Bragg withdraws his army—A boost for Lincoln, 1863

Although Bragg remains in relative control of positions at Stones River, after learning that Federal reinforcements were moving toward Murfreesboro, he plans a retreat with Generals Polk and Hardee. The wagons and wounded leave that afternoon, with the rest of the army withdrawing before nightfall. Cleburne’s Division, in which my great grandfather served, began its withdrawal at 11:00 PM, and marched all night and throughout the next day with only brief rest stops.

As Bragg withdrew his army overnight from the Stones River battlefield* the morale was very low. The troops believed that they had won great victories at Perryville in October, and now at Murfreesboro, and understandably they were disheartened with Bragg's decision to retreat again. Trudging through intermittent sleet and rain did not help the situation for them.

From Murfreesboro, on this miserable night in 1863, the army marched to Manchester. At the end of the 48-mile march, the troops will pitch their tents on January 6. Two days later, seeing at the enemy  has decided not to pursue, the army will march north to Tullahoma, behind the protection of the Duck River, 35 miles south of Murfreesboro. Hardee’s corps will set up camp at Tullahoma on the south bank of the Duck River. Polk's corps will encamp at Shelbyville, about 15 miles northwest.

Union Gen. Rosecrans's army will remain in control at Murfreesboro. He will use the coming months to refit his army for a summer advance on the Confederates entrenched around Tullahoma.

It had been a bloody encounter. Statistically, Bragg was the clear winner. His troops inflicted 12,906 Union casualties, while his Army of Tennessee received 11,739 killed, wounded, or missing. But because Bragg's army was the one to withdraw, the Union is credited with the victory.

The Union victory at Murfreesboro made Rosecrans famous. It also finally gave President Lincoln the victory he needed to counter anti-war protests and Congressional dissatisfaction in the North and also to engender support his heretofore unpopular Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln estimated the importance of Rosecrans's victory in a telegram he sent to him later in 1863:

I repeat that my appreciation of you has not abated. I can never forget, if I remember anything, that at the end of last year and the beginning of this, you gave us a hard earned victory, which had there been a defeat instead, the country scarcely could have lived over. Neither can I forget the check you so opportunely gave to a dangerous sentiment which was spreading in the North.

Lincoln will need all the good news he can get. For the first 6 months of 1863, the North will see its darkest period during the war. The Union cause will drag on everywhere without serious military campaigning nor decisive victories. The Harper's Weekly editorial, "Have We a General Among Us?" (January 17, 1863), will be the big question in the early months of the new year.

* The Battle of Murfreesboro is also known as the Battle of Stones River.

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; The Civil War Almanac, John Bowman; The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln; Civil War Times, Daniel Wait Howe; Military Reminiscences of the Civil War, Vol. 1, Jacob D. Cox

Battle of Murfreesboro, Day 3 | Breckinridge's Charge

The second day of fighting in the Battle of Stones River took place on this date, Thursday, 1863.* It is remembered as the ill-fated "Breckinridge's Charge," the attack across McFadden's farm to a ford in the river.

General Patrick Cleburne, in whose division Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes served, reports on events pertaining to his division at the Battle of Murfreesboro on today's date:

On Friday morning, January 2, I was satisfied that the enemy was fortifying his position. On consultation with my brigade commanders, I addressed a note to General Hardee, which I requested him to forward to General Bragg, stating this important fact, and that I feared, if my single, and now reduced, line was pushed on the enemy in his fortified position, the result would prove very disastrous, but that I believed I could hold a defensible position against any assault of the enemy.

About noon on the 2nd, Bragg decided that to protect Gen. Leonidas Polk's force from being enfiladed, an enemy force must be dislodged from a low ridge east of the river. Bragg issued the order over the protestations of both Polk and Gen. John C. Breckinridge. Breckinridge was to attack the enemy, which would require a near-suicidal attack against a heavily fortified position. Gen. Hardee, to whom Bragg had given tactical command, had no knowledge that the attack was ordered by his superior. Cleburne was ordered to send 4 of his guns to support the assault on the ridge, but it would make little difference to Breckinridge's men.

Battle of Murfreesboro, 4 PM, January 2, 1863
Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

At 4 PM, Cleburne and his division heard firing resulting from Breckinridge’s attack with his 5 brigades, more than 2 miles away. Cleburne's men watched the fighting on the front across the McFadden farm, from their shelter in the line of cedars west of the Nashville Turnpike and the Stones River. One Federal eyewitness, Daniel Wait Howe, wrote that Breckinridge’s men advanced in columns, "cheering as they came.

McFadden Farm: Union View of Breckinridge's Charge
Source: National Park Service

At first, Breckenridge's men seemed to drive the enemy, taking the hill in front of them, pushing on toward the ford. However, Rosecrans, in anticipation of an attack, had massed 58 cannon near the river on a small hill on the west side of the river, which commanded the entire open field. While the massive cannon fire was directed at the hapless Confederates, 3 times the men managed to rally and charge. But they were cut down by the terrible grape shot and canister fire.

McFadden Ford
Source: Murfreesboro Post

Remarkably, some men managed to reach the edge of the river, and a few even crossed it, only to fall in front of the Federal artillery, which had them in their sights. The destruction was dreadful. "With the exception of the charge at Missionary Ridge," wrote Howe, "it was the most magnificent spectacle that I saw during my entire service... No braver charge was made during the war."

But that was not the way Bragg felt about Breckinridge’s results. To him, the attack was failure. In his report of the action Bragg wrote,

The contest was short and severe, the enemy were driven back and the eminence gained, but the movement as a whole was a failure, and the position was again yielded. Our forces were moved, unfortunately, to the left so far as to throw a portion of them into and over Stone's River, where they encountered heavy masses of the enemy, while those against whom they were intended to operate had a destructive enfilade on our whole line. Our reserve line was so close to the front as to receive the enemy's fire, and returning it took their friends in the rear. The cavalry force was left entirely out of the action.

Artillery Monument
Source: National Park Service

In Breckinridge's 45-minute charge, 1,800 of his Confederates were killed or wounded by the the concentrated artillery fire. Union troops counterattacked, pushing back the shattered remnants of Breckinridge’s Division. Bragg immediately sent Anderson's Brigade across the river to form a line on the front of Breckinridge's command. His brigade remained there in position during the night. Bragg also sent Cleburne's Division over, and placed Hardee in command of that side of the river.

Cleburne concludes his report:

About 11 o’clock that night the enemy made a reconnaissance in force in front of my division; he was driven back by my skirmishers. Immediately afterward I received orders to withdraw my pickets and resume the position held by me on the morning of December 30, on the right of the army, in rear of Breckinridge’s division. Here I remained, enduring the incessant cold rain of that night and the next day, until 11 p.m. of the 3d, when I commenced retreating on Manchester.

Hardee ordered Cleburne to quit his position and fall back quietly to the east bank of Stones River, leaving ground which had been taken at great cost. The troops marched back through another cold and drenching rain, fording the Stones River, and back to the same bivouac north of Murfreesboro they had left 48 hours earlier.

Essentially, this was the end of the Battle of Murfreesboro. There will be a little skirmishing on the 3rd, but by evening, faced with this disaster and the approach of Union reinforcements, Bragg will begin the evacuation of his army. Two days later, Rosecrans's battered army will march into Murfreesboro and declare victory.

As the close of his report, Cleburne commends various officers in his division, including Gen. Wood and his brigade, in which my great grandfather's 32nd Regiment served.

Battle of Murfreesboro, end of day, January 2, 1863
Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

Bragg took 37,317 soldiers into the fight at Murfreesboro, and Rosecrans 43,400. Of the 80,717 soldiers from both sides who began fighting on the first day, 24,645 were either killed, wounded, or captured by battle's end on January 2. In terms of percentage of casualties, the Battle of Murfreesboro was one of the worst.

One writer, Capt. Wilson J. Vance, a Medal of Honor recipient for his valor in this battle, had this to say about the outcome for the Southern army:

It was at Stone’s River that the South was at the very pinnacle of confidence and warlike power; and it was here that she was halted and beaten back, never again to exhibit such strength and menace. It was here that the tide of the Confederacy passed its flood, henceforth to recede; here that its sun crossed the meridian and began its journey to the twilight and the dark. Southern valor was manifested in splendid lustre on many a field thereafter, but the capacity for sustained aggression was gone. After Stone’s River, the Southern soldier fought to repel rather than to drive his foe.

Today, the Stones River National Battlefield includes only 650 of the 4,000 or so acres that comprised the original battle grounds.


* My Great Grandfather's 32nd Regiment (Col. Mark P. Lowrey's), was recalled from guard duty on bridges south of Nashville, and participated in some of the after-battle skirmishing while Bragg withdrew his army from Stones River. The brigade was guarding bridges south of Murfreesboro.

Sources: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell and Elizabeth Purdue; Stones River—Bloody Winter in Tennessee, James Lee McDonough; Civil War Times, 1861-1865, Daniel Wait Howe; The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Stone's River: The Turning-Point of the Civil War, Wilson J. Vance; Official Records Vol. 20, Part 1; National Park Service: Stones River National Battlefield

Free at last

On today's date in 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued an executive order emancipating all slaves in the Confederate States of America. From this moment on the war will be a crusade to free slaves.

First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln
Francis Bicknell Carpenter, 1864

Most Americans have been schooled to think of the Civil War as having been fought over slavery. But that was not the case, at least at the beginning of that great conflict. Even after more than a year into the War Between the States, the abolition of slavery was not a key political or military objective of the Union, nor of President Lincoln himself. Many people, North and South, opposed slavery but did not favor emancipation. They were willing to let slavery die on its own over time. They were not willing to let the slavery issue bring on a war.

Lincoln felt differently. While he had personal and moral convictions about the institution of slavery, his political views were conflicted. In his first inaugural address in 1861, he stated:

Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that—

I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.

However, in his second inaugural speech, 4 bloody years later, Lincoln clearly stated his belief that slavery had been "the cause of the war."

According to Civil War author, Michael R. Bradley, Lincoln was on the right track about slavery being a major cause of the war, at least in part. Many believe that all other causes or contributing factors to the rebellion could have been mitigated. However, extremist views on both sides destroyed all hope of reaching consensus about a process to bring the institution of slavery to an end, facts Lincoln alluded to in his second inaugural address.

To the extent that Lincoln was right about slavery being a major cause of the war, he was wrong about it being a motivation for Northerners and Southerners to fight each other.

At the time of the war, few Southerners actually owned slaves—less than 10 percent. Only the rich could afford slaves, and few, if any Southern soldiers were willing to risk their lives for the advantage of the wealthy class. For the Confederate soldier, the loss of slaves meant nothing to him.

On the other side of the battle lines, most of those soldiers were fighting to preserve the Union, not to free slaves. They were in agreement with Lincoln's previous sentiments, expressed in an open letter to Horace Greeley on August 22, 1862:

My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it—if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save this Union.*

Now, many of these same brave soldiers felt betrayed and insulted, their cause to preserve the Union now supplanted by Lincoln's expanded goal for saving it. It is true—a sad truth—that 19th century white men of both sides of the conflict held long-standing convictions about their supremacy over the black race. Northern soldiers certainly did not see themselves as the Lord's mighty army bringing freedom to the captive Negro. This was not why they had joined to fight in the Union cause.

Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was about to change that. Interestingly, it only affected territory under the Union's actual control. Those slaves in territory Lincoln actually controlled, he left enslaved. Furthermore, slaveholders in Northern states continued to own slaves after Lincoln's order. The political value of emancipation was what was important to Lincoln.

The true nature of the proclamation was not lost on the Union army commanders. They ordered only slaves of Confederate owners to be pressed into labor for the Union army. Slaves of "loyal" men were left in place, under the authority of their masters. It was now illegal to help slaves of loyal owners run away or to prevent any loyal slaveholders from reclaiming their slaves. According to Bradley, "Rosecrans and his subordinates perceived the Emancipation Proclamation not to be a means of freeing slaves so much as a device by which their labor could be denied to the Confederate armed forces and their supporters. Slaves were not seen so much as human beings to be supported and cherished as brothers but as an economic commodity... to be denied an enemy."

For my Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes, serving on this date in the Confederate Army of Tennessee in the midst of the Battle of Murfreesboro, Lincoln's Proclamation had little impact. Even in the areas in which the army operated in the months ahead, Lincoln's order did little to affect the Confederates. However, many Southerners had been thinking already about how to resolve the slavery issue. One novel idea soon would be put forward by the commander of Great Grandfather's division, Patrick Cleburne: Why not enlist black men to fight for their liberation on the side of the Confederacy? It would be a controversial proposal, and not seriously considered again until the South's near defeat.

On the other hand, the Union army already was utilizing freed slaves as laborers, then as soldiers. By May 1863, the U.S. government established the Bureau of Colored Troops to manage the swelling numbers of black soldiers within its ranks. By the end of the war, roughly 179,000 black men (10% of the Union Army) will serve as U.S. soldiers and another 19,000 in the service of the Navy.

Lincoln’s Proclamation didn't actually outlaw slavery. Neither did it make the freed slaves citizens of the United States. What it did accomplish was to make the destruction of slavery an explicit goal of the war in addition to reuniting the severed Union through military force and occupation. Also, by making the abolishment of slavery a war goal, Lincoln's executive order had the effect of turning foreign opinion in favor of the Union. That shift doomed the Confederacy's hopes of gaining official recognition from European countries, particularly Britain, which had abolished slavery 30 years earlier.

* Actually, Lincoln had an even more concise war aim in 1864: My enemies pretend that I am now carrying on this war for the sole purpose of abolition. So long as I am President it shall be for the sole purpose of restoring the Union. Pretty clear. The rest of the quote adds: But no human power can subdue this rebellion without the use of the emancipation policy, and every other policy calculated to weaken the moral and physical forces of the rebellion. Apparently, these words are inscribed in stone in the interior walls of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC. The quote is also contained in Lincoln's collected works.

Sources: Tullahoma: The 1863 Campaign for the Control of Middle Tennessee, Michael R. Bradley; National Archives website; The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 7: 1863-1865 (Kindle Edition)

The Battle of Murfreesboro, Day 2

My Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes's 32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment (Lowrey's), which was a part of Wood's Brigade, was a few miles away from the battle taking place on the Stones River. The regiment's assignment over the past few weeks had been to guard the railroad bridges south of Murfreesboro.  It did not rejoin the rest of the division until after the worst of the fighting at Murfreesboro was over.*

In the first day of fighting, Union Gen. Rosecrans was so badly whipped that he was on the verge of retreating. But he decided to hold on. That night, the Federals withdrew to consolidate their lines, and Confederate Gen. Leonidas Polk occupied their evacuated line the on the morning of the 1st of January. Gen. Braxton Bragg had expected Rosecrans to retreat, and was perplexed when he had not done so. He was at a loss as to how to force the enemy to evacuate the field.

Following are the events as they unfolded for Wood's Brigade of Cleburne's Division at the river near Murfreesboro on Wednesday of the second day of the battle.

It's New Years Day along Stones River. Bragg sends word to Gen. Cleburne to move his men forward to discover whether the enemy's line is still in force. Cleburne sends Liddell’s Brigade ahead to reconnoiter, and after hearing the sound and receiving the report of heavy fighting, sends Wood’s Brigade to cover Liddell’s flank. By the time Wood’s Brigade moves forward, Liddell is forced to fall back, so that Wood’s men find themselves outgunned. They, too, will have to fall back to the cover of the cedar break, taking heavy losses and leaving some 100 casualties in enemy hands.

From Gen. Cleburne’s report of this fight:

On the morning of January 1, there were rumors that the enemy was retreating. I was ordered by General Hardee to push forward, feel the enemy, and ascertain the true state of affairs in our front. Liddell’s brigade was moved forward and to the left, and drove the enemy’s skirmishers back at least a quarter of a mile, and beyond a white house used as a Federal hospital, and situated on the small dirt road near which our last fight of the day before occurred...

Liddell again swept the Nashville turnpike with his artillery, and greatly disturbed the enemy’s trains, which could be seen on and near it. Receiving another message from General Hardee to the effect that he had ordered me to feel the enemy, and could not hear my guns, and at the same time receiving information from General Liddell that he was in line of battle near the hospital just mentioned, and needed immediate support on his right, I ordered General Wood to move his brigade forward cautiously, and support Liddell on the right, but I also informed him that the object was merely to ascertain whether the enemy was still in force in our front, not to bring on a general battle. Wood’s brigade moved forward, and I moved Johnson’s skirmishers forward en echelon on Wood’s right flank, so as to protect him as much as possible. Wood’s brigade formed line close to the dirt road last mentioned, immediately became hotly engaged with a large force of the enemy, which advanced on him out of the cedars where our repulse of the day before occurred. He found that Liddell was not on his left, as expected, having previously fallen back; he also discovered that the enemy were flanking him on the left with another heavy force. At this time he received an order direct from General Hardee not to bring on a general battle. He ceased firing and fell back, leaving several killed and wounded on the ground. Some of the men of the Forty-fifth Mississippi Regiment had gone so far ahead that retreat was impossible; they remained where they were, and fell into the hand of the enemy. Wood must have lost nearly 100 in killed, wounded, and prisoners in this fight. It was now clear the enemy was still in force in my front, and I so reported it.

For the rest of the day, Cleburne’s men were largely inactive, watching the front from the shelter of the line of cedars west of the Nashville Turnpike. That night, the men settled down to another freezing night without campfires. They waited throughout the next day.

In an after-battle report, Gen. Hardee provided his reasons for why Cleburne’s success failed to send the enemy in retreat:

If, at the moment when the enemy were driven from the thick woods north of the Wilkinson turnpike, a fresh division could have replaced Cleburne’s exhausted troops and followed up the victory, the rout of Rosecrans’ army would have been complete. The interval required to collect and reform our lines, now shattered by four successive conflicts, was occupied by the enemy in planting heavy batteries and massing fresh columns of infantry to oppose our further advance. I sent for re-enforcements. The commanding general [Bragg] replied he had none to give me.

In fairness to Bragg concerning his decision not to send reinforcements to Cleburne, earlier that morning, he had called for Gen. Breckinridge to send 2 brigades to reinforce Hardee. However, he countermanded the order when Breckinridge, misunderstanding the unfolding situation, told Bragg that a heavy force was advancing on him. In reality, in Cleburne’s front the Federal right wing was doubled back upon the center of the Union army. In front of Withers’s and Cheatham’s divisions, commanded by Leonidas Polk, the Federal right wing and part of the Union center finally were driven back; but at the angle where the Union center joined the left wing, the Federal lines remained intact.

* The toll on Wood’s Brigade in the fighting at the Battle of Murfreesboro was staggering. He lost almost half his force—504 of 1,100 men. The 32nd Regiment would participate in some of the after-battle skirmishing while Bragg withdrew his army over the next couple of days.

Sources: Official Records, Vol. 20, Part 1; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell and Elizabeth Purdue; Stones River—Bloody Winter in Tennessee, James Lee McDonough

The Battle of Murfreesboro, Day 1

The Southern attack came at dawn today's date, Wednesday, 1862. The fighting of the first day of the battle, took place west and northwest of the town of Murfreesboro. The south end of the battlefield was about a mile below the Franklin Road, which ran west. 1-1/2 miles north of and parallel to this road, was the Wilkinson Turnpike. A mile further north and also parallel, was a small dirt road. Overall’s Creek bound the battlefield, about 3 miles wide, on the east by Stones River¹ and on the west. A short distance apart and directly northwest from Murfreesboro, ran the turnpike and railroad to Nashville.

On the 30th, the Confederate divisions of Generals McCown, Withers, and Cheatham lay in line of battle near the eastern edge of the area, which would soon become the battlefield. McCown’s division formed a line south of the Franklin Road. Beginning at the road Whithers's division extended to a point immediately north of the Nashville Turnpike and railroad, with Cheatham in a line behind Withers. Breckinridge’s and Cleburne’s divisions, north of Murfreesboro, were separated from Withers and Cheatham by Stones River.

Union Gen. Rosecrans concentrated his army facing the Confederate divisions, both on the west and north. At some points the 2 armies were only 500 yards apart.

Both Bragg and Rosecrans essentially had formed the same plan, to be executed the same morning—to attack with the left and drive back the enemy’s right wing. The Confederates, however, advanced earlier on this cold morning.

Battle of Murfreesboro, opening of first day, December 31, 1863
Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

Following are the events associated with my Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes's division, Gen. Cleburne's of Hardee's Corps, posted on the right of the Wilkinson Pike, extending toward Salem Pike.² 

Gen. Cleburne ordered his men to be awakened and ready for battle at 5:00 AM. The morning was cold and frosty and a thick morning haze covered the ground. No fires were allowed, and the men were assembled quickly and readied to move before sunrise. Cleburne placed S.A.M. Wood’s Brigade behind Polk in a second line as a reserve.

Cleburne and his division, composed of L.E. Polk’s, Bushrod Johnson’s, St. John Liddell’s, and Wood’s brigades, began the advance, and his division moved forward on a front nearly a mile wide. The terrain was not ideal for an attack. The ground was broken and filled with limestone boulders and cedar bushes, allowing for gapping and bunching of the men during the advance.

The division encountered the enemy’s line behind a fence and natural breastworks of limestone. Cleburne threw his brigades into the charge against the Federals. The fight was short, fierce, and bloody, lasting about 25 minutes, when the enemy gave way, and Cleburne’s men pursued. The Rebel charge broke the second Federal line. This line soon yielded and both lines pressed into one. The Federals retreated, leaving behind their two rifled cannon, which were immediately turned upon them by the Confederate attackers. By now the alignment of units became haphazard and disorderly. When Cleburne’s brigades ran up against a new Federal line near the Wilkinson Turnpike about 9:00 AM, their progress was checked by the disciplined volleys of the Federals.

Cleburne's and McCown's Divisions renewed their advance at about 9:30 AM, in a sweep of a line that was 10 brigades long, against the startled Federals of Alexander McCook’s XX Corps. Every soldier assigned to the Confederate attack was now in the front line, and if it faltered before it reached the Nashville Pike, there would be no reserves to throw into the fight.

After the fight along the Wilkinson Pike, Cleburne sent Wood’s Brigade back to allow the men to replenish their depleted cartridge pouches, while his 3 other brigades, plus Preston Smith’s Brigade of Frank Cheatham’s Division, moved a half mile beyond the Wilkerson Pike. There, Cleburne ran into another Federal line, where fierce fighting took place at close range for nearly an hour before the Yankees were driven from the field. 

Cleburne pursued into the early afternoon. By now his men were tired, having carried the burden of the attack for over 8 hours. Now, less than a half mile from the Nashville Pike, with little sleep and no breakfast or lunch or even water, they encountered their fifth line of Federals of the day. Nevertheless, they charged the enemy line and drove the defenders from their position through a cedar break and onto the Nashville Pike, which was the Federals' main line of supply and communication. Cleburne's force had reached the original center of Rosecrans’ army, but it was now after 3:00 PM, and the men had reached the end of their strength. 

By now Rosecrans realized his peril and sent reserves to hold the turnpike. Cleburne’s line broke, and the men fled to the protection of the cedar break about a quarter mile to the rear. Hardee detached Wood’s Brigade to guard their ammunition train, which was threatened by a Federal cavalry probe. Judging that another attack by Cleburne “would have been folly, not valor,” Hardee ordered Cleburne to hold the ground he had gained (about a half mile west of the Nashville Turnpike), rest the division, and await further orders.

For the second night in a row, Cleburne’s men went to sleep without the benefit of campfires or hot food. Having discarded their packs in the attack, they were also without tents or blankets. Even so, they slept knowing they had whipped the Yankees badly, and anticipated that they would withdraw. 

The Southern attack, which came at dawn on this first day had the Union on the defensive by day's end. On the enemy's side of the battlefield, the offensive movement planned by Rosecrans was now out of the question. His supreme object now was to save his army from annihilation by holding his line. He will have Gen. George Henry Thomas largely to thank for preventing a Confederate victory.³  By nighttime, Rosecrans's troops may be battered, but they are not defeated. To Bragg's disappointment, over night the enemy prepared to resume fighting tomorrow.

Battle of Murfreesboro, end of first day, December 31, 1863
Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jespersen

¹ The Battle of Murfreesboro is also known as the Battle of Stones River.

² My great grandfather's 32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment (Lowrey's), which was a part of Wood's Brigade, was a few miles away from the battle on the Stones River. The brigade's assignment for the past few weeks had been to guard bridges south of Nashville to prevent Rosecrans from resupplying his troops stationed in that city. Most recently the brigade had been assisting Gen. Wharton’s cavalry in retarding the advance of Gen. McCook's right wing of the Federal army. The 32nd Regiment did not rejoin its division at Stones River until after the worst of the fighting was over.

³ This won't be the only time that Thomas, a former slave owner from Virginia, will come to the Union army's rescue. He will later be known by the well-deserved nickname, "Rock of Chickamauga," for reasons that will become apparent in the next year. Thomas will remain a thorn in the side of the Army of Tennessee for the duration of the war in the West.

Sources: Confederate Military History: Tennessee, James D. Porter; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne:  Confederate General, Howell and Elizabeth Purdue; Stones River—Bloody Winter in Tennessee, James Lee McDonough; Civil War Times, Daniel Wait Howe; The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Official Records, Vol. 20, Part 2

The eve of battle

On this date, Tuesday, in 1862, Union Gen. McCook, leaving one brigade (Baldwin's) at Triune to cover his extreme right, moved forward with the remainder of his command on a country road known as the Bole Jack road toward Murfreesboro, reaching camp west of the Stones River late in the evening. From the Confederate army's movements he concluded that Gen. Braxton Bragg intended to give battle at Murfreesboro, and so arranged his troops accordingly.

Late that tonight while McCook was preparing his troops, Bragg called his generals, Hardee and Polk, to his headquarters to receive new orders. He had decided to seize the initiative and attack Rosecrans. Hardee was given overall tactical command during the attack, which was to begin at dawn on the 31st. Gen. Cleburne received his orders late in the afternoon of the 30th. Cleburne broke camp and began to march southward through a cold, pelting rain. He deployed his men in line of battle as best he could in the dark, after receiving guidance to his assigned position from Hardee’s staff officers. In the wet and pitch-darkness his men began removing their shoes, and many their trousers, in order to wade through the bone-chilling water of Stones River.

Like Bragg, Rosecrans's plan called for the battle to begin early on the morning of the 31st, by an advance of the army's left, wheeling to the right. Rosecrans expected to advance on Murfreesboro and get into the rear of Bragg's army, while Bragg intended to double back the Federal right across the Nashville Turnpike and cut off Rosecrans's retreat to Nashville.

Both armies await what will become the Battle of Murfreesboro, or the Battle of Stones River, which will begin tomorrow, December 31, 1862, and last through January 2, 1863.

Eve of the Battle of Murfreesboro, Dec. 30, 1863
Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jespersen

Sources: The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Civil War Times, 1861-1865, Daniel Wait Howe

Objective: Murfreesboro & Nashville

Murfreesboro, Tennessee, 1863, from Harper's Weekly

The town of Murfreesboro was situated on the railroad to Chattanooga, 30 miles southeast of Nashville, in the midst of the great plain stretching from the base of the Cumberland Mountains toward the Cumberland River. It was surrounded by a gently undulating and highly cultivated country.

Leading in every direction from the town were numerous turnpikes. Stones River—named after an early settler—was formed there where the middle and south branches of the stream united, and flowed north between low steep banks of limestone, difficult to cross, and emptied into the Cumberland River. At the time of the battle the stream was so low that it could be crossed by infantry everywhere. The Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad crossed the river about 200 yards above the turnpike bridge. 500 yards beyond, the railroad intersected the Nashville Turnpike at a sharp angle, then ran 800 yards between the pike and the river, at which point the stream turns abruptly to the east and passes to the north.

At the time, open fields surrounded the town, fringed with dense cedar-brakes. These brakes provided excellent cover for approaching infantry, but were almost impervious to artillery due to their density. They would prove to be a significant obstacle in the coming conflict.

The center of Bragg's army was at Murfreesboro, under Gen. Leonidas Polk. The right was at Readyville, under Gen. John McCown. The left at Triune and Eaglesville, was under Gen. William Hardee. Three brigades of Hardee's Corps from John C. Breckenridge's Division were at Murfreesboro. Gen. Patrick Cleburne's Division (in which Great Grandfather Oakes served, although presently stationed at Triune) and Adams's Brigade of Breckinridge's Division were under the immediate command of Hardee, near Eaglesville, about 20 miles west of Murfreesboro. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry brigade was also attached to Hardee's Corps at this time.

Battle of Murfreesboro, Dec. 30, 1863
Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jespersen

Bragg placed Breckinridge's Division on his extreme right, across Stones River, to protect that flank and cover the town. Adams's brigade rested on the Lebanon road, about a mile and a half from town. Breckinridge's Division formed the first line, facing north, and was posted in the edge of the forest. To the left of Adams the line was broken by a field about 300 yards in width, which apparently was left unoccupied; but it and the fields in front were covered by the 20th Tennessee and Wright's Battery. Preston's Brigade rested with its right in the woods, and extended along the edge with its left toward the river. On the left of Preston, Palmer's Brigade was formed, and on his left Hanson's completed that portion of the line, including a hill about 600 yards in front of his center. Jackson's Brigade was placed on the east side of the Lebanon road, in front and the right of Adams's men. On the other side of the river the right of Withers's Division rested at the bank, near the intersection of the turnpike with the railroad, in front and to the right of Hanson's. It extended south across the Wilkinson Pike to the Triune-Franklin road. In the rear of Withers's Division, Cheatham's was posted as a supporting force. McCown's Division, also under Hardee's commanded, was placed on Wither's left. Cleburne's Division was placed on the left, 500 yards to rear as support for that division.

Bragg's main line of battle was in the edge of the woods, with open ground to the front. There he formed his troops in two lines, the first line protected by entrenchments, and his second line formed some six hundred yards to the rear. He awaited Rosecrans's attack on Tuesday the 30th, and not receiving it, made his arrangements for an advance and attack in force on the next morning. His troops remained in line of battle, ready to move with the early Wednesday dawn.

Bragg's plan of battle was, as Providence would have it, a mirror image of  Rosecrans's plan. Hardee on the left, with McCown's and Cleburne's Divisions, was to advance against the Federal right, which being forced back, Polk and Withers's and Cheatham's Divisions were then to push the center. The movement would be made by a steady wheel to the right, with Polk's command as a pivot. Bragg planned to drive the enemy's right and center back against its left on Stones River and across the Nashville Turnpike, seizing this line of communication with Nashville, thereby cutting the Federal army from its base of operations and supplies. In so doing, hoped Bragg, he would secure the objective of his campaign, Nashville.

Bragg's plan was equally as bold as that of his opponent, whose command was slightly smaller in strength to the Rebel force. The success of either army depended largely on the degree of success in the opening moves of the battle. Rosecrans's orders were for his troops to breakfast before daylight and attack at 7:00 AM. Bragg issued orders to attack at daylight.

The 2 armies are now arrayed only some 500 yards apart, facing each other and eager for the fight to finally begin.

Sources: The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Civil War Times, Daniel Wait Howe; Stone's River: The Turning-Point of the Civil War, Wilson J. Vance

Battle line on the Stones River

On Sunday, the 28th, there was no general movement of troops. Union Gen. McCook sent a brigade on reconnaissance to learn that Hardee's Corps had retired to Murfreesboro.

Confederate Gen. Patrick Cleburne reported:

On the morning of the 28th, General Hardee ordered me to form a line of battle north of Murfreesboro and east of Stone’s River, my line to face north, its left resting on the river, its right near the Lebanon turnpike, 800 or 1,000 yards in rear of a line already occupied by Breckenridge’s division. 

Wood’s brigade, falling back slowly before General McCook’s army corps, impeding his advance wherever opportunities offered, finally reached Stone’s River and rejoined the division on the morning of the 29th.

Although a part of Wood's Brigade, my great grandfather's regiment, Lowrey's 32nd Mississippi Infantry, apparently was not brought back from advanced guard duty at Triune with the rest of the brigade on the 29th. Therefore, this unit will miss the first day of battle.

Sources: The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Official Records, Vol. 20, Part 1

Getting into position

As a great battle neared, the 4th Brigade, under command of Brig. Gen. S.A.M. Wood, was stationed at Triune, 4 miles north of College Grove, on the Nashville and Shelbyville turnpike. My great grandfather's 32nd Mississippi (Lowrey's Regiment), which was a part of Wood's force, was a few miles away at Wartrace, guarding bridges and supporting Gen. Wharton's cavalry force, as Rosecrans's troops advanced toward it on its way to Murfreesboro. According to a regimental soldier's recollection, Lowrey's 32nd Regiment was ordered to Murfreesboro on this Saturday in 1862, although according to Lowrey, the regiment did not participate in the first day of the battle.

Here are the events as they unfolded for Wood's force in the battle.

General Cleburne reports:

Early on the morning of the 27th, I received orders from [Gen. Hardee] to take up position on the turnpike about 1 mile north of my encampment. While making this disposition, I received orders from General Hardee to move the three brigades with me to Murfreesborough by the routes previously decided upon; also that Wood’s brigade would remain at Triune and assist General Wharton’s cavalry to retard the farther advance of the enemy.

For proceedings of Wood’s brigade under this order, I respectfully refer you to the report of Brig. Gen. S.A.M. Wood, herewith transmitted.

Gen. Wood's report continues the narrative of events prior to the battle: 

On the morning of the 28th, General Hardee ordered me to form line of battle north of Murfreesborough and east of Stone’s River, my line to face north, its left resting on the river, its right near the Lebanon turnpike, 800 or 1,000 yards in rear of a line already occupied by Breckinridge’s division.

Wood’s brigade, falling back slowly before General McCook’s army corps, impending his advance wherever the opportunity offered, finally reached Stone’s River and rejoined the division on the morning of the 29th.

I lay, inactive, in line of battle until the evening of the 30th, when I received orders to move from the right to the left of the army. Arriving in the fording place on Stone’s River, I received orders to remain there until General Hardee had examined the ground and determined my position. It was dark when staff officers were sent to order me forward and show me my position. The passage of the river in the night was attended with many difficulties, and my whole division was not in position before midnight. As well as I could judge from the camp-fires, my line was a prolongation to the left of Cheatham’s line, and was 400 or 500 yards in rear of McCown’s division.”

Gen. Hardee then ordered that the brigades should be ready to attack the enemy at 4:30 AM. The narrative continues with his report:

Before daylight I formed line, placing Polk’s brigade, with Calvert’s battery, on the right; Johnson’s brigade, with Darden’s battery, in the center, and Liddell’s brigade, with the Warren Light Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Shannon, on the left. Wood’s brigade I placed a short distance in rear of Polk’s. This brigade had no battery in the fight, its battery (Semple’s, of six Napoleon guns) having been detached the day before to support Hanson’s brigade, of Breckinridge’s division, and having remained with that brigade on the right of the army.

Sources: Corinth Information Database; Official Records, Vol. 20, Part 1; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly

Rosecrans advances against Bragg

On today's date, a Friday, in 1862, Union Gen. William Rosecrans began advancing upon Gen. Braxton Bragg with an army of 54,000. Bragg had 37,000, having been weakened some days earlier when President Davis ordered Stevenson’s division to the defense of Vicksburg. While Confederate cavalry and infantry outposts impeded the Federal advance, Bragg, well aware now that Rosecrans's entire army was moving in force against him, formed his army for battle near Stones River. This stream, for which the battle is named, flowing to the north, was about 1-1/2 miles west of Murfreesboro.

The Federal army occupies Nashville, and after 4 months of preparation, Rosecrans is ready to begin  his advance against Bragg's Army of Tennessee. He will spend 4 days advancing a distance of 20 miles, his movements being delayed by the cavalry of Generals Wheeler and Wharton, who will whittle away at his troops, killing and wounding large numbers. Rosecrans's plan is for Maj. Gen. McCook to advance with 3 divisions by Triune against Hardee's Corps, Maj. Gen George H. Thomas to advance on his right with 2 divisions, and Maj. Gen. Crittenden with 3 divisions to move directly on Murfreesboro. Rosecrans is fully informed as to the Confederate position.

The Confederate center is at Murfreesboro under Gen. Leonidas Polk. The right wing of the army is at Readyville under Maj. Gen. John McCown, and the left is at Triune and Eagleville under Gen. William Hardee.

The right of Hardee's Corps (except for the 32nd Mississippi Regiment) and left were spared attack by McCook's force due to morning fog. At noon, when the fog had lifted, McCook pushed rapidly forward, with Sheridan behind him. As they approached Triune, they discovered that the Confederates had burnt the bridge across Wilson's Creek, leaving behind a battery and cavalry support to hold the crossing. Forcing the battery unit to withdraw, the Federals repaired the bridge, crossed over, and encamped on the other side. Meanwhile, Hardee had withdrawn his force and concentrated concentrated at Murfreesboro ready to receive Rosecrans's the attack.

Today it is cold and overcast with rain threatening. Wood’s Brigade is 4 miles north at Triune, serving as a divisional advance guard. Wood will report to Gen. Cleburne that a Federal column is advancing from the north. There are other reports that Rosecrans's army was on the move. The next morning Hardee will order Cleburne to move at once to Murfreesboro.

Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was in Wood's Brigade at this time. However, his regiment, the 32nd Mississippi, was on special duty guarding the bridges in front of Rosecrans's advance.

Sources: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell and Elizabeth Purdue; Confederate Military History: Tennessee, Vol. 10, James D. Porter; The Army of the Cumberland, Henry Martyn Cist; Stone's River: The Turning-Point of the Civil War, Wilson J. Vance; Official Records, Vol. 20, Part 1

The battle draws nearer for the 32nd Miss. Regiment

According to historian Dunbar Rowland, on this date in 1862,

Colonel Lowrey, with his regiment and the Third Confederate, was guarding the line of railroad between Normandy Station and Fosterville, and General Breckenridge was ordered to send a regiment, not less than 250 strong, to relieve him. But it does not appear that the Thirty-second had an opportunity to take part in the battle.

Apparently, at this time the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, in which Great Grandfather Oakes was serving, was operating as a unit separate from the rest of Wood's Brigade, which did have an active part in the battle. According the the Official Records,* Gen. Hardee ordered Lowrey and the 32nd Regiment to be relieved on today's date, of guarding the railroad between Normandy Station and Fosterville, south of Murfreesboro, and to rejoin the brigade near Hardee’s headquarters near Eagleville. In his post-war autobiography, Gen. Lowrey explains that his regiment was detached from Wood's Brigade for this special duty, and was not relieved in time to engage in the first day's fight on the 31st. However, according to Lowrey, the regiment did take an active part in the skirmishing that followed, and Lowrey was put in charge of leading Wood's brigade in the army's retreat from Murfreesboro.

* The organization of the army, which is undated in the Official Records, Vol. 20, Part 1, but is placed in the Stones River Campaign section (note at bottom of page indicates that it was “compiled from the reports”), Wood’s Brigade (Fourth) is listed without Lowrey's 32nd Mississippi Regiment. This is likely because the regiment was counted as being on detached duty at the time, guarding bridges and supporting Gen. Wharton's cavalry.

Sources: Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898, Dunbar Rowland; Official Records, Vol. 20, Part 2; Lowrey's Autobiography; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly

Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne

Maj. Gen. Patrick Ronayne Cleburne

President Davis visited the Army of Tennessee stationed at Murfreesboro on this date in 1862. Among other urgent business, he commissioned the rising star, Patrick R. Cleburne, as Major General (recommended by Gens. Bragg, Buckner, and Hardee) and appointed him to fill the vacancy left by Simon B. Buckner’s transfer to another department. In so doing, Davis promoted Cleburne over 2 other senior brigadier generals, S.A.M. Wood and Bushrod Johnson.  

Maj. Gen. Cleburne’s division now consisted of his old brigade (now commanded by the newly appointed Brig. Gen. Lucius E. Polk), Liddell’s Arkansas brigade, Bushrod Johnson’s Tennessee brigade, and S.A.M. Wood’s Alabama and Mississippi Brigade (including my great grandfather's 32nd Mississippi Regiment). Attached to this division are Calvert’s Arkansas Battery, Swett’s Mississippi battery, Darden’s Mississippi Battery, and Henry Semple’s Alabama Battery.

Born in County Cork, Ireland, Patrick Cleburne was an orphan by the age of 15. He served in a Welsh regiment in the British Army, rising to the rank of corporal. After 3 years of army life, he emigrated to the United States, eventually settling in Helena, Arkansas, where he became a pharmacist. By 1860, he was a naturalized citizen, a practicing lawyer, and a well respected citizen of his adopted town.

At the beginning of the War for Southern Independence, Cleburne sided with the Southern nation that had adopted him as one of its own. Enlisting as a 33-year old private in the local militia, he quickly rose in rank. In January 1861, he led his company in the seizure of the U.S. Arsenal in Little Rock. When Arkansas left the Union, his militia unit became part of the 1st Arkansas Infantry, later designated the 15th Arkansas, of which he was elected Colonel. He was promoted to brigadier general in March 1862.

Wiley Sword, agreeing with fellow Civil War historian Thomas Connelly's assessment, wrote that while Cleburne had a mild-mannered personalty, he was also "a ferocious fighter, perhaps the best infantry general of the Confederacy's Western armies." Sword also observes that "Cleburne was an overachiever with a driving zeal for success." He also was possessed with "uncompromising integrity... Unwilling to compromise principle or personal dignity for political expediency."

Cleburne monument at Ringgold Gap

Cleburne's first serious engagement in the Army of Mississippi, was at the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862. Later that August, in the Battle of Richmond, Kentucky, he was wounded in the face. After receiving his current promotion to Major General at Murfreesboro, Cleburne will lead his division, among which was my great grandfathers 32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment, in the upcoming Battle of Murfreesboro (Stones River). He will go on to achieve military success, even while the army looses some of its engagements. His strategic ability and the admiration of his men earned him the nickname "Stonewall of the West." Sadly, Gen. Cleburne will not survive the war. He will fall at the Battle of Franklin in 1864.

Interestingly, in early 1864, Cleburne wrote a proposal to emancipate slaves and enlist them in the Confederate Army. This proposal was not well received by the rest of the army's leadership and was largely ignored. Toward the end of the war, though, even the Confederate Congress came around to the idea. However, by then it was too late to make any difference in the war's outcome.

Sources: Official Records, Vol 20, Part 2; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell and Elizabeth Purdue; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Mountains Touched With Fire, Wile Sword