Hill.² On this route the troops were about 4 miles east of and parallel of the Columbia-Spring Hill pike and were screened by woods. Unfortunately, they were spotted, and the nervous men kept in constant readiness for an attack. When they reached open country, the troops left the road and marched across fields towards town. All in all, it was an exhausting march.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Gen. Hood had devised a plan for trapping Schofield's army at Spring Hill, which he communicated to Cleburne and Benjamin Cheatham while at the Rutherford Creek crossing. Cleburne was to assist Cheatham, whose leadership role on this date would be second only to Hood. Cleburne was to attack Spring Hill without waiting for the rest of the command to arrive. William Bate’s and John C. Brown’s Divisions were instructed to support Cleburne, and a portion of Alexander P. Stewart’s Corps was to move northwestward to the Columbia pike and then southward toward Columbia.

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson
An excellent animated map of Spring Hill is available at the
Civil War Trust website

At 3 PM, Cleburne’s Division reached Rally Hill pike, at a ford across the Rutherford Creek, about 2.5 miles southeast of the town and Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield's army. A local farmer handed out tobacco to the passing men, while another local woman dispensed cooked pork.

Cleburne’s men waded across a small tributary of Rutherford Creek and continued along a wagon road to the foot of a critical knoll south of town, which was defended by Gen. Luther Bradley’s brigade. Hood met Cleburne along the road and ordered him to form his 3 brigades en echelon to the left of the road, facing west. Bate had been ordered to form on his left and Brown was advancing to form on his right. It was now after 3:30 PM.

Lowrey’s Brigade led the attack, followed by Daniel Govan’s an Hiram Granbury’s. Behind Cleburne's men were the 2 other divisions of Cheatham’s Corps, along with Stewart’s Corps and Edward Johnson’s Division of Stephen D. Lee’s Corps. The remaining 2 divisions of Lee’s corps demonstrated in front of Columbia to hold Schofield there. The Confederate force at this position consisted of about 20,000 men.

Around 4 PM, after some delay, Cleburne ordered his brigades forward to attack Bradley's fortification on the knoll. Hood then rode about a half-mile south of Rally Hill Road to where Bate's Division was deployed.

During his ride, Hood apparently decided to modify his original plan, which led to much confusion later in the day. Without notifying Cleburne or Cheatham, Hood ordered Bate to cross the fields northwestward to the pike, seize it, and then move south to Columbia. Instead of supporting Cleburne, Bate’s Division became the force to march to the pike and then on toward Columbia.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

The Knoll on the Spring Hill Battlefield, looking northwest in the direction of

Cleburne's attack. Lowrey's Brigade marched up the center of this photo.

About 4:15, Cleburne’s advancing division, with Lowrey on the right, Govan in the center, and Granbury on the left, reached Bradley’s line. Lowrey’s and Govan’s brigades charged the right side and wing of the Federal line, while simultaneously Nathan Forrest’s cavalry charged the front. Cleburne and Forrest directed the attack, riding side by side with swords drawn. Later, Forrest recalled the advance as having been made “with a promptness and energy, and gallantry which I have never seen excelled.” Gen. Lowrey later wrote about this battle,

Late in the evening, General Forrest attacked the enemy at Spring Hill, and I moved rapidly to his assistance. The enemy had moved out one mile from the village, and had made strong breastworks of fence rails, and occupied a strong position, from which the cavalry had failed to move him. The moment I arrived on the ground I formed a line and moved against the enemy, drove him from his works, and pursued him about a mile through an open field.

As soon as Granbury could come up and formed, he followed to my left, and Govan was brought up and held in reserve. Granbury did not get into the engagement, as the whole of the enemy's line to my left gave way as my line advanced, but the line to my right stood firm, and as I advanced, I left them in my rear.

Gen. Bradley, who was severely wounded in this assault, wrote, “we were soon furiously attacked in front and on the right flank, a brigade of the enemy swinging completely around the right of the Forty-second Illinois and the Sixth-fourth Ohio. We gave them a very destructive fire and somewhat staggered them in front, and had we had some support on the right, and the right flank not been turned, we could have held our ground." Lowrey’s and Govan’s Brigades, charging with fixed bayonets, swept away the Federal line before them, causing the enemy's entire right wing to collapse. Most of the Federal front retreated to avoid capture.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Near the crest of the knoll, looking south,
over the ground on which Lowrey's men attacked

As Lowrey's attack cleared the top of the hill, then through woods and into an open field beyond, his men received intense fire from a Federal regiment on his right. Unknowingly, the troops had charged at a perpendicular angle to a concealed line of Federal breastworks along the wooded knoll to their right. While reforming his men under the assumption that the Federals were going to charge his right, Lowrey said he delivered "a few shots from [his] right flank to keep them demoralized..." Then he rode to inform Cleburne who personally led Govan’s Brigade in a successful charge, and with Lowrey's Brigade, pursued the Federals into a retreat toward Spring Hill. It was nearing sunset.

Many of these fleeing Federals sought protection behind their artillery across the Columbia turnpike. However, Granbury’s Brigade drove the Yankees with their guns in a retreat further to the outskirts of Spring Hill. It was now time for the brigadiers to reorganize their scattered men and reform their lines.

Fearing an advance by the enemy, Cleburne intended to assault this new line before it was fully formed. As Lowrey’s and Govan’s Brigades were being quickly reformed for a new attack, Cheatham abruptly halted it, and ordered Cleburne to await a concentrated attack that could overwhelm the Spring Hill defenders. Believing that Stanley's strong artillery fire portended a much larger force on Spring Hill, Cheatham was convinced that to take the town, it would be necessary for Cleburne to have the support of both Bate and Brown.³ However, Cheatham was unaware of Hood’s revised orders for Bate to move southward on the pike toward Columbia. So Cheatham's orders for Cleburne and Bate no longer reflected Hood’s revised plans.

Given the situation as he now saw it, Cheatham ordered Brown to begin an assault as soon as his division was in line of battle, and for Cleburne and Bate to take up the attack successively. At dusk, the Confederates were rapidly forming to overwhelm the enemy on Spring Hill. By 5 PM, Brown’s Division on the extreme right sent their skirmishers forward. Forrest provided support for Brown’s advance on their right flank, from across the Rally Hill pike.

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson
An excellent animated map of Spring Hill
is available at the Civil war Trust website

Nighttime came early at this time of year with the sun setting before 5 PM. Now near dark on a moonless night, Bate began his approach on the Columbia turnpike, having moved in line of battle almost 2 miles across the fields from Rally Hill Road. He was still acting under Hood’s original orders to take the pike and sweep southward. When Bate’s skirmishers were within 100 yards of the pike, they saw Federal troops and wagons coming north heading toward Spring Hill. His skirmishers fired on the head of the Federal column, driving it from the road and creating confusion. While bringing his line into position to strike the flank of the Federal column, Bate received an order from Hood to pull back.

Meanwhile, Cleburne, who had prepared an advance further to the north to destroy Stanley's wagons and artillery, also received an order from Cheatham to remain where he was until further orders. He kept his division in readiness for an attack until after dark. But Cheatham's order never came.  After darkness fell, without further orders, Cleburne ordered his brigades to bivouac in line of battle, facing the town, below the knoll from which they had driven Bradley.

What transpired next has baffled participants and historians ever since.

About 6:45 PM, Granbury’s men, lying down in the dark about 90 yards from the Columbia turnpike, heard the advanced element of Schofield's division passing toward Spring Hill. Cleburne, under orders to wait for the signal to attack, held back his men while the Federals passed them. At 7:30, after the Federal column had quietly moved passed, Cleburne drew back Granbury’s Brigade and placed it facing the pike on the left extension of his other brigades. By 8 PM, Bate, who in the darkness had had difficulty finding Cleburne’s left, now faced the road, extending Granbury’s line. At 10:00, Edward Johnson’s Division, temporarily under Cheatham’s command, formed an extension of Bate’s line, which altogether stretched Cheatham’s line for nearly 2 miles along the turnpike. By 10:45, the main Federal column passed Cleburne’s troops. Cleburne sent word to Hood, but Hood took no action. Thus the opportunity for one of the greatest victories of the war was lost.⁴

By 2 AM, the last of Schofield’s divisions had passed Hood's men. Many of his troops could see Confederate campfires to the east as they quietly moved by. By daybreak, the enemy had reached Franklin, 14 miles north of Spring Hill, astounded at their good fortune. Schofield, nearly caught in Hood's trap, somehow had managed to get away.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

The Absalom Thompson House, Hood's headquarters, November 29, 1864

Hood's plans for the 29th had gone terribly awry. The engagement resulted in considerable loss for both sides with no real advantage for the Confederates. The Union forces lost around 350 killed and wounded, while Confederate losses were around 500. The greater loss for the Confederates may have been the drastic reversal in mood that came over the army, which had a direct impact on the battle the next day.

Schofield had been entirely successfully with extricating his whole force from Spring Hill. By the morning of the 30th, he was was at Franklin building a new line of fortifications. Finally realizing what had happened, an enraged Hood began looking for officers to blame rather than accepting responsibility for the breakdown of his command. He immediately ordered a pursuit, and by the end of the day, would recklessly hurl his army into the climatic Battle of Franklin.⁵

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There is a Divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we may. If in the next life we are permitted an insight into the events of this life and their causes, we shall be surprised to find how much Providence, and how very little human agency and planning have to do with all really noble and grand achievements. And how little credit is due to many who pass among us as great.

Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, 1886 (Quoted in The Last Hurrah, Wiley Sword)
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¹Gen. Lowrey later wrote about the events of the earlier portion of this day in 1864:

When the enemy began the retreat from the vicinity of Columbia, Tenn., a large portion of our army crossed Duck River at Davis' Ford, five miles above Columbia. My brigade crossed first early on the morning of the 29th of November, and moved in advance all day. We moved to intercept the enemy at Spring Hill, Tenn., but were compelled to move cautiously, for we were expecting continually to meet the enemy. The enemy made one bold demonstration on our moving columns in the evening, I suppose for the purpose of detaining us. Lt. Gen. Hood was with me in person a good part of the day, and directed me to attack the enemy wherever I found him, without regard to his numbers or position.

²Spring Hill and the vicinity saw a lot of Civil War action, and the Army of Tennessee was present on more than one occasion. While the army was stationed here in May 1863, cavalry officer, Gen. Earl Van Dorn, was murdered at his headquarters by a jealous husband. My Great-Great Grandfather David Crockett Neal’s 6th Tennessee Regiment provided the escort for Van Dorn's body to Columbia, Tennessee. Later, Van Dorn's remains were brought back to Mississippi and buried at Wintergreen Cemetery in Port Gibson.

³Earlier, Brown’s Division had followed Bate’s across the Rutherford Creek. Beyond the stream, he reached Rally Hill Road at 4:30. However, he had not attacked due to his belief that a Federal line in front of Spring Hill threatened his right flank. Having neither artillery nor cavalry, he waited for Cheatham's arrival. Approving Brown's decision, and without notifying Cleburne, Cheatham rode off to report the situation to Hood. Earlier, Hood had sent Stewart's Corps for support. However, Stewart had become lost during the afternoon before arriving at the northern end of the Confederate line to block the pike north of Spring Hill. Having also received confused orders, Stewart rode back to find Hood for clarification.

⁴Gen. Cheatham, whose own performance at Spring Hill was lacking, later wrote an extensive article in the Southern Historical Society Papers to correct some of Hood's misrepresentations about the Spring Hill battle ("The Lost Opportunity at Spring Hill"): Concerning Hood's decision to end the fight, "I was never more astonished than when General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open—orders to main quiet until morning—and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to Franklin."
⁵Author and Battle of Franklin historian Eric A. Jacobson provides an interesting narrative of the Spring Hill Affair on the site of the battlefield: See Civil War Trust website. When my wife and I visited the Franklin battlefield in 2010, we were introduced to Jacobson at the museum there. He was gracious enough to spend more than an hour discussing the battle and answering my questions.

Sources: The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, Wiley Sword; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; For Cause & For Country, Eric A. Jacobson; The Army of Tennessee, Stanley F. Horn; Five Tragic Hours, James Le McDonough & Thomas L. Connelly; Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898, Dunbar Rowland; Mark P. Lowrey Autobiography, Georgia State Parks & Historic Sites; Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 9; Official Records, Vol. 45, Pt. 1

Setting the stage for Spring Hill

On a cold and snowing evening on today's date in 1864, Confederate Gen. John B. Hood called together his infantry and cavalry corps commanders to outline his strategy for Spring Hill. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest's cavalry was ordered to move up the Duck River and seize several fords, while the rest of the infantry arrived. This would allow Hood to lay a pontoon bridge across the Duck River at Davis's Ford. From there the army will march on the Davis's Ford Road to Spring Hill, 12 miles north of Columbia, on the main road to Nashville. Two of Stephen D. Lee's divisions will be left at Columbia with the artillery to hold the army of Gen. John Schofield, Hood's old West Point roommate, on the north bank of the river.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's Corps, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving in Gen. Patrick Cleburne's Division, was encamped between the Mount Pleasant and Pulaski Pikes, near the St. John's Church at the intersection of a road to the little community of Ashwood. The beauty of the church with its quiet grove and peaceful cemetery was hard to ignore. Cleburne re-marked, “This is the most beautiful and peaceful spot I ever beheld... It is almost worth dying to be buried in such a beautiful spot.” His words will have an even more poignant meaning in a few days.

The stage is being set for some of the most grim and vicious fighting of the war.

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St. John's Church in Ashwood, located between the towns of Columbia and Mt. Pleasant, is still a beloved historical site in Tennessee's Maury County. Built by Leonidas Polk, and his 3 brothers—cousins to the 11th President or the United States, James K. Polk—the church and cemetery are made up of land owned by brothers. The Polks also donated the material for the church, which was built by slave labor and completed in 1842. As a plantation church, it provided a place of worship for the Polk families, their slaves, and their neighbors. Leonidas Polk served as its first rector before becoming the first Bishop of Louisiana and later a general in the Confederate Army. Lt. Gen. Polk was killed a few days before the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain at the head of the First Corps.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

St. John's Church
It is almost worth dying to be buried in such a beautiful spot —Patrick R. Cleburne

During the war, the church was used as a Confederate hospital, as were many public buildings and private homes in the area. The cemetery lies behind the church where Gens. Cleburne, Granbury, and Strahl were buried following the Battle of Franklin. Later their remains were removed and reinterred in other states, although their gravesites at St. John’s were never used again.

All but one of the original Polk brothers are buried at St. John’s. Bishop Gen. Leonidas Polk was buried at Christ Cathedral in New Orleans where he served as Bishop. His nephew, Brig. Gen. Lucias E. Polk of Cleburne's Division, severely wounded at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, is also buried here, as are other Confederates.

Over the years the St. John's congregation dwindled, and today regular services are no longer held. 

  

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Five miles southwest is the town of Mount Pleasant, also in Maury County. Among other things, it is the birthplace of the famous Confederate Sam R. Watkins, known for his memoir, Company Aytch: Or, a Side Show of the Big Show, an important primary source about the common Confederate soldier's experience. Born in the Ashwood/Mount Pleasant community, Watkins served in Company H of the 1st Tennessee Infantry (the “Maury Greys”), and most of his war experience was in the Army of Tennessee.

His colorful Civil War account is always fascinating, sometimes comical, and at a few points, simply horrifying. One of the most haunting passages is his account of the Battle of Franklin, which he opens with these words:

Kind reader, right here my pen, and courage, and ability fail me. I shrink from the butchery. Would to God I could tear the page from these memoirs and from my own memory. It is the blackest page in the history of the war of the Lost Cause. It was the bloodiest battle of modern times in any war. It was the finishing stroke to the independence of the Southern Confederacy. I was there.

Zion Presbyterian Church Cemetery, Est. 1807
In addition to Sam R. Watkins, soldiers from the Civil War, the War of 1812,
and the Revolutionary War are buried here, too.

Watkins's unit often fought near Great Grandfather Oakes's regiment, as it did in the Battle of Franklin. Watkins survived the war, one of only a hand-ful of original recruits from his company. Twenty years later, with a "house full of young 'rebels' clustering a-round my knees and bumping about my elbows," he wrote his remarkable account.

On our excursion through Tennessee a few years ago, I just had to take a short side trip to visit his gravesite in the Zion Presbyterian Church Cemetery in Maury County. 

Sources: Five Tragic Hours, James Lee McDonough & Thomas L. Connelly; Episcopal Church and Visual Arts

A fast march to Columbia

On November 19, 1864, Gen. John B. Hood began his Tennessee Campaign from Florence, Alabama, to take the Federal stronghold at Nashville. He sent Gen. Nathan B. Forrest's cavalry to clear the way to Columbia, Tennessee. Hood planned to quickly advance his army and defeat Gen. John Schofield outside Columbia, then move on to take Nashville.

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

Hood sent his 32,000-man army northward in the snow and freezing rain from the Tennessee River by 3 different roads. Cheatham’s Corps, with Patrick Cleburne's Division (in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving in Lowrey's Brigade) in the lead, was assigned the western road through Waynesboro. One brigade, Mercer’s, was left behind to guard the river crossings. On today's date in 1864, Cleburne set out with his 3 other brigades—Govan’s, Lowrey’s, and Granbury’s—northward in the middle of a sleet storm. The rain soon stopped, but the sun melted the snow and left the roads in a terrible condition. By evening, the head of the column crossed the Tennessee state line.

On the 20th, Federal Gen. George Thomas in Nashville ordered Schofield to prepare to fall back to Columbia. The next day, Schofield began moving his 26,000-man force from Pulaski to Columbia along the Duck River, 41 miles south of Nashville. He reached it on the 24th, just in time to keep Forrest's cavalry from seizing the river crossings. Schofield ordered his men to build entrenchments on the north side of the river while he awaited reinforcements from Nashville.

By the 26th, Cleburne's Division was approaching Columbia along with Cheatham's Corps via the Mt. Pleasant Road. By the 27th, the rest of Hood's army closed in on Columbia, forcing Schofield to abandon the town and withdraw a mile and a half to the north. Across the river 2 Federal corps blocked further advance. It was rainy and cold, turning to snow, when the Confederates went into bivouac to await the arrival of the supply wagons.

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Five Tragic Hours, James Lee McDonough & Thomas L. Connelly; Hood's Campaign for Tennessee, William R. Scaife; Official Records, Vol. 45, Pt. 1

Sherman's March to the Sea

On today's date in 1864, Union Gen. William T. Sherman began his infamous march across Georgia to Savannah. He has finally been granted his wish to "make Georgia howl!" Sherman marched his 62,000 troops on the Decatur road, with 20-days' provisions. Behind him, Atlanta lay in ruins, while his gleeful troops sang the "Battle Hymn of the Republic."

Sherman faced little opposition in his campaign except for skirmishing with Joseph Wheeler's cavalry. He left a 60-mile wide path of destruction on his way to Savannah, which he reached by December 21st. At the conclusion of his march the conquering general wrote, "we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies."*

Sherman's "hard hand of war" terrorized the countryside, destroying all sources of food and leaving behind a hungry and demoralized people. It was psychological warfare in the most destructive campaign against a civilian population during the war, earning Sherman the epithet, "Nero of the Nineteenth Century." His March to the Sea was the first instance of a country bringing the might of its industrial and military prowess to destroy a population's ability to support war. And it was the harbinger of the policy of total war, which will be adopted in the 20th century.

Source: North Georgia Encyclopedia

As Sherman departed Atlanta on his campaign of havoc and destruction, Confederate Gen. John B. Hood was more than 200 miles northwest, crossing the Tennessee River to Florence. Hood's plan was to march on to Nashville, and after taking the Federal garrison there, to invade Kentucky. His long range goal was to unite with Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia. Or so he hoped.

* Much earlier in the war, Sherman had adopted a practice of bringing his "hard hand of war" to Georgia citizens. One infamous incident was his forced exile of the Rosewell Mill Women during his earlier Spring campaign.

Sources: Decision in the West, Albert Castel; North Georgia Encyclopedia; Life in Dixie During the War, 1861-1865, Mary A.H. Gay

Crossing the Tennessee River | Hood's grand plan

Gen. John B. Hood's Army of Tennessee had been at Tuscumbia since October 31, 1864 awaiting the arrival of Gen. Nathan B. Forrest and his cavalry. Hood ordered a mile-long pontoon bridge built over the Tennessee River. Patrick Cleburne’s Division, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving, began crossing on this date in 1864, with bands playing and the soldiers marching in a column of fours. The bands continued to play as other divisions crossed the river. Once across, Cleburne bivouacked his division in Florence, Alabama, where Hood set up his headquarters.

The next day, the famous cavalry general and his 6,000-man column arrived in camp. Apparently, he and his troops immediately became the objects of much curiosity. Several of the brigade bands got together to serenade the general, and it turned into an impromptu outdoor concert.

Source: Wikipedia

Also on the 14th, Federal. Gen. John M. Schofield arrived at Pulaski, Tennessee, about 50 miles northeast of Hood's position. He took command of about 26,000 Federal troops that were assembling there. His orders were to delay Hood's advance in order to gain time for Gen. George Thomas's sizable force to concentrate at Nashville.

Finally across the river and bolstered by with Forrest’s cavalry, Hood unveiled his grand plan for a Tennessee Campaign: He would march the army north into Middle Tennessee and retake Nashville, 115 miles to the north. He believed that there were few Federal soldiers in Tennessee, meaning his campaign would not require much fighting if he could move his army fast enough. He convinced Gen. 
P.G.T. Beauregard, the Confederate Western theater commander, of the soundness of his plan and assured him that he would move “at the earliest possible moment.” Instead, rains forced repeated postponements. Short on supplies, on November 30, Hood issued another General Order to inform his troops of his plan, calling on them to accept a period of short rations with “a cheerful spirit.”

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, Wiley Sword; Hood's Tennessee Campaign, William R. Scaife; Official Records, Vol. 45, Pt. 1

On to Tuscumbia

By October 15, 1864, rather than enticing Union Gen. William T. Sherman into battle while he held a strategic position at Dalton, Confederate Gen. John B. Hood pulled his army back about 9 miles south of LaFayette. From LaFayette, Hood changed his plans again, withdrawing on the 20th to Gadsden in northeastern Alabama. There Hood met for 2 days with Gen. 
P.G.T. Beauregard his commander, to discuss Hood's plans for a campaign into Tennessee. Apparently, it was with some reluctance that Beauregard agreed as he doubted Hood's ability to wage such a campaign.

On today's date in 1864, Hood moved his army from Gadsden to Alpine on the Georgia-Alabama border, then crossed the Sand Mountain into Alabama. It rained most of the way. The roads were muddy and full of water, in some places knee deep. From there the army moved toward Guntersville, Alabama, the nearest point of crossing the Tennessee River. From Guntersville he planned to capture the large Federal base at Nashville before the Federals could be reinforced. Beyond accomplishing that, Hood's grand hope was to march into Kentucky to threaten Louisville and Cincinnati. From that point he would march east to join Robert E. Lee's army in fighting Ulysses S. Grant.

Along the way to Guntersville, Hood changed his direction to the west, aiming for Tuscumbia, Alabama, about 90 miles northwest of Guntersville.¹ About midway in his march, he decided for a crossing at Decatur. On the 28th, men from Patrick Cleburne's (Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes's Division) and William Bate's Divisions skirmished against the Federal fortification there. The fighting confirmed for Hood that the force there was too strong, so he continued on to Tuscumbia, which he reached on October 31st. His army will remain there until November 13th.²

Source: Wikipedia

In the meantime, when Sherman, who had followed Hood as far as Gaylesville, Alabama, learned of Hood's movement, he sent 2 corps to reinforce Gen. George Thomas at Nashville.³ Apparently he personally had given up plans for pursuing Hood further, writing, "I cannot guess his movements as I could those of Johnston, who was a sensible man and only did sensible things." However, Sherman did correctly sense Hood's ultimate plan:

Divining the object of his movement against our communications, which had been thus far rapid and skillful, I detached by rail General Schofield and two of my six corps to Nashville, all the reinforcements that Thomas deemed necessary to enable him to defend Tennessee, and began my systematic preparations for resuming the offensive against Georgia.

The 2 armies then went their separate ways: Hood into Tennessee and Sherman back to Atlanta,  planning his infamous March to the Sea.

¹ At this point President Davis reminded Hood of his orders not to abandon operations in Georgia and that he expected Hood to defeat Sherman before entering Tennessee. Gen. P.T.G. Beauregard later reported that Hood's failure to cross the river at Guntersville as he had agreed resulted in the failure of his Tennessee Campaign. 

² While at Tuscumbia, Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was the closest to home that he had been in over 3 years of war. From Tuscumbia to Kosouth, Mississippi, it is only 50 miles or so. There is no record that he ever was able to visit, at least not until after the army retreated from Nashville to Tupelo in December.

³ Schofield arrived at Pulaski, Tennessee, about 50 miles northeast of Hood's position, taking command of the Federal troops assembling there. Soon, in total, about 26,000 troops were present. Schofield was under Thomas's orders to delay Hood advance to gain time for Thomas to concentrate his troops in Nashville.

Sources: Patrick Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Advance and Retreat, John B. Hood; The Army of Tennessee, Stanley F. Horn; Hood's Campaign for Tennessee, William R. Scaife; Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 4

The Third Battle of Dalton

In late September 1864, Confederate Gen. John B. Hood crossed his army over the Chattahoochee River to strike the Western & Atlantic Railroad at several places north of the river. The army also captured Federal garrisons at Big Shanty (Kennesaw) and Acworth. By October 5th, Union Gen. William T. Sherman's force of about 40,000 men were on the move from Atlanta towards Hood's army.

Rather than offer battle as he had originally planned, Hood abandoned the idea and decided, instead, to strike the railroad north of the Etowah River. If Sherman didn't follow, but instead returned to Atlanta, Hood would pursue. Hood marched his army toward the Alabama border at Cedartown, Georgia. By now it was apparent to President Davis that Hood's offensive was in trouble. He sent his representative, Gen. 
P.G.T. Beauregard, to meet with Hood and discuss his strategy for striking the railroad between Dalton and Resaca while looking for an opportunity to fight Sherman. However, Hood's real intention was to push beyond Gadsden into Tennessee.

After taking the railroad as agreed, Hood attacked the Federal garrison at Dalton* which surrendered on this date in 1864. His army then inflicted heavy damage to the railroad between Tunnel Hill and Resaca, taking 1,000 prisoners. Although to Hood his plan must have seemed successful, so far, the general of the Army of Tennessee had been acting more like the leader of a raiding party than a commander of an army with a mission to defeat Sherman.

Apparently, the presence of Patrick Cleburne's Division, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving, in front of the Dalton garrison had a direct influence on its commander's decision to surrender. In his report, the Federal commander stated, "the division of Cleburne, which was in the rear of the rebel general... was over anxious to fight."

Source: Wikipedia

By October 13th, Hood learned that Sherman had reached Resaca and was moving on Dalton. Hood knew the terrain well having fought here in May. It was a good strategic position from which to battle Sherman. However, on October 14th, Hood pulled back southwest to Villanow. On the 15th-16th, he pulled his army further back, about 9 miles south of LaFayette, below Pigeon Mountain. His men traipsed over the ground on which they had been victorious in the Battle of Chickamauga almost a year before. Great Grandfather Oakes bivouacked with Cleburne’s Division on the same campground it had occupied the night before that famous battle.


At LaFayette, Hood will alter his plans yet again. He will withdraw to northeastern Alabama, effectively giving up any pretense of defending Georgia. After tearing up Sherman's rail line as far as Tunnel Hill, he will move his army through Snake Creek and other gaps, over the earlier battleground at Rocky Face Ridge, then southwest to Gadsden, arriving there on on the 20th.

*The First Battle of Dalton (not to be confused with the Battle of Rocky Face Ridge near Dalton) was fought between February 22 and 27, 1864. The Second Battle of Dalton was a Confederate cavalry action led by Joseph Wheeler against the Federal garrison here on August 14 & 15, 1864, ending in Wheeler's defeat.

Sources: Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Patrick Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Hood's Campaign for Tennessee, William R. Scaife; Official Records, Vol. 39, Pt. 1

Crossing the Coosa River

By October 6, 1864, in an attempt to cut Union Gen. William T. Sherman's supply line from Tennessee, Confederate Gen. John B. Hood led his army past New Hope Church toward Cedartown, near the Alabama border. A little north at Cave Spring, his army was joined by Gen. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry returning from a raid into Tennessee.

On today's date in 1864, the army reached Coosaville on the Coosa River. Over the next couple of days, Hood crossed his army over the river, passing Rocky Face Ridge while aiming for Resaca, Dalton, and Tunnel Hill, tearing up track as it went. Once again, the men trudged over ground on which they had fought only a few months before.

Source: Hood's Campaign for Tennessee, William R. Scaife

Change of plans

While Confederate Gen. John B. Hood's Army of Tennessee was encamped at Palmetto, the general developed a plan, with President Davis's blessing, for the destruction of Union Gen. William T. Sherman's supply line to Tennessee. On October 1, 1864, Hood crossed his army over the Chattahoochee River to strike the Western & Atlantic Railroad at several places north of the river. The Confederates captured Federal garrisons at Big Shanty (Kennesaw) and Acworth. Another force attacked the Federals at Allatoona Pass.¹

So far Hood's plan had been successful. October 5th, Sherman's force of about 40,000 men were on the move towards Hood's army, which hoped to give battle to the Yankee invaders.

However, on today's date in 1864, Hood had a change of heart and abandoned his original plan. He decided, instead, to strike the railroad north of the Etowah River. If Sherman didn't follow, but instead returned to Atlanta, Hood would pursue. Accordingly, Hood marched his army across the New Hope Church battle grounds toward the Alabama border at Cedartown, Georgia. At this point his supply line was stretched thin.

Almost immediately, Davis knew that Hood's offensive was in trouble. On the 9th, Gen. 
P.G.T. Beauregard,  the new commander of the Department of the West,² met with Hood near Cedartown at Cave Spring. Apparently Hood misled Beauregard about his true plans for his campaign. Hood discussed his strategy for striking the railroad between Dalton and Resaca. Beauregard left with the impression that Hood would continue his operations around Gadsden, Alabama, and that he would remain in contact with Sherman's army. He would look for an opportunity to fight Sherman if his foe was so inclined, or follow him back to Atlanta.

Hood's real intention, however, seems to have been to push beyond Gadsden into Middle Tennessee.

¹Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French led this attack at Allatoona. Demanding the surrender of the Federal troops there, French eventually was forced to withdraw when he learned that enemy reinforcements were on their way. The Federal commanding the besieged fort, Gen. John M. Corse sent a message, to which a reply came: "General Sherman says hold fast; we are coming." In 1870, Evangelist Peter P. Bliss wrote a hymn commemorating the battle entitled, "Hold the Fort, for I am Coming." The gospel song which invokes themes of Christian deliverance, has been sing in countless churches since, although few any longer know of its roots in this battle.
²Davis met with Beauregard in Augusta, Georgia, on October 2, as part of his visit to Hood's army at Palmetto. There Davis and gave Beauregard command of the newly created Department of the West, responsible for the five Southern states from Georgia to the Mississippi River, with the armies of Hood and Richard Taylor under his command. Beauregard would officially take command on October 17th. He later stated he didn't believe he had actual authority to order Hood at this point.

Source: Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Hood's Campaign for Tennessee, William R. Scaife

Plans for a new campaign

During President Jefferson Davis's visit with the Army of Tennessee at Palmetto, he and Gen. John B. Hood developed a plan for what should occur next. It would start with Hood's destruction of Union Gen. William T. Sherman's supply line to Tennessee.

Hood planned to cross the Chattahoochee River west of Marietta on the road from Powder Springs to Rome, Georgia, where he would seize the Western & Atlantic Railroad. He hoped to draw Sherman away from Atlanta for a fight. Should Hood believe he didn't have hope of success, he would move his army to Gadsden, Alabama, and again entice Sherman into a fight. If Hood had a chance to stop Sherman's continued advance into Georgia, this was it.

On today's date in 1864, Hood's army set out on its march north from Palmetto, the men trudging through a cold rain. On October 1st, Hood crossed his army over the Chattahoochee at Moore's Ferry, south of Campbellton, opening his fall campaign to draw out Sherman.

Source: Wikipedia
An excellent animated map of Hood's invasion of Tennessee is available at
the Civil War Trust website

On October 2nd, my Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes, serving in Patrick Cleburne's Division, marched to Powder Springs, 12 miles southwest of Marietta, with the right column of the army. The army camped near Flint Hill Church. Over the next couple of days, while elements of the army destroyed several miles of railroad north of Kennesaw Mountain, the rest of the army moved to New Hope Church, their formal battleground. The rain and elements had exposed many of the shallow graves of earlier battles, and hundreds of soldiers volunteered to shovel dirt over the exposed bodies.

Hood will soon move northeast to strike the railroad. For the next week, Gen. Alexander Stewart's  Corps will destroy the rail line between the Chattahoochee and Etowah Rivers, capturing Federal garrisons at Big Shanty (Kennesaw) and Acworth. Taking the bait, by October 6th, Sherman had his army mobilized and was marching toward the old battleground at Kennesaw.

Perceiving a threatened invasion of Tennessee, Sherman sent Gen. George Thomas's army to Nashville to take command of the Federal troops there.

Sources: Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Pudue; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Advance and Retreat, John B. Hood; Hood's Campaign for Tennessee, William R. Scaife; Official Records, Vol. 39, Pt. 1

President Davis visits the army at Palmetto

On today's date in 1864, President Jefferson Davis arrived for a 3-day visit with Confederate Gen. John B. Hood and his army, encamped at Palmetto since the 18th. Unsuccessful in its attempt to hold back Union Gen. William T. Sherman's capture of Atlanta, Davis and the Confederate nation were deeply concerned about the state of affairs with his Army of Tennessee.

One of the serious issues confronting Davis was the bitter relationship Hood had with his subordinate leaders, most notably, with Lt. Gen. William Hardee, Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes's corps commander. Hood was about to sack Hardee. The commanding general unjustly blamed Hardee for the army's defeats since Hood had taken control following Joseph E. Johnston's removal in July. After the Battle of Jonesboro, Hood was angry with Hardee and his men for what Hood perceived as their "disgraceful effort," since only about 1,400 were killed and wounded in that fight. Ironically, in the same battle, Hood's old corps under the command of Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, the force assigned the main attack at Jonesboro, was repulsed. Hood's issue was deeply centered in his personal animosity toward Hardee.

The feeling was mutual. Hardee had only remained in Hood's army to date at the insistence of the president. In his own meeting with the president, Hardee suggested that Hood be removed and that Johnston be returned to his old position. Similar discussions with Gen. Alexander P. Stewart and Stephen D. Lee revealed to the president the same opinion.

This is Davis's third visit to the Army of Tennessee, and the army had never looked so miserable. Thousands of men were without shoes. Food was scarce. Small arms and munitions were in short supply. Hood's depleted army was in dire need of supplies and reinforcements. Morale was at a low ebb. But the greatest problem at the moment was the crisis in leadership. It was obvious to Davis that a change was needed, and Hood urged the president to act.*

After departing Palmetto, on the 28th, Davis telegraphed a formal order for Hardee's release of command and reassignment to command the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Hardee will leave the army 2 days later. Hood immediately promoted Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham to command Hardee's Corps, bypassing the logical choice of Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne, Great Grandfather Oakes's division commander.

Hood will continue to deny and intentionally misunderstand the situation within his army, and it won't be the last time he will blame others for his own shortcomings as a commander.

* Presiden Davis will appoint Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard to head a new department known as the Military District of the West. While ostensibly Beauregard will be Hood's superior, Hood will retain almost the same level of autonomy he previously had.

Sources: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Decision in the West, Albert Castel; Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, Volume 2 November 1863-June 1865, Jacob D. Cox; Official Records, Vol. 32, Pt. 3

The army moves to Palmetto

On today's date in 1864, having given up Atlanta in a long series of destructive battles, Confederate Gen. John B. Hood began marching his depleted army to Palmetto Station, 20 miles west of Jonesboro, on the Atlanta & West Point Railroad. There the army went into camp while Hood considered what to do next. Partick Cleburne's Division, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving, encamped 5 miles northwest of the town. The army will remain here until the 29th.

Source: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue